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J. G. Taylor 589
The authors examine the tax penalty provisions of the Tax Reform Act of
1976 and the Export Administration Act Amendments of 1977 in relation to
U.S. persons who "participate in or cooperate with" international boycotts
or bribery. The article discusses the various types of international boycotts
and the penalty, computational, and reporting requirements imposed on
participants as clarified by the Treasury Guidelines and Revenue Proce-
dures. The authors conclude with a discussion of the novelty, complexity,
and potential impact of the legislation.
TAKING SIDES: AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. LEGISLATIVE
RESPONSE TO THE ARAB BOYCOTT
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Ralph B. Lake 613
The current legislative scheme in opposition to the Arab boycott is generally
directed against the Arab League countries' secondary and tertiary, indirect
forms of boycott. Provisions in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, recent public
disclosure requirements, and sections of the Export Administration Act of
1977 all aim to discourage U.S. exporters from taking boycott-related action.
The dilemma facing the U.S. taxpayer in attempting to comply with these
legislative enactments is presented, along with a discussion of the advisabil-
ity of even having such legislation.
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976: TREATMENT OF FOREIGN
INCOME AND EFFECTS ON U.S. DEVELOPMENT OF
FOREIGN MINERAL RESOURCES
.................................. William J. Nolan, Jr. 635
The author discusses the significance of the extensive legislative changes
embodied in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, as applied to U.S. mineral resource
corporations. Many of the changes will result in a substantial increase of
overseas business costs through repeal or modification of tax credits and the
elimination of certain positive incentives. The loss of special treatment for
capital invested in less developed countries and treatment of certain foreign
capital gains as domestic will tend to discourage the development of foreign
mineral resources and lessen the ability to compete in foreign markets.
IMPACT OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976 ON AMERICANS
WORKING ABROAD
........................................... Marianne Burge 647
Section 911 of the Internal Revenue Code dealing with the exclusion granted
to U.S. citizens for income earned abroad was substantially altered by the
1976 Tax Reform Act. Burge discusses the changes and analyzes their addi-
tional cost impact on taxpayers and employers' tax reimbursement plans.
She cites particularly the virtual repeal of the exclusion, the increased costs
to employers of doing business abroad, and the problem of making a tax-
saving election under section 911 for employees who may be transferred to
other locations.
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976: CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
...................................... Richard W Graham 661
The author focuses on those sections of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 which
affect subpart F and section 1248 of the Internal Revenue Code. The 1976
Act has changed some of the rules for taxing a U.S. shareholder's foreign
earnings from a Controlled Foreign Corporation. He discusses the changes
in the treatment of year-to-year income from shipping, insurance, earnings
invested in U.S. property, and Export Trade Corporations. He also explains
how the 1976 Act has broadened the powers, described in section 1248, for
taxing the disposition of a U.S. citizen's foreign corporation stock as if it were
a repatriation of tax deferred earnings.
FOREIGN SITUS TRUSTS
...... ......... ......................... M ark S. C aldw ell
Peter B. Nagel 675
Recent amendments to the Internal Revenue Code culminate longstanding
efforts by Congress to curtail the use of foreign situs trusts. Provisions of the
Tax Reform Act of 1976 deem income earned by a foreign trust with U.S.
beneficiaries to be earned currently by those persons who transfer property
to such a trust. Changes in the throwback rules, including the possible impo-
sition of a nondeductible interest charge, now render foreign trusts consider-
ably less attractive than their domestic counterparts. Finally, the section
1491 excise tax provisions now impose a maximum capital gains rate tax on
the transfer of appreciated property to a foreign trust.
STUDENT COMMENTS
PARENS PATRIAE ANTITRUST SUITS BY FOREIGN NATIONS
......................................... R ussell L . C ap lan 705
The author explores the parens patriae suit as an alternative means by which
foreign governments can bring antitrust actions on behalf of their citizens in
United States courts. The historical development of parens patriae is traced
to show the legitimacy of this type of action. The author proceeds to discuss
the problems encountered by a foreign government in its efforts to sue Ameri-
can antibiotic manufacturers. The conclusion is that a parens patriae suit is
the most effective means by which a foreign country can prosecute its action.
THE PITFALLS OF ACT OF STATE ANALYSIS IN THE ANTITRUST
CONTEXT: A CRITIQUE OF HUNT V. MOBIL OIL
......................................... D avid K . Pansius 749
International antitrust issues pose perhaps the greatest challenge to the act
of state doctrine. On the one hand, courts are understandably reluctant to
prosecute complaints alleging restraints on U.S. foreign commerce when the
acts of foreign sovereigns are integral elements of the cause of action. On the
other hand, a blanket refusal to investigate antitrust claims when sovereign
acts are involved will unduly preclude review of illegal private conspiracies.
Much of this tension arises from the mistaken notion that courts cannot
investigate private acts motivating a sovereign's anticompetitive determina-
tions - the act of state doctrine grants no such immunity from review.
Rather, the act of state doctrine only protects private anticompetitive acts
compelled by the sovereign himself. Consequently, barring an exception such
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Between October 1973 and January 1974 the Mideast oil
cartel raised the posted price of petroleum from $3.00 to $11.65
per barrel. In February 1975, Eli Black, President of United
Brands, jumped to his death in mid-Manhattan. These seem-
ingly unrelated events coalesced in the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
Among other provisions, the Act contains severe tax penalties
for U.S. persons who agree to participate in or cooperate with
an international boycott or who bribe foreign officials.
The Arab boycott of Israel can be traced to 1946 when the
Arab League declared that products of Palestinian Jews were
to be considered undesirable in Arab countries. The year 1948
witnessed the creation of Israel, a de jure state of war between
Israel and the Arab nations, and the Arab boycott office. All
three still exist today. Until recently, however, the boycott was
honored in the breach. With the quadrupling of oil prices and
the multiplication of Arab economic power, boycott practices
which previously existed mainly on paper were suddenly imple-
mented and became a matter of concern-to Arab nations, to
Israel, and to the United States Congress.'
* The authors are associated with the United States Treasury Department. The
views expressed are opinions of the authors and should not be construed to reflect the
views of the Treasury Department.
** Deputy Assistant Secretary for Trade and Investment Policy, United States
Deparment of the Treasury. Formerly Director, International Tax Staff, United States
Department of the Treasury.
*** Economist, Office of International Monetary Affairs, United States Depart-
ment of the Treasury. Formerly Economist, International Tax Staff, United States
Department of the Treasury.
1. Wall St. J., June 25, 1976, at 1, col. 6.
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Overseas bribery, like the boycott, has existed for many
years. Boycott concern was triggered not by sensational new
bribes, but by front page revelation of longstanding practices.'
Two bills were introduced during the second session of the
94th Congress to deal with these problems. On March 15, 1976,
Senator Ribicoff and others introduced S. 3138, specifically
aimed at the boycott of Israel. On March 16, 1976, Senator
Harry Byrd, Jr., introduced S. 3150, aimed at the bribery of
foreign officials. Over the serious misgivings of Senator Long,
the two bills were melded together and included in the Senate
Finance Committee version of H.R. 10612. 3 They passed the
Senate essentially unchanged on August 6, 1976. Since the
House had enacted no legislation on bribes or boycotts, the
issues went to conference.
Bills were also introduced by Senators Stevenson and Wil-
liams,4 and by Representatives Koch and Bingham5 to address
the boycott problem through tighter language in the Export
Administration Act.' Among other features, these bills would
have mandated disclosure of corporate boycott reports by the
Commerce Department; prohibited U.S. firms from furnishing
information pursuant to a boycott request on the firm's direc-
tors, officers, shareholders, or employees; and prohibited a re-
fusal to deal with other U.S. firms pursuant to a boycott. There
were differences between the House and Senate versions relat-
ing both to the scope of prohibited actions and to private dam-
2. The Wall Street Journal pursued the corporate expose with great diligence. See,
e.g., the following articles: Dec. 4, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (Lockheed Aircraft Corp.); Nov.
26, 1975, at 2, col. 1 (Castle & Cooke, Inc.); Nov. 17, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (Lockheed
Aircraft Corp.); Nov. 14, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (Exxon Corp.); Oct. 20, 1975, at 20, col. 2
(American Home Prod. Corp.); July 14, 1975, at 10, col. 2 (Exxon Corp.); July 14, 1975,
at 1, col. 6 (Del Monte Corp.); June 12, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (auditing procedures); May
21, 1975, at 5, col. 1 (Gulf Oil Corp.); May 21, 1975, at 4, col. 2 (United Brands Co.,
Del Monte Corp., Castle & Cooke, Inc.); May 19, 1975, at 2, col. 3 (Gulf Oil Corp.);
May 19, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (U.S. oil company subsidiaries in Italy); May 15, 1975, at 3,
col. 2 (Ashland Oil, Inc.); May 9, 1975, at 1, col. 1 (general practice of U.S. firms
abroad); April 9, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (United Brands Co.).
3. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 557-68 (1976).
4. S. 3084, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
5. H.R. 5377, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
6. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-13 (1970). Relevant committee reports include: Housa
COMM. ON INT'L RFATIONS, EXTENDING THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION Acr, H.R. REP. No.
1469, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); SUaCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., THE ARAB
BoYcoTr AND AMERICAN BuSINESS (1976).
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age suits. While a Senate filibuster prevented the naming of
conferees in the 94th Congress, a conference bill on amend-
ments to the Export Administration Act was reported in the
first session of the 95th Congress with the blessings of the Busi-
ness Roundtable (170 officers of major U.S. corporations) and
the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith and was enacted
on June 22, 1977. 7
B. Administration Response
The Ford Administration, and particularly the Treasury,
applauded the goals of the 94th Congress but was unenthusias-
tic about new legislation in the context either of the Tax Re-
form Act or the Export Administration Act Amendments. Sec-
retary Simon testified that existing U.S. anti-boycott measures
were effective, that the Arab countries were liberalizing their
boycott rules, and that new legislation might lead to confronta-
tion and more rigid attitudes in the Middle East.8
The Treasury specifically objected to the tax measures
contained in the Ribicoff Bill (S. 3138) for the following rea-
sons:
9
(1) Existing legislation under the Export Adminis-
tration Act, the Sherman Antitrust Act, and the Civil
Rights Acts is more suited to dealing with the prob-
lem.
(2) New legislation might have an adverse impact
on trade and investment in the Arab League coun-
tries.
(3) The possibility is at best small that the Arab
countries would change their policies as a result of
new legislation.
(4) Tax legislation would impose a severe adminis-
trative burden on the Internal Revenue Service.
In connection with the Ford Administration's concerns, it
may be noted that U.S. exports to Arab nations in 1976 were
7. Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235,
amending 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-13 (1970).
8. Statement by Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon before the House
Committee on International Relations, in Department of the Treasury News Release
No. 915 (June 9, 1976).
9. Letter from Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon to Senate and House
conferees on the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Aug. 26, 1976; Letter from Assistant Secre-
tary for Tax Policy Charles Walker to Senator Russell Long, May 25, 1976.
1977
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approximately $8 billion. Total merchandise exports from all
countries to the Arab nations amounted to some $60 billion for
1976; thus, U.S. sales already accounted for only 13 percent of
the total. In addition, U.S. firms were carrying out Middle East
construction contracts of approximately $20 billion, about one-
half of the total outstanding contracts in the area. New con-
tracts are vulnerable to competition from European and Japa-
nese firms. On the other side of the ledger, U.S. imports of oil
from the Arab countries amount to approximately 17 million
barrels per day, some 30 percent of U.S. consumption. Mean-
while, the United States is a major depository for liquid funds
from Arab countries, and the total of these funds could reach
$40 billion by 1980.
At one time the Ford Administration might have had a
choice between the Export Administration Act approach and
the Tax Reform Act approach. However, instead of negotiating
with Congress for one approach or the other, the Administra-
tion opposed both measures. 10 As a result, the 94th Congress
enacted the tax legislation and the 95th Congress enacted the
trade legislation."
C. Tax Reform Act of 1976
The Conference Committee on the Tax Reform Act did not
significantly alter the Senate language concerning foreign
bribes. 12 Basically, the law provides that DISC (Domestic In-
ternational Sales Corporation) and deferral benefits are lost
with respect to the amount of any bribe paid directly or indi-
rectly to an official, employee, or agent of any government.
Further, the earnings and profits of a foreign corporation pay-
ing a bribe are not reduced by the amount of the bribe.
After prolonged and sometimes heated discussion, how-
ever, the Conference Committee did significantly narrow and
10. President Gerald Ford endorsed the anti-boycott provisions of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 in his second televised debate with James Carter on Oct. 6, 1976, rather to
the surprise of Administration officials who had been working the halls of Congress in
an opposite direction.
11. The complexity and magnitude of the anti-boycott legislation, with its accom-
panying regulations and reporting requirements, sired the Anti-Boycott Bulletin pub-
lished by the MIDDLE EAsT MONTHLY, which deals exclusively with boycott issues.
12. The Senate bill treated the loss of tax benefits in terms of "bribe-produced
income" while the Conference Committee related the loss of benefits to the amount of
the bribe. Further, the Conference Committee deleted the Senate provision which
would have denied foreign tax credit for bribe-produced income.
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revise the Senate boycott provisions,' 3 The Senate bill would
have denied to all income from all boycotting countries the tax
benefits associated with DISC, deferral, the foreign tax credit,
and the exclusion from gross income of foreign earned income,
even if a taxpayer had agreed to participate in the boycott at
the behest of only one country. The Conference measure
dropped the foreign earned income exclusion and set forth a
proportional test for determining the extent to which tax bene-
fits are denied. The Conference approach denies the various tax
benefits in accordance with the ratio of sales, purchases, and
payroll arising from boycott activity to total foreign sales, pur-
chases, and payroll of the taxpayer. Alternatively, the taxpayer
may specifically identify foreign taxes and income attributable
to boycott activities and lose only the U.S. tax benefits asso-
ciated with the specifically attributable taxes and income.
The Conference bill also carved out exceptions in the defi-
nition of an "international boycott" so as not to proscribe the
kinds of trade restrictions which the United States itself has
imposed from time to time, most recently on trade with Cuba
and North Vietnam.
The definition of "participation in or cooperation with" an
international boycott is fundamental to the anti-boycott provi-
sions. The basic elements of the definition were first introduced
by Senator Ribicoff. The Ribicoff bill" focused on the require-
ment that a taxpayer agree to participate in or cooperate with
an international boycott before being subjected to tax sanc-
tions. The requirement of an agreement remained intact
throughout deliberation on the bill.'5 The seemingly simple
concept of an agreement raises thorny factual issues which
must ultimately be resolved on a case-by-case basis. These
issues have long bedeviled the Sherman Antitrust Act and
promise to be equally difficult in the boycott legislation.
Participation in or cooperation with an international boy-
cott is also defined in terms of refraining from doing business
with boycotted individuals, companies, or countries. Under the
13. H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). See also STAFF OF HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., SUMMARY OF THE CONFERENCE AGREE-
MENT ON THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1976 (Comm. Print 1976).
14. S. 3138, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
15. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 999(b)(3).
1977
594 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
law, the benefits of DISC, deferral, and the foreign tax credit
are lost to the extent a taxpayer agrees to refrain from doing
business in furtherance of an international boycott.
D. Export Administration Act Amendments of 1977
While the boycott provisions of the Tax Reform Act"6 and
the Export Administration Act 7 are parallel in many respects,
there are significant differences, both as to triggering events
and as to penalties. The tax provisions are triggered by a boy-
cott agreement; boycott actions are relevant only insofar as
they establish the existence of an agreement. By contrast, the
trade provisions are triggered by boycott actions; and
agreement is relevant only if it is carried out. Violation of the
anti-boycott provisions of the Export Administration Act re-
sults in criminal penalties while violation of the anti-boycott
provisions of the Tax Reform Act results in the denial of tax
benefits. This difference of course implies a higher standard of
proof (including proof of culpable intent) to obtain a conviction
under the Export Administration Act than to impose penalties
under the Tax Reform Act. s Middle level corporate executives
are the likely target of the Export Administration Act, whereas
corporate profits are the target of the Tax Reform Act. The
Treasury Department is responsible for administering the Tax
Reform Act, and the Commerce Department is responsible for
administering the Export Administration Act. All these differ-
ences necessarily mean that the standards of behavior required
under the Tax Reform Act are not precisely the same as the
standards of behavior required under the Export Administra-
tion Act - much to the frustration of affected corporations and
individuals.
Prohibited actions under the Export Administration
Amendments are similar (but not identical) to those in the Tax
Reform Act. The actions prohibited by the Export Administra-
tion Act include: 9
16. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1525, amending INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954.
17. Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235,
amending 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-13 (1970).
18. On the other hand, it may be inherently more difficult to prove the existence
of an agreement than to prove the occurrence of particular actions.
19. Export Administration Amendments of 1977, § 201(a).
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(1) Refusing, or requiring any other person to re-
fuse, to do business with or in a boycotted country,
with any business concern organized under the laws
of the boycotted country, or with any national or resi-
dent of the boycotted country.
(2) Refusing, or requiring any other person to re-
fuse, to employ or otherwise discriminate against any
U.S. person on the basis of the race, religion, sex, or
national origin of that person or of any owner, officer,
director, or employee of that person.
(3) Furnishing information on the race, religion,
sex, or national origin of any U.S. person or any
owner, officer, director, or employee of a U.S. person.
(4) Furnishing information about whether any per-
son has, has had, or proposes to have any business
relationship with or in a boycotted country, with any
business concern organized under the laws of the boy-
cotted country, or with any national or resident of the
boycotted country.
(5) Furnishing information about whether any per-
son is a member of, has made contributions to, or is
otherwise associated with or involved in the activities
of a charitable or fraternal organization which sup-
ports the boycotted country.
(6) Paying, honoring, confirming, or otherwise im-
plementing a letter of credit containing a prohibited
boycott condition.
The Export Administration Amendments provide certain
exceptions to the prohibited actions. These exceptions include:
(1) Compliance with requirements prohibiting the
importation into the boycotting country of goods or
services from the boycotted country or any business
organized under the laws of the boycotted country, or
compliance with requirements prohibiting the ship-
ment of goods to the boycotting country on a carrier
of the boycotted country, or by a route other than
that prescribed by the boycotting country or its na-
tionals.
(2) Compliance with certification requirements
contained in import and shipping documents as to
the country of origin, name and nationality of the
1977
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carrier, route of shipment, and the name of the sup-
plier.
(3) Compliance with the unilateral and specific
selection of goods and services by a boycotting coun-
try or its nationals.
(4) Compliance with export requirements relating
to shipments or transshipments of exports.
(5) Compliance with immigration or passport re-
quirements.
(6) Compliance by a U.S. person resident in a for-
eign country with local law with respect to that per-
son's activities in that country.
The Commerce Department is now preparing rules and
regulations to implement the Export Administration Amend-
ments; preliminary rules must be issued within 90 days from
enactment of the statute (June 22, 1977), and final rules must
be issued within another 120 days.
E. Treasury Guidelines and Other Procedures
As the first step in administering the anti-boycott provi-
sions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,2o the Secretary of the
Treasury issued Guidelines consisting of questions and answers
relating to the denial of certain tax benefits for participation
in or cooperation with an international boycott. The first set of
Guidelines was issued on November 4, 1976; 21 a supplementary
set of Guidelines was issued on December 30, 1976.22 In re-
sponse to congressional criticism, primarily from Senator Ribi-
coff, the Carter Administration reviewed the Guidelines issued
by the Ford Administration. This review culminated in a pub-
lic hearing on April 29, 1977, chaired by Laurence N. Wood-
worth, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy. Six witnesses made
statements and numerous written comments were submitted.
The Carter Administration published a revised set of
Guidelines on August 12, 1977, superseding all previous Guide-
lines.13 These Guidelines will be followed by the Internal Reve-
20. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1525, amending INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954.
21. Tax Reform Act of 1976 Guidelines; International Boycotts, 1976 INT. REv.
BULL. No. 49, at 17 [hereinafter cited as Guidelines I].
22. Tax Reform Act of 1976 Guidelines; International Boycotts, 1977 INT. REv.
BULL. No. 5, at 19 [hereinafter cited as Guidelines II].
23. Tax Reform Act of 1976 Guidelines; International Boycotts, 42 Fed. Reg. 41504
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nue Service and the Treasury in requiring the filing of taxpayer
reports, in making determinations as to participation in or co-
operation with an international boycott, and in computing the
loss of tax benefits associated with boycott participation or
cooperation.2'
As an additional step in administering the boycott provi-
sion, the Internal Revenue Service issued a revenue procedure
setting forth the procedures for the issuance of
"determinations" under section 999(d) relating to whether a
particular activity constitutes participation in or cooperation
with an international boycott. 2s Further steps in the adminis-
tration of the law involved the publication of temporary and
proposed regulations relating to the computation of the inter-
national boycott factor,2" and the issuance of Form 5713,
"International Boycott Report," 7 to be used by taxpayers in
fulfilling their reporting obligations under the anti-boycott pro-
visions of the Tax Reform Act.
I. INTERNATIONAL BoycoTts
A. Exception for Certain Boycotts
Not all boycotts are bad. The United States itself has a
history of boycotting foreign nations. Thus, the boycott legisla-
tion contains certain safe havens which permit the same kinds
of trading restrictions which the United States itself has im-
posed in recent years under the authority of the Trading with
(1977). These August 12, 1977 Guidelines contain new questions and answers and
revisions to the first and second sets of Guidelines. To a large extent, however, the
August 12, 1977 Guidelines carry over the questions and answers contained in the
earlier Guidelines. Changes in the Guidelines which result in an increase in the report-
ing burden or tax liability of a person will be effective after August 22, 1977. The same
numbering system is used in all three sets.
24. The Guidelines interpret the statute and the Conference Committee Report.
While the Conference Committee was open to the public, and a transcript was main-
tained, little weight was given to that transcript in preparing the Guidelines. After the
statute itself, Conference Committee Reports are regarded as the best indication of
legislative intent. The appropriate weight to be given to a Conference Committee
transcript is not well defined, particularly when the transcript amplifies or conflicts
with the statute or the Committee Report. Public disclosure of Conference transcripts
is a new occurrence , untested by the judicial system. However, for purposes of inter-
preting a statute, the courts may give substantial weight to contemporaneous state-
ments made by a bill's sponsors.
25. 1977 INT. REv. BULL. No. 14, at 16 (proposed 26 C.F.R. 7.999-1).
26. Temporary Treas. Reg. § 7.999-1; Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.999-1 (1977).
27. Department of the Treasury, Form 5713, International Boycott Report, May
1977
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the Enemy Act" and the Export Administration Act. 29 Thus, a
taxpayer may agree to meet requirements imposed by a foreign
country with respect to any manner of international boycott if
United States law, regulations, or Executive Orders sanction
that boycott.30 In addition, whether or not there is a U.S. sanc-
tion, a taxpayer may agree to comply with either a prohibition
on the importation of goods produced in whole or in part in any
country which is the object of an international boycott3 l or a
prohibition on the exportation of products to a country which
is the object of an international boycott.2
B. Boycott Agreements
Tax benefits are denied under the boycott provision of the
Tax Reform Act of 1976 only when a taxpayer agrees to partici-
pate in or cooperate with an international boycott.3 3 The tax-
payer is punished not for deeds, but for an agreement to com-
mit those deeds. The mere fact that a taxpayer refrains from
hiring Jews, refrains from doing business with a U.S. company
on the Arab blacklist, or refrains from shipping on blacklisted
vessels is not sufficient, in and of itself, to result in a loss of
tax benefits. The taxpayer must agree to refrain from these
activities to be affected by the anti-boycott sanctions con-
tained in the Tax Reform Act of 1976. The Treasury Guidelines
focus on the requirement of an explicit or implicit agreement,
either written or oral.34 When there is no explicit agreement,
the existence of an agreement will not be inferred solely from
the fact that a taxpayer has refrained from activities enumer-
ated in the legislation.35 However, a clear pattern of refraining
from certain business arrangements could indicate that the
taxpayer has agreed to refrain from these activities, and the
burden would be on the taxpayer to establish otherwise. Thus,
28. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1-44 (1970).
29. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-13 (1970).
30. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 999(b)(4)(A).
31. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 999(b)(4)(B).
32. INT. RED. CODE OF 1954, § 999(b)(4)(C).
33. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 999(b)(3).
34. Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 23 (Qs. H-1, H-2).
35. Id. at 24 (Q. H-5). The answer to H-5 was tightened in the revised Guidelines
of August 12, 1977, to provide that a course of conduct "is evidence that, together with
other evidence, could be sufficient to establish an implied agreement." A similar in
terrorem caution was added to the prefatory material in the August 12, 1977 Guide-
lines in item (g).
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an overall course of conduct could support an inference that an
agreement exists, even though component parts of that con-
duct, by themselves, would not.
3
1
The Guidelines draw a fine distinction between the per-
mitted act of recognizing the application of a country's laws,
regulations, requirements, or administrative practices37 and the
prohibited act of complying with those laws, regulations, re-
quirements, or administrative practices. 38 The distinction is
further developed in the hypothetical case of a subsidiary or a
branch that acknowledges in its incorporation or registration
documents that local laws apply to it, including local laws that
implement a boycott. In this hypothetical case the acknowl-
edgement of local law does not constitute a boycott agreement
or support the inference that an agreement exists.
3
1
Letters of credit and accompanying certificates are an-
other area where fine lines have been drawn. Under the Novem-
ber 4, 1976 Guidelines, a bank could honor (with no loss of tax
benefits) a letter of credit which required the bank to confirm
that the payee has furnished a certificate of boycott compli-
ance.4 0 The reasoning of the November 4, 1976 Guidelines was
that the bank had not itself refrained from the activities listed
in section 999(b)(3). The August 12, 1977 Guidelines reverse
this result. The bank, by confirming the certificate of boycott
compliance contained in a letter of credit is now deemed to
have entered into an agreement. By confirming the letter of
credit with a boycott certificate, the bank is deemed to agree
36. Question H-14, for example, deals with the hypothetical example wherein a
construction contract with a boycotting country specifies a list of permissible subcon-
tractors. Such a contract indicates a pattern of exclusion; however, the general con-
tractor might be able to show that the nonlisted companies were excluded for reasons
unrelated to the boycott. Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 25.
37. Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 24 (Q. H-3). The August 12, 1977 Guidelines
include a provision in the answer to H-3, noting that a course of conduct of complying
with local boycott laws, regulations, requirements, or administrative practices may be
evidence of an agreement to comply.
38. Id. at 24 (Q. H-4). This distinction parallels the language of the Conference
Committee Report, S. REP. No. 94-1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 466-67 (1976). By
contrast, the Export Administration Amendments provide an exception to the prohib-
ited actions whereby a person can comply with or agree to comply with local law.
39. Id. at 24 (Q. H-7).
40. Id. at 27 (Q. H-29). The Export Administration Amendments specifically
prohibit the paying, honoring, confirming, or otherwise implementing a letter of credit
containing boycott conditions.
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to refrain from doing business with any other U.S. persons that
might not have been able to furnish a boycott certificate. The
bank will therefore lose its tax benefits. Further, if a bank
promises a boycotting country that it will not honor letters of
credit relating to the export of goods to a boycotted country,
the bank will lose its tax benefits." Such a promise would
amount to an agreement to refrain from doing business with
the government, companies, or nationals of a boycotted coun-
try.
These distinctions and others mirror the fine lines that
resulted from the legislative compromises underlying the stat-
ute and the Conference Report. Congress apparently intended
to put some pressure on taxpayers with operations in boycot-
ting countries without abruptly terminating all U.S. business
activity in the Middle East.
C. Related Boycotts and Related Persons
If a taxpayer has agreed to an international boycott spon-
sored by one country, he is presumed to have agreed to cooper-
ate with all countries associated in carrying out that interna-
tional boycott. 2 Further, if a person controls or is controlled
by"3 a corporation which participates in or cooperates with an
international boycott, the controlling person or the controlled
person is presumed to participate or cooperate in the boycott."
The taint of participation and cooperation thus spreads from
one boycotting country to another and from one related corpo-
ration to another. If a person agrees to the Libyan boycott of
Israel, that person will be presumed to have agreed to the Syr-
ian boycott of Israel. Further, if corporation A agrees to boycott
Israel, related corporation B will be presumed to have agreed
to boycott Israel. However, these presumptions of taint may be
rebutted if a taxpayer can clearly demonstrate that he or a
41. Id. at 27 (Q. H-30).
42. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 999(b)(1).
43. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 304(c) sets forth the relevant test of control as the
ownership (actual or constructive) of stock possessing at least 50 percent of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote, or at least 50 percent of
the total value of shares of all classes of stock.
44. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 999(e)(1)-(2). Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 20 (Q.
D-1). Note that under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a)(1), a person includes an
individual, trust, estate, partnership, association, company, or corporation.
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member of a controlled group of corporations 5 of which he is a
member, has separate and identifiable operations that were not
involved with the international boycott."6
D. Types of Boycott Activity
An agreement to participate in or cooperate with an inter-
national boycott may involve any one of five different types of
activity.
The first type of boycott activity involves refraining from
doing business with or in a boycotted country.47 A borderline
example illustrates this case: A company owns a number of
ships, some of which call at the boycotted country and some
of which call at the boycotting country. The ships calling at the
boycotting country refrain from calling at the boycotted coun-
try. This is not considered participation in or cooperation with
an international boycott; the shipping company has not re-
frained from doing business with the boycotted country since
some of its ships call there.45
The second type of boycott activity involves refraining
from doing business with any U.S. person engaged in trade in
a boycotted country.49 Again borderline examples illustrate the
rule. A U.S. company may agree to refrain from doing business
with a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company without refraining
from doing business with a U.S. person.50 Further, a bank
which provides financial advice may agree to refrain from rec-
ommending for investment by a boycotting country the shares
of U.S. companies engaged in trade in a boycotted country.5
The rationale is that the bank itself has not agreed to refrain
from doing business with the issuing companies. Finally, a
bank managing an investment portfolio for a boycotting coun-
try may agree to refrain from purchasing stocks or bonds issued
by certain companies on the theory that the concept of "doing
45. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 993(a)(3) defines a controlled group of corporations.
46. Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 20 (Qs. D-1, D-2).
47. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 999(b)(3)(A)(i).
48. Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 28 (Q. 1-2).
49. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 999(b)(3)(A)(ii). Section 7701(a)(30) defines the
term "United States person" to mean: (A) a citizen or resident of the United States;
(B) a domestic partnership; (C) a domestic corporation; and (D) any estate or trust
(other than a foreign estate or foreign trust).
50. Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 28 (Q. J-4).
51. Id. at 29 (Q. J-5).
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business" with a company does not encompass the purchase of
that company's securities.5
The third type of boycott activity involves an agreement
to refrain from doing business with any company whose owner-
ship or management is made up, in whole or in part, of individ-
uals of a particular nationality, race, or religion. 53 The fourth
type involves an agreement to refrain from employing individu-
als of a particular nationality, race, or religion.54 These last two
anti-boycott provisions parallel the concerns of civil rights leg-
islation. The basic standards established under that legislation
are carried over in the Guidelines.
55
The fifth and final type of boycott activity relates to condi-
tional sales agreements which require refraining from shipping
or insuring products on a carrier owned, leased, or operated by
a person who does not participate in or cooperate with an inter-
national boycott. 5 The Guidelines provide a war risk safe
haven rule: compliance with precautionary shipping measures
designed to avoid the risk of confiscation of goods does not
involve participation in or cooperation with an international
boycott .
E. Tax Penalties
Current U.S. taxation of the undistributed earnings of a
foreign subsidiary, current taxation of DISC earnings, and de-
nial of the foreign tax credit all occur if a firm agrees to an
international boycott. The actual amount of benefits denied
depends not only on the extent of participation and cooperation
but also on the method used to compute the reduction of tax
benefits.
There are two alternative methods for computing the loss
of tax benefits. A taxpayer can use the international boycott
factor, or the taxpayer can determine the taxes and income
specifically attributable to his boycott activities. 5
52. Id. at 29 (Q. J-6).
53. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 999(b)(3)(A)(iii).
54. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 999(b)(3)(A)(iv).
55. Guidelines 1, supra note 21, at 29-30 (Qs. K,L).
56. NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 999(b)(3)(B). Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 30-32
(Part M).
57. Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 31 (Q. M-5). A similar exception is contained
in the Export Administration Amendments.
58. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 999(c).
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The international boycott factor is intended for use pri-
marily by taxpayers who cannot clearly separate boycott and
nonboycott operations. The international boycott factor is a
fraction. The numerator of the fraction reflects the operations
of a person (or of the controlled group) which are related to all
countries associated in carrying out a particular international
boycott, and is determined by computing the sum of purchases
made from, sales made to or from, and payroll paid or accrued
for services performed in these countries minus the amount of
purchases, sales, and payroll clearly demonstrated to be attrib-
utable to nonboycott operations in these countries." The de-
nominator of the fraction reflects the worldwide' operations of
that person (or controlled group) and is determined by comput-
ing the sum of purchases made from, sales made to or from, and
payroll paid or accrued for services performed in any country
other than the United States."
Using the international boycott factor method, the reduc-
tion in tax benefits resulting from a boycott agreement is deter-
mined by multiplying the otherwise allowable tax benefit by
the taxpayer's boycott factor. In the case of DISC and deferral,
the law operates by requiring a deemed distribution to the
shareholders of the DISC"2 or to the shareholders of the con-
trolled foreign corporation 3 of the amount found by multiply-
ing undistributed earnings by the factor. Alternatively, under
the specifically attributable method, the amount deemed dis-
tributed to the shareholders of the DISC or to the shareholders
of the controlled foreign corporation is the amount of income
specifically attributable to the boycott operations."
The method of computing the reduction of the foreign tax
credit differs depending on whether the international boycott
factor or the specifically attributable taxes and income method
is used. If the international boycott factor is used, the reduc-
59. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 999(c)(1). See Temporary Treas. Reg. § 7.999-1;
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.999-1 (1977).
60. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 999(c)(3) defines "worldwide" to mean operations
in or related to countries other than the United States.
61. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 999(c)(1). See Temporary Treas. Reg. § 7.999-1;
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.999-1 (1977).
)2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 995(b)(1).
63. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 952(a).
64. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 999(c)(2).
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tion in the foreign tax credit is determined by computing the
foreign tax credit that would be allowed under section 901 for
the taxable year as if section 908 (relating to boycotts) had not
been enacted. The section 901 credit encompasses both the
direct credit and the indirect credits allowable under sections
902 and 960. The section 901 credit is subject to the limitations
of both section 904 (the overall limitation) and section 907 (the
special limitation for oil related income). If a person partici-
pates in a boycott, the credit allowed under section 901 is re-
duced by the product resulting from multiplying the section
901 credit (before the application of the section 908 reduction)
by the international boycott factor.65
If a taxpayer can clearly demonstrate the amount of for-
eign taxes and earnings which are allocable to his boycott oper-
ations, the international boycott factor need not be used. "6 In-
stead, the reduction in foreign tax credit is computed by reduc-
ing the amount of foreign taxes paid, before determination of
the section 904 limitation, by all foreign taxes not specifically
attributable to nonboycott operations.
67
The taxes which are not creditable either by application
of the international boycott factor method or the specifically
attributable method are deductible, despite the general rule
that a taxpayer cannot in a given taxable year claim both a
credit and a deduction for foreign taxes.68 Moreover, no recom-
putation of the section 901 credit nor the section 904 limitation
is made after the deduction.
69
F. Reporting Requirements
The boycott legislation imposes extensive reporting re-
quirements both on individual taxpayers and on the Secretary
of the Treasury. In some instances, the reporting burden may
turn out to be the heaviest penalty of the statute. Generally,
any U.S. person or any other person that either claims the
benefit of the foreign tax credit under section 901 or owns stock
in a DISC is required to report to the Internal Revenue Service
65. Guidelines 1I, supra note 22, at 22 (Q. N-1).
66. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 999 (c)(2); Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 20 (Q. D-
3).
67. Guidelines IT, supra note 22, at 22 (Q. N-i).
68. INT. REV. CODE OF i954, §§ 78, 275(a)(4), 908(b).
69. Guidelines II, supra note 22, at 22 (Q. N-2).
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if it has operations in or related to a boycotting country. 7" Boy-
cotting countries, for purposes of reporting under the statute,
include two groups of countries: first, those countries on the
Secretary's list of countries 7' which currently require or may
require participation in or cooperation with an international
boycott and, second, any other country in which the person
required to file the report (or a member of a controlled group
which includes that person) has operations and which the per-
son knows or has reason to know requires any person to partici-
pate in or cooperate with an international boycott. 2
A person required to file an international boycott report
under section 999(a) will fulfill this requirement by filing a new
Internal Revenue Service Form 5713, "International Boycott
Report Form. '73 These reports will be submitted as part of the
taxpayer's income tax return and, therefore, will be accorded
the same degree of confidential treatment under section 6103
as any other information contained in an income tax return.
74
70. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 999(a); Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 17 (Q. A-I),
provides that a person is required to report if he: (a) has operations; or (b) is a member
of a controlled group, a member of which has operations; or (c) is a U.S. shareholder
(within the meaning of section 951(b)) of a foreign corporation that has operations, but
only if a U.S. shareholder owns (within the meaning of section 958(a)) stock of that
foreign corporation; or (d) is a partner of a partnership that has operations; or (e) is
treated under section 671 as the owner of a trust that has operations in or related to a
boycotting country. Additionally, if a person controls a corporation (within the mean-
ing of section 304(c)) and either that person or the controlled corporation is required
to report under section 999(e), that person must report whether the controlled corpora-
tion participated in or cooperated with the boycott. The controlled corporation must
make the same report with respect to the operations and reports of the person control-
ling it. See text accompanying notes 75-77 infra for exceptions to the reporting require-
ments.
71. International boycotting countries included on the list published by the Secre-
tary, effective Nov. 4, 1976, are as follows: Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Lybia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
Arab Republic, and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen. 1976 INT. REV. BULL.
No. 49, at 17. As of August 1977, the list has not been changed.
72. Boycotts sanctioned by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 999(b)(4)(A), (B), or (C)
are not included for purposes of this reporting requirement.
73. Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 18 (Q. A-5). The "International Boycott Re-
port" will cover the same time period as the taxpayer's income tax return. In the case
of a controlled group, all persons required to report under section 999(a) shall report
for all members of the controlled group for the taxable years of those members which
end with or within the taxable year of the controlled group's common parent that ends
with or within the taxable year of the reporting person. In the event no common parent
exists, the members of the controlled group shall elect the tax year of one of the
members to serve as the common tax year for the group. Id. at 19 (Q. A-13).
74. Id. at 18 (Q. A-6). In this respect, the reports differ from those submitted to
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Reports by taxpayers are waived in certain circumstances.
Taxpayers are not required to report participation in or cooper-
ation with an international boycott if the operations are sanc-
tioned by section 999(b) (4), unless the boycotting country is on
the list maintained by the Secretary of the Treasury.75 A foreign
corporation need not file an international boycott report for any
taxable year unless it claims the benefits of the foreign tax
credit under section 901 or owns stock in a DISC.76 Other waiv-
ers are provided for special situations.77
The Secretary of the Treasury must report to Congress
annually on the administration of the boycott provision.7 The
Secretary is also required to maintain and publish quarterly a
current list of countries which require or may require participa-
tion in or cooperation with an international boycott.79
G. Determinations
In dealing with boycotts through the tax statutes, Con-
gress realized that the burden of proof would be shifted to the
taxpayer once the Internal Revenue Service asserted a defi-
ciency. This was no doubt a welcome feature to Senator Ribi-
coff and other sponsors. By the same token, it was obviously a
matter of concern to affected companies. In the tug and haul
of legislative compromise, a novel procedure was devised. Upon
request from a taxpayer, the Secretary of the Treasury is di-
rected to issue a "determination" with respect to whether a
particular operation of a taxpayer, or a member of a controlled
group which includes that taxpayer, constitutes participation
in or cooperation with an international boycott.80 Assuming the
the Commerce Department under the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. app. §
2406(c)). In October 1976, President Ford announced that reports submitted under the
Export Administration Act would be made public.
75. Id. at 17 (Q. A-i).
76. Id. at 19 (Q. A-12).
77. See, e.g., Guidelines II, supra note 22, at 20 (Qs. A-14, A-17, A-18).
78. Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 1067(a) requires the Secretary to set forth: (1) the
number of international boycott reports filed; (2) the number of such reports indicating
international boycott participation or cooperation; and (3) a detailed description of the
administration of the boycott provision. The Conference Report invites the Secretary
to provide additional information which would be helpful in evaluating the legislation.
79. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 999(a)(3).
80. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 999(d). While section 999(d) provides that a tax-
payer may request a determination in advance of an operation, or before the end of a
taxable year in which the operation is carried out, the Secretary may decline to issue
such a determination before the close of the taxable year.
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taxpayer's factual statements are correct, the determination
will be binding for purposes of a subsequent audit. The deter-
mination and background documents relating to it will be sub-
ject to public inspection, unlike an international boycott re-
port."
H. Effective Date Provisions
Generally, the reporting requirements and tax sanctions
apply to boycott agreements made after November 3, 1976, and
to agreements made on or before November 3, 1976, that con-
tinue after that date.82 However, operations on or before Nov-
ember 3, 1976, are also reportable if the taxpayer enters into a
boycott agreement after the November 4, 1976, effective date.8'
The Act contains a binding contract rule. Under this rule,
the tax sanctions and reporting requirements apply only to
boycott agreements made on or after September 2, 1976, and
to agreements made before that date that continue after De-
cember 31, 1977.4
A person may renounce existing agreements to participate
in or cooperate with an international boycott by communicat-
ing his renunciation to the government or person with whom
the agreement was made.85 A renunciation will avoid the tax
penalties otherwise imposed.
III. FOREIGN BRIBES
The foreign bribe provision of the Tax Reform Act of 1976
denies the benefits of deferral and DISC for the amount of any
illegal payment made by or on behalf of a controlled foreign
corporation or a DISC to an official, employee, or agent of any
government.8 The benefits of deferral are denied by treating
the amount of illegal bribes, kickbacks, or other payments as
subpart F income, as defined in section 952(a). The benefits of
81. Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 23 (Q. G-1). A determination will be treated
as a "written determination" within the meaning of section 6110(b)(1) and will be
subject to the rules set forth in section 6110(c).
82. Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 1066(a)(1); Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 21 (Q.
E-1).
83. Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 20 (Q. E-1).
84. Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 1066(a)(2); Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 20 (Q.
E-). Special transition rules are set forth in Questions E-2 and E-3. Id. at 21.
85. Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 22 (Q. E-5).
86. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 952(a)(4), 995(b)(1)(iii). These provisions apply to
all illegal payments made after Nov. 3, 1976. Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 1066(b).
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DISC are denied by treating the amount of illegal bribes, kick-
backs, or other payments as distributions under section
995(b)(1). Further, the amount of illegal payments may not be
used to reduce the earnings and profits (or to enlarge the defi-
cit) of a foreign corporation.
8 7
Illegal bribes, kickbacks, or other payments are defined
under section 162(c). Such payments have long been disal-
lowed as a deduction for U.S. tax purposes when they are con-
sidered unlawful under the laws of the United States or under
any generally enforced law of a state.88 Penalties are now pro-
vided for illegal payments made by foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
corporations. The significance of the foreign bribe legislation is
that foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations can no longer
disregard the U.S. tax consequences of illegal payments.
In an attempt to uncover corporate tax evasion and avoid-
ance schemes involving illegal bribes, kickbacks, and other
payments, the Internal Revenue Service initiated an audit pro-
gram characterized by the so-called "eleven questions" even
before the Tax Reform Act was passed. Under this program,
the auditors ask corporate officials, key employees, and ac-
countants eleven specific questions concerning illegal bribes,
kickbacks, and other payments.8 9 Responses to the questions
must be provided in writing and under oath. U.S. companies
and their foreign subsidiaries that are engaged in bribing for-
eign officials now run the dual risk of additional U.S. tax liabil-
ity and, if the illegal payments are concealed, U.S. perjury
charges.
IV. SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS
A. Novelty and Complexity
The international boycott and foreign bribe provisions,
like the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Trading with the
Enemy Act, are extraterritorial in scope. Like the accumulated
earnings tax and the personal holding company tax, the boy-
cott and bribe provisions are used for penalty purposes. Fi-
nally, like the gambling and narcotics excise taxes, the purpose
of the boycott and bribe penalty is not to collect revenue but
87. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 964(a).
88. Tress. Reg. §§ 1.162-18(a)(4), 1.162-18(b)(2) (1977).
89. Department of the Treasury News Release, No. IR-1590 (Apr. 7, 1976).
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to further public policy. What is novel in the new legislation is
not the individual elements but the combination of extraterri-
toriality, penalty, and non-revenue considerations in a single
provision. Whether this combination is viewed as a wise or
improvident use of the tax law depends very much on the ob-
server.
The sanctions imposed by these provisions may bear little
relation to the offense. Moreover, benefits denied under the
boycott provision depend as much on the method of computa-
tion as on the extent of participation and cooperation. For ex-
ample, the taxpayer can select either the international boycott
factor method or the specifically attributable method for com-
puting tax benefits denied. Depending on the extent of their
excess foreign tax credits, some taxpayers who use the specifi-
cally attributable method will incur no tax penalty, even
though they cooperate fully with an international boycott. The
same can be true of a U.S. corporation that bribes foreign offi-
cials using the earnings of a highly-taxed foreign subsidiary.
This paper testifies to the complexity of the tax statute.
When a compromise law is drafted under severe time pressures,
the result, as in this case, can easily resemble a lawyers' and
accountants' relief act. The Export Administration Act
Amendments, enacted after longer Congressional deliberation,
seem simpler and clearer - in defining prohibited actions, in
defining exceptions, and in stipulating penalties. Unfortun-
ately, pride of legislative authorship may well preclude harmo-
nization or merger of the Tax Reform Act provisions with the
Export Administration Act Amendments.
B. Tax Treaty Implications
The Model U.S. Income Tax Convention, as well as some
existing U.S. income tax treaties, guarantee a foreign tax credit
for taxes paid to a treaty partner. Denial of the foreign tax
credit for participation in or cooperation with an international
boycott might be construed as a violation of these treaty provi-
sions. The Treasury Department believes that the boycott leg-
islation does not conflict with existing treaties, but merely
amends U.S. law in a manner generally contemplated by the
treaty language. For example, Article 23 (Relief from Double
Taxation) of the U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, which
has language similar to that of many existing treaties, provides
that "subject to the limitations of the law of the United States
1977
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(as it may be amended from time to time without changing the
general principle thereof), the United States shall allow . . . a
credit against. . . United States tax."10 This language specifi-
cally permits changes in U.S. law, provided the general princi-
ples of the foreign tax credit are not disturbed. The boycott
provision is just such a change.
C. Revenue Impact
At best, it is difficult to estimate the revenue consequences
of changes in taxation of international transactions. The reve-
nue impact of a given change may depend on complex interac-
tions between U.S. and foreign tax laws, the foreign tax credit
limitation, and methods of organizing business enterprises. All
these difficulties were inherent in the bribe and boycott provi-
sions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. To make matters worse,
it is customary to express revenue estimates as point estimates
rather than range estimates. Point estimates convey a false
sense of precision, particularly for the boycott and bribe provi-
sions.
With these caveats, the revenue estimates of the Senate
and Conference Committee versions of the boycott and bribe
provisions were estimated as follows, by fiscal year:
Millions of Dollars'
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
House - - - - -
Senate 142 100 100 100 100
Conference 32 70 70 70
- nil
*Less than $5 million
90. Department of the Treasury, Model Convention Between the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of. . . for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and
Capital, May 18, 1976.
91. Source: COMMITTEE ON CONFERENCE, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, H.R. REP. No.
94-1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 634 (1976).
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At least 90 percent of the revenue projected in the Conference
bill is related to boycotts and no more that 10 percent to bribes.
A rough breakdown might be (in millions of dollars):
Boycott provision: denial of -




Total, Conference bill, 1979 70
Revenue estimates are intended to show the impact of a change
in law prior to any economic response. But a major reason for
passing the bribe and boycott legislation was to persuade com-
panies to change their business methods. There are a number
of ways affected companies and countries can adjust their prac-
tices:
(1) They can stop participating in boycotts and
they can stop paying bribes.
(2) Foreign countries can stop requiring participa-
tion in boycotts, and they can impose effective local
sanctions against bribery.
(3) Companies with boycott and bribe activities can
attempt to isolate those activities from other lines of
business to avoid contamination.
While it is by no means certain that this legislation will
have a significant revenue effect, the provisions are important.
Senior officials of any prudent company will think twice before
becoming mired in audit controversy and possible litigation
over boycotts and bribes.
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Despite the repeated assertions of U.S. businessmen that
the Arab boycott of Israel has had little effect on their relations
with either Israel or the Arab countries,' and despite the asser-
tions of the State Department that diplomacy is adequate to
deal with the boycott,2 the disposition of Congress to oppose the
boycott has crescendoed from the piano of disclosure to the
sforzando of prohibitive legislation. This article will attempt to
set forth the current legislative scheme, emphasizing the Tax
Reform Act of 1976,1 and to comment upon the legislation as
policy.
The Arab boycott of Israel itself is a loosely administered
intergovernmental organization under the auspices of the Arab
League which maintains a permanent administrative body, the
Central Boycott Office, in Damascus.' The boycott has three
aspects. In its primary, or direct form, it simply involves the
refusal of the participating countries to maintain any economic
relations with Israel. This primary boycott is not an uncommon
act of belligerency under a declared state of war.5 As such, it is
* The authors wish to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Dalma Grandjean
and John Spinnato, both students at the University of Dayton School of Law.
** Member of the Ohio Bar; Foreign Tax Administrator, NCR Corporation;
B.B.A., J.D., Cincinnati.
***Member of the Ohio Bar; Attorney, NCR Corporation; Adjunct Assistant Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law; B.A., Wake Forest, M.B.A., J.D.,
Denver.
1. A general discussion of the "gaps, shortcomings, and failures" of the boycott is
found in D. CHILL, THE ARAB BoYcoTr OF ISRAEL 29-39 (1976).
2. See, e.g., remarks of Sidney Sober, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State News Release, May 14,
1976.
3. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 504, 90 Stat. 1563, codified at
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 44A.
4. D. CHILL, supra note 1, at 3.
5. See generally Muir, The Boycott in International Law, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON.
187 (1974); Bouve, The National Boycott as an International Delinquency, 28 AM. J.
INT'L L. 19 (1934); Lauterpacht, Boycott in International Relations, 14 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L
L. 125 (1933).
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a clear excercise of sovereignty outside the legislative jurisdic-
tion of the United States. Although the thrust of the legislation
is at times excessive, the legislative scheme is therefore gener-
ally directed against the secondary and tertiary, indirect forms
of the Arab boycott. These respectively involve the refusal of
the boycotting countries to deal with foreign firms which en-
gage in certain economic relations with Israel, and the refusal
to deal with foreign firms which transact certain business with
boycotted, or "blacklisted" firms. For example, a non-
boycotted firm may be denied an import license by Arab coun-
tries for a product which contains components manufactured
by a blacklisted company or is manufactured under a license
from a blacklisted company. The erratic application of the in-
direct forms of the Arab boycott is well known,' but in general
the rationale behind it is the same' as that of the direct boy-
cott-to damage, or at least not to assist, the economy of Israel.
Opposition to the boycott has taken several forms: require-
ment of public disclosures by U.S. business of certain manifes-
tations of boycott; the denial of tax benefits in the event of
"cooperation with or participation in an international boy-
cott"; 7 and legislation which would prohibit most boycott-
related activity.8 Additionally, the antitrust laws have been
used to challenge compliance with certain aspects of the Arab
boycott of Israel.' There has also been a flurry of state activity
related to the Arab boycott. 0 Although all the U.S. legislation
applies to all foreign boycotts, it is clear that it has been pro-
mulgated as a response to the Arab boycott.
6. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, April 19, 1976, at 56.
7. Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 1061, codified at INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 908.
8. Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235
(June 22, 1977) (codified in 50 U.S.C. app.).
9. Antitrust as an Antidote to the Arab Boycott: United States v. Bechtel Corp.,
8 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 799 (1976); Note, The Antitrust Implications of the Arab
Boycott, 74 MICH. L. REv. 795 (1976).
10. See, e.g., ch. 1247, 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., 5426 (1976) (to be codified as CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16721, 16721.5, effective Jan. 1, 1977); ch. 613, 1976 Md. Laws,
1702 (1976) (to be codified as MD. COMMERCIAL LAW CODE ANN. §§ 11-2A01 - 11-2A15);
New York, Bill 56411, N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW, § 296.13 (McKinney 1976); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1129.11 (Page).





The Export Administration Act of 1969" states that the
policy of the United States is "to oppose restrictive trade prac-
tices or boycotts fostered or imposed by foreign countries
against other countries friendly to the United States."' 2 The
Act further directs the Department of Commerce to issue regu-
lations which require the reporting of "requests for the furnish-
ing of information or the signing of agreements"' 3 dealing with
restrictive trade practices or boycotts.
Prior to the stir created by the 1976 Presidential debates,
the regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act' required the
reporting to the Office of Export Administration either individ-
ually or in a quarterly accumulation any "request for an action,
including the furnishing of information or the signing of agree-
ments, that has the effect of furthering or supporting a restric-
tive trade practice or boycott .... '"' The regulations distin-
guish between types of requests. They expressly prohibit com-
pliance with any request which "discriminates . .. against
U.S. citizens or firms on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin."' 6 Thus a firm may not, for example, certify
that it has no Jewish members on its board of directors. Firms
receiving requests which do not involve discrimination against
U.S. citizens are "encouraged and requested to refuse to take
any action"' 7 which may support or further a boycott, but are
not prohibited from doing so.
The vast majority of boycott-related requests are either
requests for a certification that goods shipped under a given bill
of lading or letter of credit contain no components manufac-
tured in Israel or requests for a certification that such goods
will not be delivered on a vessel which calls on an Israeli port.
Such certifications are reportable, and in the past constituted
"compliance" with the boycott. The reporting form used the
word "comply" for such actions, and firms furnishing such cer-
11. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413.
12. Id. § 2402(5)(A).
13. Id. § 2403(b)(1).
14. 15 C.F.R. § 369 (1976).
15. Id. § 369.4.
16. Id. § 369.2.
17. Id. § 369.3.
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tifications received highly unfavorable publicity, even though
such certifications usually involved the mere stating of a fact
totally unrelated to the boycott. The Department of Commerce
corrected this problem to a certain extent by a proposed revi-
sion to the regulations which would remove the word "comply"
from the reporting form, and which would eliminate the report-
ing requirement altogether for "positive U.S. certificate of ori-
gin.' 8 Thus, a manufacturer would only be required to report
a request if it certified that goods were not of Israeli origin.
Prior to President Ford's announcement on October 6,
1976, that the names of U.S. companies which had complied
with the Arab boycott would be made public, reports received
by the Office of Export Administration were held in confidence.
After the announcement, however, the regulations were
amended to permit public inspection of the reports received
after October 7, 1976, and eliminated the quarterly multiple
transaction report."9 Currently, a request must be reported
within 15 calendar days after the end of the month in which
the request was received. Some confusion has developed as to
when a request is "received." It should be noted that in the
common situation in which one of the aforementioned certifica-
tions of origin is placed on shipping documents as a result of
direction in a published export manual, the request is deemed
to have been "received" when the certificate is placed on the
document, not when the goods covered by the document are
shipped. The public disclosure is, of course, an effort to dis-
courage any action by U.S. exporters from taking boycott-
related action.
11. FEDERAL TAX LEGISLATION
A. The Tax Law
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 (TRA) contains several provi-
sions which are intended to discourage U.S. taxpayers from
cooperating with international boycotts not sanctioned by the
.United States.20 The TRA does not make cooperation with an
international boycott illegal per se.
18. 41 Fed. Reg. 51,424 (1976).
19. 41 Fed. Reg. 44,861 (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 46,443 (1976).
20. Tax Reform Act of 1976, §§ 1061-64, codified at INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§
908, 952(a), as amended 995(b)(1), as amended § 999 (1976).
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The Act requires all taxpayers to report to the Treasury all
boycotts known to the taxpayer if the taxpayer has operations
in the country enforcing a boycott.2' The report must also con-
tain a list of all boycotts in which the taxpayer was requested
to participate and the extent to which the taxpayer complied
with the request.2 Finally, the Treasury is to publish and
maintain a list of known boycott countries." The taxpayer
must report all operations in the listed countries. 2 The report
will be on Form 571321 and must be filed annually with the
taxpayer's U.S. income tax return .
2
If a taxpayer has agreed to comply with certain defined
boycott activities, the taxpayer will lose tax benefits otherwise
available to it. The benefits lost include the deferral of DISC
income,2 the deferral of earned income of controlled foreign
corporations, 2 and the loss of foreign tax credits. 29 The reduc-
tion of tax benefits will be reflected on Form 1120-DISC, Form
3646, and Form 1118 respectively. 30
It should be noted that while the taxpayer will suffer the
loss of the foreign tax credit with respect to boycott activities,
the foreign tax may be taken as a deduction on the U.S. tax
return2' It will, however, be a foreign source deduction which
will reduce foreign source income.
32
In computing the lost tax benefits, the taxpayer must seg-
regate boycott-tainted income and foreign taxes from all other
foreign income and foreign taxes. The taxpayer may use the
actual amounts involved if it can demonstrate that the
boycott-tainted operation is clearly separate and apart from all
other operations and the amounts are clearly attributable to
the boycott operation." If a clear separation is not possible, the
21. INT. R.EV. CODE OF 1954, § 999(a)(1)(B) [hereinafter cited as I.R.C.].
22. Id. § 999(a)(2).
23. Id. § 999(a)(3).
24. Id. § 999(a)(1).
25. 41 Fed. Reg. 49,923, Question A-5 (1976).
26. Id. Question A-7.
27. I.R.C. § 995(b)(1)(F); see also id. § 999(c)(2).
28. Id. § 952(a)(3).
29. Id. § 908(a).
30. Supra note 25, Question A-5.
31. I.R.C. § 908(b).
32. Id. § 862(b).
33. Id. § 999(c)(2).
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taxpayer must compute its lost tax benefits by means of a ratio,
the International Boycott Factor.34 This fraction consists of a
numerator which includes all of the boycott-related operations
of the taxpayer. The denominator of the fraction is the world-
wide operations of the taxpayer. Worldwide operations is de-
fined to exclude operations in the United States.
3 5
If a taxpayer participates in or cooperates with a boycott
during a tax year, the law establishes a presumption that all
operations related to that boycott are in fact boycott tainted.
3'
To the extent the taxpayer can demonstrate that it has clearly
separate and identifiable operations which are not boycott
tainted within the presumed boycott activities, no tax benefits
will be lost as to the separate operation. 37 The burden of proof,
however, is clearly on the taxpayer.
The Tax Reform Act distinguishes between primary and
secondary boycotts.3 8 A taxpayer must report all known boy-
cotts unless they are sanctioned by the United States. How-
ever, a taxpayer will only lose tax benefits if it agrees to engage
in a secondary boycott which is not sanctioned by the United
States.
The TRA recognizes that a boycott may be enforced both
by the government of a country and by businesses or nationals
of that country.
39
The term "taxpayer" used throughout the foregoing is
technically either a U.S. person or a U.S. shareholder of a
foreign corporation. A U.S. person must report known boycotts
and compute lost tax benefits for itself and its 50 percent or
greater ownership controlled group.' A U.S. person who owns
10 percent or more of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock entitled to vote of a foreign corporation is a U.S.
34. Id. § 999(c)(1).
35. Id. § 999(c)(3).
36. Id. § 999(b)(1).
37. Id. § 999(b)(2).
38. Primary Boycotts are defined at I.R.C. § 999(b)(4)(B), (C). Secondary Boy-
cotts are defined at I.R.C. § 999(b)(3).
39. I.R.C. § 999(b)(3). Throughout this article, the term "boycott country" in-
cludes the country, government, businesses, and nationals of the boycott country.
40. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30).
41. Id. 38 999(a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(2), (c)(1), which refer to the 50 percent control
group test in I.R.C. § 993(a)(3). See I.R.C. § 999(e) for attribution rules between a
person and a corporation vis-a-vis boycotts.
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shareholder of a foreign corporation."2 Finally, if any person
other than a U.S. person claims the benefit of the foreign tax
credit or owns stock in a DISC, it will be subject to the boycott
provisions of the Tax Reform Act.43
B. Necessity of Further Clarification
The international boycott provisions of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 had no predecessor in prior tax law. This has made
the need for clarification and interpretation by the U.S. Treas-
ury even more critical than for most of the new legislation. To
the Treasury's credit, it published a guideline in question-and-
answer format in an attempt to answer the most obvious ques-
tions which would occur to taxpayers." Its reward for this effort
was severe criticism from a member of Congress for telling
taxpayers how to "avoid" the Act's sanctions against interna-
tional boycotts. 5 The Senator has chosen to overlook the fact
that some of the "avoidance" techniques which appeared in the
Treasury Guidelines were suggested in the boycott provisions
of the Conference Report for the Tax Reform Act." The Sena-
tor's assumption that taxpayers should have no guidance from
the Treasury on the complexities of the new Act is hardly con-
ducive to sound tax administration.
4 7
Despite the criticism, it is hoped that additional clarifica-
tion concerning the boycott provisions of the TRA will be forth-
coming from the Treasury. Below are two areas which are in
need for further clarification.
1. International Boycott Factor
If a U.S. taxpayer is unable to segregate boycott-tainted
operations from all others, the taxpayer must use the Interna-
tional Boycott Factor to compute its lost tax benefits. The
Treasury has already indicated that if a taxpayer can segregate
some but not all boycott-tainted activities, it may compute its
lost tax benefits for such separate activities but must forfeit all
deferral, DISC, and foreign tax benefits for other foreign activi-
42. Id. § 999(a)(1) which refers to the 10 percent test in I.R.C. § 951(b).
43. Supra note 25, Question A-1.
44. Supra note 25.
45. Letter to the Secretary of Treasury from Senator Ribicoff, BNA DAILY TAX
REPORT, No. 237, at J-2 (Dec. 8, 1976).
46. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 399 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4118.
47. Id. at 467, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4173.
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ties.48 In the alternative it would be required to use the Interna-
tional Boycott Factor. Therefore, it must be presumed that
most taxpayers will in fact be required to compute the Factor.
The Treasury has indicated that the International Boycott
Factor is to be determined with reference to three items: pur-
chases, sales and payroll. 9 Precisely how the Factor is to be
computed was set out in proposed regulations issued on March
1, 1977.50
The regulations for computing the International Boycott
Factor suffer from numerous defects. Perhaps the most obvious
fault is that the regulations require purchases, sales, and pay-
roll to be added to each other in both the numerator and de-
nominator in order to form the fraction.' Elementary algebra
will convince anyone that the resulting number is not the aver-
age percentage of the individual items, but a number which in
fact has no relevance to anything.
Only a little less obvious a defect in the regulations is the
potential for double counting, particularly within one con-
trolled group. Thus a sale for one group member is a purchase
by another. The proposed regulations attempt to deal with this
problem in the numerator of the Factor but fail to consider the
problem in constructing the denominator. 5
Because of the numerous problems with the International
Boycott Factor regulations as now proposed, it would not be
surprising if they are changed before being issued in final form.
2. Clarification of Scope of Official List
The boycott provisions of the Tax Reform Act require the
Secretary to maintain and publish not less frequently than
quarterly a current list of countries which require or may re-
quire participation in a secondary international boycott as de-
fined in the TRA. While the Act states that the Secretary
"shall" maintain a "current" list, it does not specifically state
the list must contain all boycotts known to the Secretary." To
48. 42 Fed. Reg. 1092, § F-8 (1977).
49. Supra note 25, § F-1.
50. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.999-1, 42 Fed. Reg. 11,845 (1977).
51. Id. § 1.999-1(c).
52. Id. § 1.999-1(b)(7).
53. That the list in fact would not be complete was contemplated by Congress,
supra note 46, at 469, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4175.
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date, the Treasury has not stated whether in fact the official
list will be complete. It is conceivable that one or more boycotts
will be omitted from the list for political or national policy
reasons.
In any audit of a taxpayer's return for tax years after 1975,
it is quite probable that the Internal Revenue agent will have
a complete list of boycott countries including listed, unlisted
and boycott countries discovered subsequent to the tax year
involved. 4 Should the agent assert a deficiency against the
taxpayer for failure to segregate all boycott operations, it is
quite probable that the taxpayer will claim that it has been
misled by the Treasury's failure to list all boycotts. This type
of argument will be most likely to arise if the taxpayer has
listed a suspected boycott in one year but has not seen the
boycott listed officially by the Treasury thereafter. The tax-
payer may then feel justified in not listing the boycott in subse-
quent years in the belief that the Treasury has determined that
the suspected boycott in fact is not of the kind described in the
tax code.
Two parts of the boycott provisions of the TRA suggest
that such arguments by the taxpayer would be looked upon
with disfavor. First, the Act imposes a positive duty upon the
taxpayer to report known or suspected boycotts if the taxpayer
has operations in the boycott country. This requirement is
wholly apart from the requirement that the taxpayer list all
operations in countries which appear on the official list. Sec-
ond, the TRA provides a means by which the taxpayer may
request that the Secretary determine if a particular activity
constitutes a boycott.5 Based upon these two provisions of the
Act, it would seem that the Treasury's official list of boycott
countries must be viewed as an aid in complying with the boy-
cott provisions of the Tax Reform Act but should not be as-
sumed to be complete.
It would be most useful if the Treasury were to state either
that all known boycotts will in fact be listed or that for various
reasons certain boycotts may not be listed. It is doubtful if
either pronouncement will ever be made. To list all countries
54. Id.
55. I.R.C. § 999(d).
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without exception would severely limit the Treasury's options
should political or national policy considerations suggest that
it would be more prudent not to list a particular country. To
state that the Treasury was, as a matter of policy, not listing
certain boycott countries would undoubtedly open the door to
further charges that it is subverting the will of Congress. The
most that can be expected from the Treasury is a rather oblique
reference to the fact that taxpayers cannot rely on the official
list in all circumstances. Such a pronouncement will surely
mean that the list is not complete and the Treasury reserves
the right to not list countries in appropriate cases.
C. Legislation of Morality
The Internal Revenue laws of the United States have,
since the passage of the 16th amendment to the Constitution,
been championed as a vehicle for public policy. Initially, the
income tax was intended to redistribute the nation's wealth
from the have's to the have not's. Over the years, numerous
provisions have been added to the Internal Revenue Code to
achieve more limited national policy objectives. One need look
no further than the Tax Reform Act of 1976 for such provisions.
Several sections of the Act were enacted to encourage capital
formation and, indirectly, new jobs."6 Child and dependent care
provisions were liberalized to permit more individuals to enter
the labor force. 7
Although many provisions of the tax code were enacted to
promote public policy, only a few were enacted to discourage
activities which were perceived as morally repugnant. In gen-
eral, ill-gotten gains have been taxed the same as all other
income. 58 Expenses of a business were permitted as a deduction
on the basis of ordinary and necessary, not on the basis of the
moral acceptability of the activity.59
Congress has on occasion passed tax legislation which is
intended to discourage morally repugnant acts. In computing
taxable income, wagering losses are only allowed to the extent
56. S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 176 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3607.
57. Id. at 132, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3565.
58. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961). See Rutkin v. United States, 343
U.S. 130 (1952).
59. I.R.C. § 162(a). See Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958); Rev. Rul.
323, 1974-2 CUM. BuLL. 40.
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of wagering gains."0 U.S. citizens who move abroad and ren-
ounce their U.S. citizenship in order to avoid the U.S. income
tax may be taxed by the United States in a less favorable
manner than other nonresident alien individuals." Illegal
bribes or kickbacks to government officials or employees
whether made in the United States or overseas cannot be de-
ducted in computing a business's taxable income.2 The same
is true of illegal payments if the law of the United States or any
state would subject the payor to criminal penalties or loss of
license or privilege to engage in a trade or business . 3 Kick-
backs, rebates or bribes paid by providers of service under
Medicare and Medicaid to secure business may not be de-
ducted from income to arrive at taxable income. 4 Restrictions
have been placed on the amount which can be claimed as a
business expense which has been incurred as damages in a
criminal antitrust action.
5
The anti-boycott provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976
are the most ambitious attempt by Congress to date to provide
tax disincentives for a particular activity. The avowed purpose
of the anti-boycott provisions is to discourage U.S. taxpayers
from participating in or cooperating with any international
boycott not sanctioned by the United States. The tax code is a
particularly clumsy vehicle for carrying out such Congressional
intent. Boycott activities do not always relate neatly to ac-
counting for income and expenses and are thus not susceptible
to computing loss of tax benefits. Further, the legislation as
written is a rather crude tool for punishing those who might
engage in a boycott.
In the case of wagering losses, bribes, or illegal payments,
the tax code provisions which restrict deductions bear a direct
relationship to the underlying undesirable activity. Generally,
the event is certain as to time and amount and thus susceptible
to being accounted for in arriving at taxable income. This will
not always be the case when one is attempting to segregate
60. I.R.C. § 165(d).
61. Id. § 877.
62. Id. § 162(c)(1). As to loss of other tax benefits as a result of foreign bribes see
I.R.C. §§ 952(a)(4), 995(b)(1).
63. Id. § 162(c)(2).
64. Id. § 162(c)(3).
65. Id. § 162(g).
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boycott-tainted income and expense. If the taxpayer has one
isolated project or business operation which is boycott tainted,
little problem will be encountered in determining boycott-
tainted income. In the more common situation of continuous
business dealings with both boycott and non-boycott countries,
segregation of boycott-tainted income and expenses is far more
difficult. If a U.S. manufacturer delivers goods to a port in the
United States for shipment overseas, some part of the goods
may be bound for boycott countries and some to non-boycott
countries. How is the expense of delivering the goods to the port
to be segregated between boycott and non-boycott taxable
income?
Congress has provided a partial answer to the question by
providing for the International Boycott Factor. In essence it has
fallen back on cost accounting techniques to segregate boycott-
tainted net income. This is the case unless the U.S. taxpayer
can clearly identify all boycott activities and they are all in fact
separate and apart from all non-boycott activities. The compu-
tation of the Internationel Boycott Factor will require addi-
tional record keeping and computations on the part of the U.S.
taxpayer. The extent of the additional effort will not be clear
until the Treasury publishes regulations on the precise method
which must be used in computing this factor. Nonetheless, the
additional computation will be required even though the tax-
payer will gain no tax advantage and, for the most part, the
boycott activities are not illegal per se.
The anti-boycott provisions of the Tax Reform Act are a
particularly crude device for punishing what is perceived as
morally wrong behavior because it cannot distinguish between
degrees of culpability or between "good" and "bad" boycotts.
If two identically situated taxpayers both agree to participate
in a boycott, both lose identical tax benefits. It makes no differ-
ence that the extent of one taxpayer's agreement was to permit
boycott language to appear on a letter of credit while the other
taxpayer's agreement was a refusal to do business with boycot-
ted businesses, a refusal to hire individuals because of race,
religion, or nationality, or a refusal to ship goods with certain
carriers.
The Tax Reform Act perceives all boycotts as either U.S.
sanctioned and "good" or non-U.S. sanctioned and "bad." The
result of such narrow thinking is that the United States could
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indirectly encourage immoral behavior far more serious than
the perceived evil of participation in international boycotts.
In 1939, the United Kingdom and Nazi Germany were at
war. The United States was officially neutral and presumably
would not have officially sanctioned a United Kingdom boycott
of Germany. Under the present anti-boycott provisions of the
TRA, U.S. taxpayers would have lost U.S. tax benefits for all
business which was related to the United Kingdom. Indirectly,
the United States would have been aiding Nazi Germany. A
critic might charge that if such events occur in the future it
would be easy enough to amend the Act to include an exception
for a "good" boycott. However, it is difficult to conceive of a
situation where the United States might remain neutral in an
international conflict but at the same time pass partisan tax
legislation.
In short, any attempt to use the tax laws to discourage
morally repugnant activities should be approached with ex-
treme caution. This is particularly true when the activities
which .are to be discouraged are broadly defined and not readily
susceptible to precise accounting treatment. If Congress truly
wishes to discourage participation in international boycotts it
should make the activities illegal per se and punish those who
engage in the acts. Properly enforced, such a criminal law
would r'esult in no U.S. tax benefits for boycott-tainted income
because no U.S. taxpayer would have such income.
D. But Who Will Sign the Report?
The anti-boycott provisions of the Tax Reform Act require
U.S. taxpayers to report on their worldwide international boy-
cott activities. The report will be submitted to the U.S. Treas-
ury as a part of the taxpayer's annual income tax return. Its
accuracy and truthfulness will be attested to under penalties
of perjury." A willful failure to file the report can result in
criminal prosecution. 7 Needless to say, the U.S. taxpayer will
be under a strong compulsion to submit a complete and accur-
ate boycott report.
The U.S. taxpayer may find that it is faced with a di-
lemna. Many of the boycott activities reported may be illegal
66. Id. § 6065.
67. Id. § 999(f).
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under state, federal, or foreign law. Refusing to hire or to have
business dealings with individuals because of race, religion, or
nationality could very well violate civil rights laws. Refusing to
do business with a person or company because it does business
in a boycotted country might violate antitrust law. Failure to
support fully a foreign country's boycott law may subject the
U.S. taxpayer to criminal prosecution in the boycott country.
Yet, each of the potentially criminal acts must be fully re-
ported to the U.S. Government in a sworn statement. The
question must be asked whether the taxpayer might raise a
fifth amendment defense to submitting the report based on
self-incrimination."
In a recent case, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that,
in general, a taxpayer may not assert the fifth amendment
right in a nontax criminal prosecution to suppress the introduc-
tion into evidence of the taxpayer's return. 9 The Court clearly
indicated that if a taxpayer intended to claim the fifth amend-
ment privilege it had to be done by refusing to complete the
relevant portions of the tax return. Thus, it would seem that if
a taxpayer suspected his boycott report might be used in a
subsequent nontax criminal prosecution, it should either not
file a boycott report or should file a return but include a state-
ment to the effect that the privilege has been claimed. In a
subsequent criminal prosecution for willful failure to file a re-
turn, the Court seems to indicate that a valid assertion of the
privilege is an absolute defense to the crime charged. A good
faith assertion of the privilege, even if mistaken, will presuma-
bly rebut a charge of willfulness. 0 However, this later proposi-
tion can not be stated with certainty at this time and will have
to await further litigation.7'
This recent case even gives hope that a U.S. taxpayer
might be able to suppress the boycott report in a nontax crimi-
nal prosecution even when the privilege was not asserted at the
time of filing the tax return. The Court asserted that the legal
requirement to file a tax return was not sufficient compulsion
68. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
69. Garner v. United States. 424 U.S. 648 (1976).
70. See United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976), for the proposition that
wilfullness does not imply evil intent in a tax prosecution but only "a voluntary
intentional violation of a known legal duty."
71. 424 U.S. at 666 (Marshall, J. concurring).
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in and of itself to say that a taxpayer was compelled to testify
against himself. It pointed out that the requirement applies to
all persons who earn income and the mere completing of a tax
return is not an admission of criminal activity. When, however,
the only persons required to file a particular report or pay a
particular tax are those guilty of nontax criminal activities, the
Court recognized the compulsive nature of the requirement to
file a return.7" Here even a stated refusal to file indicated possi-
ble criminal activity. If most or all compliance with interna-
tional boycotts is in fact illegal under federal or state law and,
therefore, all U.S. taxpayers who report such activities are in
fact admitting to criminal acts, is not the boycott report com-
pelled testimony and thus subject to being suppressed?
Claiming the privilege will depend on whether the tax-
payer has a reasonable belief that criminal prosecution is possi-
ble. Numerous threshold questions could arise such as the fol-
lowing.
Who has committed the criminal act?
If the U.S. taxpayer is an individual it would seem clear who
the potential criminal would be. If the U.S. taxpayer is a trust
or corporation, the criminal acts might be those of the taxpayer
and its officers, directors, or trustees. If an officer signs a report
which details the corporation's misdeeds, does the officer be-
come a participant in the criminal activity even if wholly inno-
cent before?
Where is the criminal act committed?
If the criminal act is in the jurisdiction of the government
which has made the act a crime, little problem arises. However,
in many instances, most of the activity will in fact occur in a
foreign jurisdiction. Can U.S. persons be prosecuted for acts
which take place outside a state or the United States? Is the
case stronger if the foreign actor is 100 percent controlled by
the U.S. person?
Can a fifth amendment privilege be asserted when the
72. 424 U.S. at 658, discussing the applicability of Mackey v. United States, 401
U.S. 667 (1971); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); and Grosso v. United
States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) to the plaintiff's claim that he was compelled to file a tax
return and incriminate himself. The three cases cited pertain to the federal excise and
information return on wagering and the fact that only gamblers were required to file
this return.
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criminal prosecution could only occur in a jurisdiction outside
the United States?
The stated purpose of the privilege is to assure that the U.S.
judicial system remains adversary in nature."3 If this is the
case, the privilege should not be available when the criminal
prosecution can only occur outside the United States.
There are no doubt other preliminary questions which
each U.S. taxpayer will have to face before it would assert the
privilege and refuse to submit a boycott report. Each question
could no doubt be the subject of an independent treatise on
criminal or constitutional law. Suffice it to say that in the
proper circumstances the privilege can and should be asserted
when the tax return is filed.
III. THE PROHIBITORY LEGISLATION
The anti-boycott sections of the Export Administration
Act of 197711 represent the strongest opposition to the Arab
boycott to date. This statute was the result of a considerable
effort by U.S. exporters and the "Israel lobby" to arrive at a
compromise piece of legislation which would have the effect of
prohibiting compliance with the Arab boycott of Israel without
destroying U.S. trade with the Arab countries.75 It is, therefore,
a good deal more moderate than previous bills, but nonetheless
shares some of the objectionable features of the tax legislation.
These anti-boycott sections prohibit the taking of or agree-
ing to take certain actions "with intent to comply with, further,
or support any boycott fostered or imposed by a foreign country
against a country which is friendly with the United States
"" Stated simply, these are:
1. Refusing to do business with the boycotted country or
its nationals or with any other person pursuant to an agreement
with, requirement of, or a request from, or on behalf of any
boycotting country.77
2. Refusing to employ or otherwise discriminate against
73. 424 U.S. at 655, citing Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415
(1966).
74. Export Administration Amendments of 1977, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-13.
75. THE NEw REPUBLIC, June 4, 1977, at 17.
76. Export Administration Amendments of 1977, § 4A(a)(1).
77. Id. § 4A(a)(1)(A).
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persons of a particular race, religion, nationality, or national
origin.7"
3. Furnishing information regarding a person's race, reli-
gion, nationality, or national origin.79
4. Furnishing information about whether a person does,
has done, or proposes to do business with the boycotted country
or its nationals or with any person known or believed to be
boycotted.'"
5. Furnishing information about whether any person is a
member, has made contributions to, or is otherwise associated
with organizations which support a boycotted country."
6. Paying, honoring, or confirming any letter of credit
which contains a condition which is prohibited by the anti-
boycott rules of the United States."
The drafters of the statute appear to have been careful to
insure that the law would serve as an antidote to the Arab
boycott, not simply to proscribe certain conduct. The six pro-
hibited acts are only unlawful if done with the intent of
complying with a foreign boycott. The broad prohibition
against refusing do business with a boycotted country is only
applicable if a refusal is made pursuant to a request from a
boycotting country, and with the stipulation that
[tihe mere absence of a business relationship with or in the
boycotted country, with any business concern organized under
the laws of the boycotted country, with any national or resident
of the boycotted country, or with any other person, does not
indicate the existence of the intent required to establish a viola-
tion of rules and regulations issued to carry out this subpara-
graph. "
Furthermore, the Act seems to be a conscious attempt to
restrict only the secondary and tertiary aspects of the Arab
boycott without infringing upon the sovereignty of the coun-
tries involved. To this end, a group of exceptions to the broad
strictures listed above has been included in the Act. Regula-
tions to be written will contain exceptions for:
78. Id. § 4A(a)(1)(B).
79. Id. § 4A(a)(1)(C).
80. Id. § 4A(a)(1)(D).
81. Id. § 4A(a)(1)(E).
82. Id. § 4A(a)(1)(F).
83. Id. § 4A(a)(1)(A).
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1. Complying with the import restrictions of boycotting
countries on goods produced in the boycotted country. 4
2. Complying with the shipping requirements of the boy-
cotting countries as to carrier and route. 5
3. Furnishing information as to the country of origin of
goods and the names and routes of shippers. Until June of 1978,
this information may be in the form of negative or blacklisting
terms, for example, "This shipment contains no goods manu-
factured in Israel." After June of 1978, only positive informa-
tion will be permitted. 6 At this writing, most Arab countries
accept positive certifications.
4. Complying with the unilateral positive selection, by a
purchaser in a boycotting country, of an importing carrier, an
insurer, suppliers of services to be performed in a boycotting
country, or suppliers. 7 The prohibition against the furnishing
of information regarding a person's race, religion, national ori-
gin, or nationality remains in force, however.8
5. Complying with the transshipment 8 and immigra-
tion"0 requirements of boycotting countries.
6. "[Clompliance by a United States person resident in
a foreign country . . .with the laws of that country with re-
spect to his activities exclusively therein . . . ."' Again, the
strictures regarding the furnishing of information as to a per-
son's nationality, race, or religion are still in force. Since a
"person" is defined as a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. corpora-
tion, the last exception is of particular significance. Its intent
is to avoid, to some extent, the extraterritorial application of
U.S. law.
The anti-boycott provisions of the Export Administration
Act seem to be a rather reasonable reaction to a perceived, if
not a real, problem. Despite the exception for compliance with
local law, it is submitted that the potential of prohibiting for-
84. Id. § 4A(a)(2)(A).
85. Id.
86. Id. § 4A(a)(2)(B).
87. Id. § 4A(a)(2)(C).
88. Id. § 4A(a)(3).
89. Id. § 4A(a)(2)(D).
90. Id. § 4A(a)(2)(E).
91. Id. § 4A(a)(2)(F).
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eign subsidiaries from engaging in conduct required by the
country in which they are incorporated is substantial. Further,
the Act could have the undesired effect of dampening trade
with Israel; firms could understandably be reluctant to enter
preliminary negotiations with an Israeli purchaser for fear that
if a potential bargain should fail they may be accused of not
completing the transaction because of their "wish" to comply
with the Arab boycott.
The past practice of many Arab countries has been to ig-
nore the boycott for products for which there is no viable alter-
native supplier. The statute may thus have the effect of caus-
ing small U.S. exporters in highly competitive industries to be
boycotted while large manufacturers which occupy a dominant
position in an industry continue to sell to the Arab markets.
Perhaps the most relevant question is whether such legis-
lation is needed at all. U.S. exporters have in the past shown a
remarkable ability to deal effectively with both Israel and the
Arab countries in spite of the boycott. Given the fact that
discrimination against U.S. citizens due to the boycott is al-
ready prohibited, one might question the need to attack the
Arab boycott itself.
IV. CONCLUSION
The disclosure, the tax, and the prohibitory boycott legis-
lation suffer from similar disabilities which make them need-
lessly burdensome and in some respects unwise as policy.
First, there is a general failure to adequately distinguish
between conduct which has the effect of discriminating against
U.S. persons and firms and the mere furnishing of information
which has no effect on U.S. trade. The disclosure regulations
have to some extent rectified this problem by changing the
reporting form to remove the word "comply" with respect to
the reporting of certain information, but the Tax Reform Act
and the Export Administration Act both apply to the furnish-
ing of information. As mentioned previously, the Arab boycott
apparatus touches the majority of U.S. exporters only with
respect to certification that exports to boycotting countries do
not contain Israeli components and are not shipped on a black-
listed vessel. Much less frequently, exporters or investors are
required to furnish information as to their involvement with
1977
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Israel .12 The exceptions in the Export Administration Act
would assumedly permit the former, but would unequivocably
prohibit the latter, even for information which is a mere state-
ment of fact, not requiring or indicating action on the part of
the furnisher. Thus far, U.S. businesses have successfully dealt
with both Israel and the Arab countries. It is submitted that
lumping such conduct which does not discriminate against
U.S. persons, together with clearly discriminatory conduct, has
the effect of needlessly discrediting action not affecting U.S.
persons and dampening U.S. trade with the Arab countries.
Similarly, all three pieces of legislation do not adequately
distinguish between the primary boycott of Israel by the Arab
League countries and the secondary boycott of firms doing
business with Israel. Opposition to the former is clearly beyond
the reach of U.S. legislation. It is submitted that the legisla-
tion, particularly the Export Administration Act, has the ef-
fect, if not the intent, of interfering with the Arab League's
primary boycott of Israel. For example, section 4A(a)(2)(A) of
the statute excepts from the broad prohibitions compliance
with the import requirements of boycotting countries that im-
ports not be manufactured in Israel. Part of the boycott, how-
ever, is to prohibit the importation of goods manufactured else-
where but containing components manufactured in Israel.
Since the statute does not except compliance with such a re-
quirement, its effect is to force the boycotting countries either
to alter their boycott requirements or not to import U.S. goods.
Furthermore, since the prohibitory legislation 3 and the tax
legislation94 apply to actions taken by all foreign subsidiaries
of U.S. companies, they thus represent yet another extraterri-
torial application of U.S. business regulation." It is ironic that
at a time when many countries are objecting to the imposition
of U.S. sponsored boycotts on the foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
companies, legislation has been enacted which discourages or
92. See, e.g., regulations issued under article 291(4) of the Commercial Code of
Iraq regarding the formation of branches of foreign companies.
93. Export Administration Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, § 204, 91 Stat. 247,
amending 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410 (1969).
94. I.R.C. §§ 999(a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(2), (c)(1).
95. See generally Bradfield, United States Extraterritorial Commerce Regula-
tions, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS 19 (V. Cameron ed. 1976).
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prohibits those same subsidiaries from taking action with re-
spect to boycotts not sanctioned by the United States. Na-
tional treatment for foreign investors is a theme upon which the
United States has consistently played. The inclusion of the
foreign subsidiaries in a growing number of U.S. regulatory
laws is inconsistent with the goal of national treatment of the
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies. This is especially true
when the U.S. regulatory policy is contrary to that of the host
country, as is often the case with boycott regulations.
Finally, the legislation in general seems to arise from a
confused set of motives. The underlying policy of the Export
Administration Act is that foreign boycotts are inimical to a
U.S. economic policy favoring classical notions of free trade.
However, the United States itself has been a participant in,
and indeed the instigator of, a number of boycotts and embar-
goes directed against foreign countries." Both that fact and the
likelihood of dampened U.S. trade with the Arab world cast
doubt upon the proposition that the anti-boycott legislation is
solely designed to promote free trade. In this respect, an even
more hypocritical motive is the notion that boycotts per se, and
in particular the Arab boycott, are somehow immoral. 7
A more likely motivation is simply the foreign policy objec-
tive of aiding Israel, a proposition which is supported by the
congratulatory statement of Israel's Foreign Minister to the
American Jewish Congress "on the successful outcome of ef-
forts to secure legislation against practices of boycott and dis-
crimination. ' '9 8 If this is the case, however, there is no reason
to cause burdensome reporting and compliance requirements
by including all foreign boycotts under the umbrella of the U.S.
legislation. The number of boycotts likely to be discovered
96. Craig, Application of the Trading with the Enemy Act to Foreign Corporations
Owned by Americans: Reflections on Fruehauf v. Massardy, 83 HARV. L. REv. 579
(1970); Muir, The Boycott in International Law, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 187, 190 (1974);
Comment, The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 and Foreign-Based Subsidiaries
of American Multinational Corporations: A Time to Abstain from Restraining, 11 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 206 (1973).
97. President Carter stated in a debate with former President Ford, "It's not a
matter of diplomacy or trade with me. It's a matter of morality." quoted in THE NEW
REPUBLIC, June 4, 1977, at 17. See also Noonan, Bribes and the Boycott, 62 A.B.A.J.
1606 (1976).
98. 1 Boycorr Raeoir 3 (1977).
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around the world may be substantial, and not all of them will
be directed against as clear cut an ally as Israel. At a time when
there is a genuine opportunity for an overall Middle East
peace, a strong pro-Israeli measure such as the anti-boycott
legislation may ultimately have an unintended deleterious ef-
fect on that opportunity.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976: Treatment of
Foreign Income and Effects on U.S.
Development of Foreign Mineral Resources
WILLIAM J. NOLAN, JR.*
The Tax Reform Act of 1976' includes the most extensive
changes in the treatment of foreign income in over a decade of
federal tax legislation. The changes range from various modifi-
cations in the computation of the foreign tax credit limitation
to a reduction in the foreign earned income exclusion for U.S.
employees abroad. In many cases these changes will result in
a substantial increase in the costs of doing business overseas,
thereby lessening the ability of U.S: corporations to maintain
foreign operations and to compete effectively in foreign mar-
kets.
Given the high level of capital investment required for the
development of mineral resources, coupled with the long lead
time between capital expenditure and the commencement of
production, changes in the tax laws are of particular interest
to U.S. mineral resource corporations. This is especially so in
the foreign area, since many U.S. mineral resource corporations
would be unable to maintain needed levels of production with-
out a continuing role in the development of foreign mineral
deposits. This article will provide a brief explanation of the
principal changes in the treatment of foreign income, with
emphasis on the effects these changes will have on U.S. devel-
opment of foreign mineral resources.2
I. FOREIGN TAX CREDIT
The basic purpose of the foreign tax credit is to prevent
international double taxation. Like most other countries, the
United States recognizes that the country in which income is
*William J. Nolan, Jr. is a Vice President of AMAX Inc. and Chairman of the
Committee on Taxation of the United States Council of the International Chamber of
Commerce. The author wishes to thank Raymond S. McCann of AMAX Inc. for his
assistance in preparing this article.
1. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 [hereinafter cited as TRA] was passed by Con-
gress as Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1525 (1976), and was signed by the President on
Oct. 4, 1976. Citations to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [hereinafter cited as
I.R.C.J are, unless otherwise indicated, as amended through 1976.
2. Although the primary concern is with hard minerals, the article will also touch
on some of the special problems which have arisen for oil and gas.
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produced has the primary right to tax that income. Thus, al-
though the United States taxes its citizens, residents, and do-
mestic corporations on their worldwide income, it has long
granted a credit against that tax for income taxes paid to for-
eign countries.3 In the absence of this credit, U.S. taxpayers
would be taxed twice on their foreign income: first by the coun-
try in which it was earned and second by the United States.
As a result, taxpayers with foreign income would suffer a sub-
stantial, if not prohibitive, penalty as compared to taxpayers
with solely domestic income.
Of equal significance-particularly with respect to U.S.
multinational corporations-is the fact that most other devel-
oped countries employ similar means to protect their own tax-
payers from double taxation.' Thus, in addition to preventing
undue discrimination between U.S. taxpayers-i.e., discrimi-
nation in favor of taxpayers with solely domestic income-the
foreign tax credit permits U.S. multinational corporations to
compete effectively with the multinational corporations of
other developed countries. It is generally recognized that, in
the absence of the foreign tax credit, U.S. commercial interests
would be forced to withdraw from the foreign scene.'
Although the Tax Reform Act leaves the foreign tax credit
more or less intact, it makes a number of changes affecting the
computation of the credit which, whatever their theoretical
merits, can only undermine the competitive potential of U.S.
multinational corporations. No doubt, much of the pressure for
these changes arose from the conviction that faltering invest-
ments abroad would lead to an increase in productive invest-
ment at home. However, this conviction is not sustained by the
3. I.R.C. §§ 901-908.
4. See generally Norr, Jurisdiction to Tax and International Income, 17 TAX L.
REV. 431, 439-41 (1962). Those countries which do not follow the credit approach
typically limit their taxing jurisdiction to domestic income.
5. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Professor Stanley
S. Surrey, then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, stated that:
American investment would not proceed at all without the foreign
tax credit because then, as the Chairman pointed out, two taxes would
be imposed and the overall burden of two taxes would be so great that
international investment would practically cease.
Hearings on Tax Conventions with Brazil, Canada, and Trinidad and Tobago Before
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1967).
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bulk of available evidence.' Moreover, in the case of mineral
resources, the fact that such a shift in investment would gener-
ally not occur should be obvious. Mineral resources are where
you find them.
A. Repeal of Per Country Limitation
Almost since its inception, the foreign tax credit has been
limited to an amount determined by multiplying the precredit
U.S. tax liability by the ratio of foreign taxable income to total
taxable income, both foreign and domestic.' Where the foreign
tax rate is less than the U.S. rate, this ratio assures that the
foreign income will incur a residual U.S. tax at the difference
between the U.S. and foreign rates. Conversely, where the for-
eign tax rate is higher than the U.S. rate, the limitation assures
that the "excess" foreign tax will not offset the U.S. tax liabil-
ity on domestic income. However, in order to account for tim-
ing differences between foreign and U.S. taxes, the "excess" in
the latter case may be carried back to the two preceding taxa-
ble years and carried forward for the next five taxable years.
Prior to the Tax Reform Act, a taxpayer was required to
compute the foreign tax credit limitation on a per country
basis, unless the taxpayer made an election (binding there-
after) to use the overall method of computation. The per coun-
try limitation was computed separately for the income tax im-
posed by each foreign country, with only the income from that
particular country being taken into account. In contrast, the
overall limitation encompasses all foreign income taxes in a
single computation with total foreign income being treated as
a unit. As explained more fully below, the per country limita-
tion was often advantageous for a taxpayer with a loss in one
foreign country and income in another. The comparative ad-
vantage of the overall limitation is that it allows a taxpayer to
average high and low foreign tax rates.
The Tax Reform Act repeals the per country limitation
and requires all taxpayers to compute the foreign tax credit
limitation under the overall method.8 In general, this change is
6. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON IMPLICA-
TIONS OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS FOR WORLD TRADE AND INVESTMENT AND FOR U.S. TRADE
AND LABOR 426-29 (Comm. Print 1973).
7. I.R.C. § 904.
8. TRA § 1031, amending I.R.C. § 904.
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effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1975.
However, the effective date is postponed for three years in the
case of a mineral resource corporation which has (i) derived at
least 80 percent of its cumulative gross receipts from the min-
ing and sale of hard minerals, (ii) been engaged in the mining
of such minerals outside the United States and its possessions
for less than five years, (iii) incurred losses from such foreign
mining activities during at least two years, and (iv) made com-
mitments for a substantial expansion of these activities.
The principal reason given for the repeal of the per country
limitation was that it allowed taxpayers with a loss in one
foreign country, and income in another, to take the entire loss
from the one country as a deduction against their domestic
income, while obtaining an undiminished foreign tax credit
with respect to the income from the other country.9 This would
not be possible under the overall method, since the loss from
the one country would offset the income from the other, thus
reducing the potential foreign tax credit. However, although
this may be interpreted as a technical justification for the re-
peal of the per country limitation, it requires even less interpre-
tation to see that the repeal will work to the particular and
unfair disadvantage of corporations with only limited foreign
operations. When such corporations undertake an expansion of
their operations into additional countries, they will not only
face the possibility of start-up losses, but a corresponding ero-
sion of their potential foreign tax credit. Although, as indicated
above, there is a transitional rule for certain mineral resource
corporations, this rule is extremely narrow in scope and will not
relieve mineral resource corporations planning an expansion of
their operations in the future.
B. Recapture of Foreign Losses
Prior to the Tax Reform Act, taxpayers with a foreign loss
in one year (either per country or overall) and foreign income
in subsequent years could deduct the foreign loss for the earlier
year from their domestic income for that year and in the later
years still obtain an undiminished foreign tax credit with re-
spect to their foreign income. The Tax Reform Act alters this
9. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 225 (1975); S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 236 (1976).
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situation by requiring, in general, that the foreign loss for the
earlier year-though still deductible from domestic income for
that year-be "recaptured" in the later years, i.e., by recharac-
terizing an equivalent amount of the foreign income in the later
years as domestic income. 0 The effect of such recapture is to
reduce the potential foreign tax credit for the later years. How-
ever, the amount of foreign income recharacterized as domestic
in any year cannot generally exceed 50 percent of that income.
The reason given for the recapture requirement was that
the allowance of an undiminished foreign tax credit in years
following a foreign loss could be viewed as resulting in a double
benefit in a case where the foreign country did not allow a loss
carryover."1 However, the requirement is not limited to such a
case, but applies as well to the more usual case where the
foreign country does allow a loss carryover. A double benefit
would not occur in the latter case, because the loss carryover
would reduce the foreign taxes in years following the foreign
loss, and this in itself would reduce the foreign tax credit. The
result is that, by undermining the potential foreign tax credit
in both cases alike, the Tax Reform Act not only eliminates
what may have been perceived as a double benefit, but also
introduces a widespread potential for double taxation. In many
instances this additional burden will prolong the recovery pe-
riod for corporations which have experienced foreign losses. In
particular, while the risk of incurring a foreign loss is not
unique to mineral resource corporations, the prospect of an
ensuing reduction in potential foreign tax credit will tend to
discourage U.S. development of foreign mineral resources.
The recapture requirement is generally effective for foreign
losses sustained in taxable years beginning after December 31,
1975. However, among other exceptions, the recapture require-
ment does not apply to expropriation losses, regardless of when
sustained. In addition, the requirement does not apply to losses
sustained on the disposition of debt obligations issued by a
foreign country before May 14, 1976, in exchange for property
located within that country. This latter exception was intended
as a transitional rule for corporations which, under the threat
10. TRA § 1032, amending I.R.C. § 904.
11. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 225 (1975); S. REP. No. 94-938,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 236 (1976).
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of expropriation, had accepted low-yield government bonds in
exchange for their property.
C. Foreign Capital Gains
For the purpose of the foreign tax credit limitation, the
Tax Reform Act will require that certain foreign capital gains
be treated as domestic.' 2 Under prior law, taxpayers occasion-
ally sought to enlarge their foreign tax credit limitation by
selling capital assets or property used in a trade or business in
a foreign country where the tax on capital gains was either
minimal or nonexistent. However, effective after November 12,
1975, such sales will generally be treated as giving rise to do-
mestic capital gain, unless the country in which the sale takes
place imposes a tax of at least 10 percent on that gain. Excep-
tions include (i) the sale by one corporation of stock in another,
if the sale takes place in a country in which the second corpora-
tion derives more than 50 percent of its gross income, and (ii)
the sale of personal property (other than stock in a corporation)
in a country in which the seller derives more than 50 percent
of its gross income or in which the property was used in the
seller's trade or business. In addition to the foregoing, the Tax
Reform Act requires that net foreign capital gains be taken into
account only to the extent that they exceed net domestic capi-
tal losses, and that only 30/48ths of the excess be treated as
foreign income. These latter provisions are effective for taxable
years beginning after December 31, 1975.
D. Foreign Oil and Gas Extraction Income
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975' 3 introduced the require-
ment that the foreign tax credit limitation on foreign oil-
related income be computed on a separate overall basis and
coupled this requirement with an outright denial of foreign tax
credit for foreign income taxes paid on foreign oil and gas ex-
traction income to the extent that these taxes exceeded 52.8
percent of such income for 1975, 50.4 percent for 1976, and 50
percent for all subsequent years.'4 The Tax Reform Act reduces
the allowable amount to 48 percent commencing with 1977.'"
12. TRA § 1032, amending I.R.C. § 904(b).
13. The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 [hereinafter cited as Tax Reduction Act] was
passed by Congress as Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (1975), and was signed by the
President on Mar. 29, 1975.
14. Tax Reduction Act § 601(a), adding I.R.C. § 907.
15. TRA § 1035, amending I.R.C. § 907.
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However, foreign taxes in excess of the 48 percent limit, but not
over 50 percent, may be carried back to the two preceding
taxable years (subject to the 48 percent limit) and carried for-
ward for the next five taxable years.
II. INCOME OF FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES; DEEMED-PAID FOREIGN TAX
CREDIT
A foreign subsidiary is not subject to U.S. tax so long as it
is not engaged in a trade or business within the United States
and does not receive dividends, interest, or other forms of pas-
sive income from U.S. sources.' 6 Moreover, the income of the
foreign subsidiary is, in general, not taxable to the U.S. parent
until distributed as a dividend.'7 In theory the resulting
"deferral" of U.S. tax liability on the income of a foreign sub-
sidiary can give rise to a substantial advantage. Generally, this
could happen where the tax rate in the country of the subsidi-
ary's incorporation is less than the U.S. rate. In such a case,
by interposing a foreign subsidiary, the U.S. parent may be
able to conduct its foreign operations at a reduced tax
cost-provided, of course, that the subsidiary's income is not
distributed. However, the cases in which a U.S. parent is ac-
tually able to obtain this advantage have become increasingly
rare. For one thing, the tax rates in most developed countries
are now comparable with the U.S. rate. In addition, the tax
laws contain a complex set of rules under which certain catego-
ries of foreign income are taxed to a U.S. parent as a construc-
tive dividend, i.e., even though not actually distributed by the
foreign subsidiary. 8 These same rules require a U.S. parent to
treat as a constructive dividend any net increase in a foreign
subsidiary's investment of accumulated earnings in U.S. prop-
erty. Finally, the tax laws contain a separate rule under which
dividend treatment is generally required for a portion of any
gain recognized on the sale of stock in a foreign subsidiary. 9
When a U.S. parent becomes taxable on the income of a
foreign subsidiary-because of either an actual or constructive
dividend-it becomes entitled to a derivative, or "deemed-
16. See I.R.C. §§ 881-82.
17. For a general discussion of this point, see Norr, Jurisdiction to Tax and Inter-
national Income, 17 TAX. L. Rav. 431, 435-37 (1962).
18. I.R.C. §§ 951-64.
19. I.R.C. § 1248.
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paid" foreign tax credit on account of any foreign income tax
paid by the subsidiary. 0 For this purpose, the deemed-paid
foreign tax generally includes not only the tax attributable to
the net income (after foreign tax) from which the distribution
is made, but also the tax attributable to the income used to pay
the foreign tax. However, the amount of the deemed-paid tax
must generally be grossed up, i.e., included as part of the taxa-
ble dividend.2' The end result of this rather complicated com-
putation is that the U.S. parent obtains the same foreign tax
credit as it would have gotten had it operated through a branch
rather than a subsidiary.
A. Investment in U.S. Property
As indicated above, the tax laws require a U.S. parent to
treat as a constructive dividend any net increase in a foreign
subsidiary's investment of accumulated earnings in U.S. prop-
erty. This exception to the general rule of "deferral" is directed
primarily against the acquisition of the stock or debt obliga-
tions of the U.S. parent or related U.S. corporations, since such
investments are, in many cases, tantamount to a distribution
of dividends. However, prior to the Tax Reform Act, the term
"U.S. property" was broadly defined to include the stock or
debt obligations of any U.S. corporation, whether related or
not. The Tax Reform Act changes this by narrowing the defini-
tion of "U.S. property" to include only the stock or obligations
basically of the U.S. parent and U.S. corporations at least 25
percent owned by the U.S. parent.1
2
The Tax Reform Act also limits the definition of "U.S.
property" to exclude movable drilling rigs and related oil ex-
ploration and production equipment used on the Continental
Shelf. The purpose of this exclusion is to promote the explora-
tion for oil in and around U.S. territorial waters.
B. Less Developed Country Corporations
Under prior law, the general requirement of dividend
treatment on the sale of stock in a foreign subsidiary (men-
tioned above) did not apply where that subsidiary was a less
developed country corporation. However, in many cases this
20. I.R.C. § 902.
21. I.R.C. § 78.
22. TRA § 1021, amending I.R.C. § 956(b)(2)(F)-(G).
VOL. 6:635
FOREIGN MINERAL INCOME TREATMENT
exemption was a mixed blessing. Although the U.S. parent was
entitled to treat the entire gain as capital gain, the lack of
dividend treatment deprived the parent of the deemed-paid
foreign tax credit. Effective for taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1975, the Tax Reform Act extends the require-
ment of dividend treatment to the sale of stock in a less devel-
oped country corporation.23 However, the requirement does not
apply to the extent that the "dividend" would be out of pre-
1976 earnings.
Prior law also accorded special treatment for the deemed-
paid foreign tax credit from less developed country corpora-
tions. Although the deemed-paid foreign tax included only the
tax attributable to the net income (after foreign tax) from
which the distribution was made, the amount of the deemed-
paid tax was not subject to the gross-up requirement discussed
above. In many cases, this special treatment produced a more
favorable foreign tax credit and was consistent with the general
policy of promoting investment in less developed countries.
The Tax Reform Act repeals the special treatment effective for
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1975.24 However,
for dividends out of pre-1976 earnings, the repeal does not take
effect until January 1, 1978. The loss of special treatment for
the deemed-paid foreign tax credit will tend to discourage the
continuing investment necessary to the growth of less devel-
oped countries, including the further development of their min-
eral resources.
III. REORGANIZATIONS INVOLVING FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES
Acquisitions and mergers involving foreign subsidiaries,
the organization of such subsidiaries, and their liquidation into
a domestic parent are all transactions which, under prior law,
required an advance ruling by the Internal Revenue Service
that tax avoidance was not one of the transaction's principal
purposes. In the absence of this advance ruling, the tax-free
treatment to which such transactions are ordinarily entitled
was denied.
In recognition of the extraordinary delays which the ad-
vance ruling requirement often created, the Tax Reform Act
23. TRA § 1022, amending I.R.C. § 1248(d)(3).
24. TRA § 1033, amending I.R.C. § 902.
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replaces it with a new and more flexible set of procedures.25 In
the case of so-called "outbound" transactions (e.g., the organi-
zation of a foreign subsidiary) a ruling need not be requested
until 183 days after the transaction has begun. In the case of
"inbound" transactions (e.g., the liquidation of a foreign sub-
sidiary) and in the case of exclusively foreign transactions (e.g.,
the acquisition of a foreign subsidiary by another foreign corpo-
ration) the ruling requirement will be dispensed with entirely.
In general, these changes are effective for transactions begun
after October 9, 1975. However, the repeal of the ruling require-
ment for "inbound" transactions and exclusively foreign trans-
actions will not take effect until 1978. In the meantime, these
transactions will be governed by the procedures for "outbound"
transactions.
IV. SPECIAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES
The tax laws have long granted a number of positive incen-
tives in the foreign area in order to promote particular national
interests. Such incentives are granted to corporations which
meet the definitional requirements of certain specialized trade
and investment vehicles. These specialized vehicles include the
Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation (WHTC) and the Pos-
sessions Corporation, both of which are affected by the Tax
Reform Act. Another vehicle in this category is the Domestic
International Sales Corporation (DISC). Although DISCs are
affected by the Tax Reform Act in a number of ways, these
changes are generally irrelevant here, since natural resources
were excluded from DISC benefits by the Tax Reduction Act
of 1975, effective for sales made after March 18, 1975.26 The
only change that the Tax Reform Act makes in this connection
is to provide a limited reprieve for natural resources being sold
pursuant to fixed contracts entered into on or before March 18,
1975. Such sales will continue to qualify for DISC benefits until
March 18, 1980.27
A. Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations
Prior to the Tax Reform Act, a WHTC was entitled to a
special deduction which reduced its effective tax rate by almost
14 percentage points. In order to qualify for this benefit, the
25. TRA § 1042, amending I.R.C. § 367.
26. Tax Reduction Act § 603(b), amending I.R.C. § 993(c)(2).
27. TRA § 1101(f), amending Tax Reduction Act § 603(b)(1).
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corporation had to be incorporated in the United States and
conduct its trade or business (other than incidental purchases)
exclusively within North, Central, or South America or the
West Indies. In addition, the corporation had to meet certain
percentage tests as to the character and source of its income.
First, it had to derive at least 90 percent of its gross income
from the active conduct of a trade or business. Secondly, it had
to derive at least 95 percent of its gross income from sources
outside the United States.
Under the Tax Reform Act, the WHTC benefit is phased
out over a 4-year period beginning with 1976.28 The 14 percen-
tage point reduction in effective tax rate is lowered to 11 per-
centage points for 1976, eight for 1977, five for 1978 and two for
1979. Commencing with 1980, the WHTC provisions are re-
pealed.
B. Possessions Corporations
For a corporation to qualify as a Possessions Corporation,
it must be incorporated in the United States, and must (i)
derive at least 80 percent of its gross income from sources
within a U.S. possession (e.g., Puerto Rico) and (ii) derive at
least 50 percent of its gross income from the active conduct of
a trade or business within that possession. Under prior law, a
Possessions Corporation could exclude from gross income its
possessions source income together with all other foreign source
income. Effective in 1976, the Tax Reform Act replaces this
exclusion with an elective tax credit equal to the U.S. tax at-
tributable to the corporation's foreign source income from its
possessions trade or business and from "qualified" possessions
investments.29 One of the stated purposes of this change was to
eliminate the benefit which prior law had afforded to all other
foreign source income and thereby end the incentive for rein-
vesting possessions earnings in foreign countries or in posses-
sions other than the one in which the corporation conducts its
trade or business. In keeping with this purpose, "qualified"
possessions investments are limited to investments in the pos-
session where the trade or business is conducted.
Under prior law, dividends paid by a Possessions Corpora-
28. TRA § 1052, amending and repealing I.R.C. §§ 921-22.
29. TRA § 1051(c), amending I.R.C. § 931; TRA § 1051(b), adding I.R.C. § 936.
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tion were ineligible for the dividends-received deduction;
therefore, it was the usual practice for the corporation to accu-
mulate its earnings for a long period of time, until these earn-
ings could be passed up in a tax-free liquidation. For the pur-
pose of encouraging a more rapid reinvestment of possessions
earnings in the United States, the Tax Reform Act extends the
dividends-received deduction to include dividends paid by a
Possessions Corporation.
V. COMPENSATION OF U.S. EMPLOYEES ABROAD
The Tax Reform Act makes a number of changes in the
foreign earned income exclusion which will substantially in-
crease the cost of maintaining U.S. employees abroad. Under
prior law, individuals employed overseas could exclude from
their income up to $20,000-and in some cases $25,000-of
their salaries. Moreover, in computing their foreign tax credit,
such individuals could treat the foreign taxes paid on their
excluded income as being attributable to their nonexcluded
income. In some cases, this had the effect of increasing the
amount of the income exclusion.
The Tax Reform Act replaces both the $20,000 and the
$25,000 exclusion with a single maximum exclusion of
$15,000. 3' In addition, it eliminates any foreign tax credit for
foreign taxes paid on the excluded amount. Finally, it requires
that the exclusion be ignored in determining the rates at which
any nonexcluded income is taxed.
30. TRA § 1051(f), amending I.R.C. § 243(b).
31. TRA § 1011, amending I.R.C. § 911.
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The United States is almost the only country which taxes
its citizens on their worldwide income regardless of whether
they reside in the United States or outside.' Ever since 1926,
however, there has been an exclusion for income earned abroad
by U.S. citizens under specified circumstances. Until 1962,
U.S. citizens abroad were allowed to exclude all of their foreign
earned income. The Revenue Act of 19622 limited the amount
excludable to $20,000, rising to $35,000 after a period of resi-
dence abroad of three years. In 1965 the $35,000 figure was
reduced to $25,000.
Until the Tax Reform Act of 19761 (TRA), the "earned
income exclusion" under section 911 of the Internal Revenue
Code was $20,000 for an individual who satisfied one of two
conditions:
1. He was a bona fide resident of a foreign country or countries
for an uninterrupted period which included an entire taxable
year; or
2. He was physically present in a foreign country or countries
for at least 510 days during any period of 18 consecutive months.
If the bona fide residence requirement was met, the exclusion
was increased to $25,000 after a 3-year period of bona fide
foreign residence.
In 1971 the Burke-Hartke Bill' proposed the repeal of sec-
tion 911 for virtually all U.S. citizens working abroad. Repeal
on a phaseout basis was proposed by Congress in the Tax Re-
form Bill of 19745 and again in 1975.8 Finally, the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 reduced the exclusion to such an extent that the
* Partner, Price Waterhouse & Co., International Tax Services. The author re-
tains the copyright to this article.
1. The other country is the Philippines.
2. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960 (codified in scattered
sections of 12, 26 U.S.C.).
3. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
4. H.R. 10914, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
5. H.R. 17488, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
6. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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maximum tax saving it provides to a married man filing a joint
return is now $3,000, i.e., the U.S. tax on the first $15,000 of
taxable income. Originally, the TRA made these changes effec-
tive for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1975. The
Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 19771.' postponed the
effective date to taxable years beginning after December 31,
1976.
II. SUMMARY OF THE 1976 CHANGES
The following changes were made by the TRA to section
911:
1. The amount of the exclusion is reduced to $15,000 per annum
regardless of length of overseas residence. Employees of chari-
table organizations can exclude $20,000 per annum.
2. The taxable income remaining after application of the exclu-
sion is subject to tax at the higher graduated rates which would
have been applicable if that earned income had not been ex-
cluded. This is known in some foreign tax systems as "exemption
with progression," because the exemption of income from tax
does not affect the progressive rates on the other income.
3. Foreign income taxes paid or accrued which are attributable
to the excluded income are not creditable or deductible.
4. Foreign earned income which is received outside the country
in which the employee earned it is not eligible for exclusion if one
of the purposes of receiving such income outside that country is
to avoid local income tax.
5. Taxpayers qualifying for the earned income exclusion can
elect not to claim it. An election not to claim the exclusion for
any taxable year is binding and can be changed only with the
consent of the Internal Revenue Service.
These changes, which are effective for taxable years begin-
ning after December 31, 1976, and their impact on U.S. citizens
abroad and their employers are discussed in greater detail
below. There were also a number of changes to other provisions
which have an impact on U.S. citizens abroad. These are as
follows:
1. Formerly, individuals claiming the foreign tax credit were
required to itemize deductions and could not claim the standard
deduction. Under the TRA, individuals who claim the foreign tax
credit can also claim the standard deduction.7
6.1 Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 302, 91
Stat. 152.
7. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1011(c), 90 Stat. 1611.
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2. Formerly, U.S. taxpayers could compute their foreign tax
credit on either a per country basis or an overall, worldwide basis.
The TRA repealed the per country method, and the overall
method is thus mandatory with some consequences for carryovers
of excess foreign tax credits from prior years."
3. Changes in the geographic source rules affecting the sale of
property will have some impact on the foreign tax credit of U.S.
citizens abroad, who formerly were able to convert some U.S.-
source capital gains into foreign-source capital gains by selling
property, such as stocks and securities, outside the U.S. In some
cases such sales will now result in U.S.-source income, and offset
of excess foreign tax credit against such income will not be possi-
ble.'
4. Formerly, a married couple of which one spouse was a nonres-
ident alien for any part of the year was precluded from filing a
joint income tax return or computing tax liability under the max-
imum tax rules. Under the TRA, a nonresident alien can elect
(with the spouse) to be taxed as a U.S. resident alien. In such
event the married couple can file a joint U.S. tax return (which
must include the worldwide income of the nonresident alien) and
can limit their tax under the maximum tax rules.1'
Ill. PROBLEM AREAS UNDER THE NEW SECTION 911
The changes to section 911 raise a number of problems.
First and foremost, the changes amount to a virtual repeal of
the exclusion, because the tax saved is at the most $3,000, and
the additional tax cost for an employee in the 50 percent tax
bracket could be $9,500 as shown in A and B below. Secondly,
for taxpayers and their advisers there are a number of compu-
tational uncertainties which cannot be resolved from a reading
of the statutes or the committee reports, and clarification will
have to await the issuance of regulations by the Treasury. The
most controversial of these problems may be handled by the
Technical Corrections Bill of 1977." Thirdly, since the election
not to claim section 911 is binding, the taxpayer cannot make
a decision on the election until the Treasury issues regulations
on circumstances in which the Internal Revenue Service will
allow a subsequent change in the election.
The main problem for the taxpayers is the additional tax
cost, which will be brought home very forcefully to them when
8. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1031, 90 Stat. 1620.
9. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1034, 90 Stat. 1629.
10. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1012, 90 Stat. 1612.
11. H.R. 6719, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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they file their 1977 returns. Since in many cases employees are
being reimbursed by their employers under tax reimbursement
plans,"2 U.S. employers have also become aware of the addi-
tional U.S. tax costs of doing business abroad. These problem
areas are discussed in more detail below.
A. Reduction in Exclusion
By reducing the exclusion from $25,000 to $15,000, an ex-
patriate's tax is increased by $10,000 at his top marginal rates
if he has been abroad for more than three years and was for-
merly eligible for an exclusion of $25,000. Thus the TRA in-
creases the U.S. tax of an employee in the 50 percent tax
bracket by $5,000 at one stroke. For an employee who has been
abroad for three years or less, the increased tax would be $5,000
at 50 percent or $2,500. Since the tax rate for a married couple
filing jointly reaches the 50 percent marginal rate of tax on
taxable income over $44,000, it is not too unrealistic to assume
many U.S. citizens working abroad would be in this tax
bracket, because in addition to their compensation they are
also taxed on the allowances they receive from their employers
for housing, cost-of-living, and other extra expenses of living
abroad.
B. Exemption with Progression
In determining the tax rate applicable to nonexcluded in-
come, the taxpayer must add back to his taxable income the
$15,000 of excluded income in the tax computation. Based on
section 911(d), the calculation of tax on the nonexcluded in-
come is made as follows:
Example 1.
Taxable income $35,000
Add: Excluded income $15,000
Less: Disallowed deductions -0- 15,000
$50,000
Tax on $50,000 17,060
Less: Tax on $15,000 excluded income 3,004
U.S. tax before credit $14,056
12. See IV. IMPACT ON EMPwmRS' TAX REIMBURSEMENT PIANS infra.
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In determining the amount of excluded income to be added
back for this purpose, deductions applicable to the excluded
income are deducted as follows:
Example 2.
Taxable income $35,000
Add: Excluded income $15,000
Less: Disallowed deductions 3,000 12,000
$47,000
Tax on $47,000 15,560
Less: Tax on $12,000 excluded income 2,255
U.S. tax before credit $13,305
The first of these examples shows that the remaining
$15,000 exclusion no longer saves the U.S. citizen tax in his top
tax bracket, but only at the rates applicable to the first $15,000
of taxable income, which for a married couple filing a joint
return is $3,004. For a U.S. taxpayer in the 50 percent tax
bracket, this change costs an additional tax of $7,500 less
$3,000, i.e., $4,500. Thus the two basic changes cost the me-
dium and highly compensated U.S. employee abroad an extra
$9,500 before foreign tax credits are taken into consideration.
C. Foreign Tax Credit Disallowance
Amended section 911(a) provides that the taxpayer will
not be allowed a deduction or credit for foreign income taxes
"to the extent that such deduction or credit is properly alloca-
ble or chargeable against amounts excluded from gross income
under this subsection."'" The TRA did not indicate how the
amount of foreign taxes disallowed in this way is to be com-
puted. The Senate Finance Committee Report states that since
the nonexcluded income is now taxed at the higher rates (under
the "exemption with progression" concept), the taxes disal-
lowed are to be considered as those taxes paid on the first
$15,000 of excluded income ($20,000 in the case of charities).
Prior to the Technical Corrections Bill of 1977, the IRS
issued instructions to the revised form 1116 (on which the for-
eign tax credit for individuals is computed) prescribing the
13. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1011, 90 Stat. 1610.
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manner in which U.S. citizens claiming the earned income ex-
clusion must compute their disallowed foreign tax. Many prac-
titioners questioned whether the method adopted by the IRS
was consistent with the intent of the TRA. This issue may be
settled by the Technical Corrections Bill of 1977, which pre-
scribes the manner in which the amount of disallowed foreign
tax is to be determined. The amount disallowed is to be calcu-
lated in the following manner:
U.S. tax on excluded income Foreign taxes paid
U.S. tax on excluded income on earned income
plus foreign tax credit
limitation for the year
If the Bill is enacted, i't is presumed that the IRS will issue
new instructions to revised form 1116 which will follow the
above method.
D. Income Received Outside Country in Which Earned
Under a new anti-avoidance provision, aimed presumably
at employees on "split payrolls" who are not reporting their full
salary to the foreign government, the TRA provides that for-
eign earned income which is received outside the country in
which earned is not eligible for exclusion if one of the purposes
of receiving such income outside that country is to avoid local
income tax. The fact that the country in which the income is
earned does not tax amounts received outside is, according to
the Senate Finance Committee Report, to be viewed as a strong
indication of a tax avoidance purpose. No indication is given
as to how the exclusion would be limited where at least $15,000
is received in the country of service. For example, if an em-
ployee is paid $25,000 by the U.S. parent company and $25,000
by a foreign subsidiary, it would appear that, regardless of the
motive for the "split payroll," $15,000 should be available for
exclusion. It should be noted that the exclusion is limited if the
income is received outside the country in which it is earned
(i.e., the country in which the employee performs the services
may not necessarily be the same country in which he is a resi-
dent). This restriction could, thus, have an adverse and per-
haps unintended impact on employees who are resident in one
country but travel extensively in other countries.
If the provision is intended to apply to the countries which
tax on a "remittance" basis, it is somewhat behind the times.
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The principal user of that method, the United Kingdom, ended
this basis of taxing foreigners in 1974 except for limited situa-
tions, for example, when a U.K.-based employee has an addi-
tional employment outside the United Kingdom.
This provision is a difficult one for tax advisers to handle
under our self-assessment procedure, except perhaps in the
most obvious situations.
E. Electing Out
Figure 1 illustrates a situation where the U.S. citizen
abroad would be better off not claiming the section 911 exclu-
sion. In most cases it will be necessary to make two calculations
in order to determine whether it would be advantageous not to
claim the exclusion. Generally, if the foreign tax is very much
higher than the U.S., the restriction in the TRA will simply
reduce excess foreign tax credits. However, if the employee can
use these excess tax credits, the new provision could result in
additional U.S. tax. In general, since the exclusion is now
worth only $3,000 in tax savings, any loss of foreign tax credit
over $3,000 would require consideration of the election. But
since the decision not to claim the exclusion is binding for
future years unless the consent of the Internal Revenue Service
is secured, it should not be elected without due consideration
of where the employee may be assigned from time to time. As
rapidly changing world economic conditions may make this
difficult to anticipate, it would seem only equitable that the
Service provide in its regulations for a change of election when
an employee moves to a different location.
Another way of avoiding the application of section 911
without making the election and, thus, retaining flexibility
may be to disqualify for its application. For example, section
1304(b) (3) prohibits a taxpayer who elects "income averaging"
from claiming the section 911 exclusion in the same year.
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Figure 1
Effect of Tax Reform Act of 1976 on
U.S. citizens working abroad
Assumptions
1. U.S. citizen married with 2 children.
2. Total salary and allowances: $50,000.
3. U.S. investment income: $1,000.
4. Itemized deductions: Nil.




6. Credit for personal exemptions ignored.
Effect of changes
1976 New law 1977()
Prior law Exclusion No Exclusion
$ $ $
1. Salary and allowances ....... 50,000 50,000 50,000
2. Less exclusion .............. 20,000 15,000 0
3. Earned income after
exclusion .................. 30,000 35,000 50,000
4. U.S. investment income ...... 1,000 1,000 1,000
5. Adjusted gross income 31,000 36,000 51,000
6. Itemized or standard
deduction .................. 0 (3,200)(2) (3,200)(2)
7. Personal exemptions ......... (3,000) (3,000) (3,000)
8. Taxable income ............. 28,000 29,800 44,800
9. U.S. tax before credit ........ 7,100 11,456(3) 14,460
A()
10. Foreign tax paid ............ 17,000 17,000 17,000
11. Foreign tax available ....... 17,000 13,771(4) 17,000
12. U.S. tax before credit ....... 7,100 11,456 14,460
13. Foreign tax credit(5) ......... 6,870 11,138 14,177
14. Net U.S. tax due ............. 230 318 283
15. Excess foreign tax
credit (line 11 - 13) ........ 10,130 2,633 2,823
B(I)
10. Foreign tax paid ............ 9,000 9,000 9,000
11. Foreign tax available ........ 9,000 7,291(4) 9,000
12. U.S. tax before credit ........ 7,100 11,456 14,460
13. Foreign tax credit(5 ) ......... 6,870 7,291 9,000
14. Net U.S. tax due ............ 230 4,165 5,460
15. Excess foreign tax
credit (line 11 - 13) ........ 2,130 0 0
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C(l)
10. Foreign tax paid ........... 0 0 0
11. Foreign tax available ........ 0 0 0
12. U.S. tax before credit ........ 7,100 11,456 14,460
13. Foreign tax credit ........... 0 0 0
14. Net U.S. tax due ............ 7,100 11,456 14,460
Notes:
1. The results under A and B illustrate the need to make two computations
to determine whether it might be preferable to elect not to claim the
earned income exclusion. Where foreign taxes are relatively high (ex-
ample A), the election may reduce U.S. tax due and increase excess
foreign tax credits. Where foreign taxes are relatively low (example C),
the exclusion is still beneficial.
The general increase in U.S. tax before credit is a result of the reduc-
tion in the exclusion and application of exemption with progression in
applying the tax rates.
The U.S. tax on the U.S. investment income is also increased because of
exemption with progression.
2. The standard deduction can now be taken even when the foreign tax
credit is claimed.
3. Computation of U.S. tax before foreign tax credit:
Taxable income ................. $29,800
Add excluded income ............ 15,000
Total ......................... $44,800
Tax on $44,480 .... ......... . $14,460
Less tax on $15,000 ............. 3,004
U.S. tax before credit .......... $11,456
4. Foreign tax available for credit:
Foreign earned income after exclusion Foreign taxes paid
U.S. tax on excluded income on earned income
plus foreign tax credit
limitation for the year
A B
11,456 X 17,000 11,456 x 9,000
3,004 + 11,138 = $13,771 3,004 + 11,138 = $7,291
5. Limitation on foreign tax credit allowable:
Foreign source taxable income
Total taxable income (before exemptions) X U.S. tax
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IV. IMPACT ON EMPLOYERS' TAX REIMBURSEMENT PLANS
In many countries the foreign income tax burdens on U.S.
citizens are higher than the U.S. tax, and any U.S. tax due is
eliminated by foreign tax credits. This will be the case even
after the TRA except in those situations where the foreign tax
credit disallowance will now result in some additional U.S. tax.
In many cases the U.S. citizen will bear the additional tax costs
himself. In most cases, however, the U.S. employers will pay
the extra tax burden of maintaining their employees overseas
under a variety of reimbursement plans. Reimbursement is
considered necessary to enable employees to be assigned to
high tax countries without loss of income. Tax costs are aggra-
vated by the fact that housing and other allowances are taxable
in most foreign countries as well as in the United States; it is
necessary to gross them up by the U.S. and foreign tax in order
to give an employee a guaranteed net disposable income.
Until recent years, most employers reimbursed their em-
ployees for excess taxes under so-called "tax protection" plans.
Under a tax protection plan, an employee is reimbursed for
U.S. and foreign taxes in excess of a hypothetical U.S. tax on
his base salary had he remained in the United States. Today,
"tax equalization," a more sophisticated method of reimburs-
ing an employee's extra tax on foreign assignment, is winning
favor with U.S. multinationals as they review their interna-
tional personnel arrangements in light of the TRA. Under a tax
equalization plan, the hypothetical tax is deducted from the
gross compensation and "retained" by the employer to pay
some or all of the excess taxes. By reducing gross compensa-
tion, the U.S. and foreign taxes are reduced. Tax equalization
overcomes the seemingly impossible task of giving an employee
a certain net disposable income by means of the following
steps:
1. Compute the U.S. tax that the employee would have paid on
his U.S. base salary if he had remained in the U.S.-the
"hypothetical tax." This gives the figure of net disposable income
that he would have had in the United States.
2. Establish his overseas compensation package by first deduct-
ing the hypothetical tax from his U.S. base pay. His U.S. base
pay is now in the form of net after tax disposable income.
3. Add to this amount all the allowances that he needs to re-
ceive net of tax, as well as any overseas or incentive premiums.




4. Reimburse him for all U.S. and foreign taxes actually paid.
The reimbursement is taxable in the United States and abroad
and will increase his tax base in the year received.
The following example illustrates the tax equalization
method.
YEAR ONE
1. Compute Hypothetical Tax
Employee's base salary $40,000
Hypothetical tax (10,000)
Net after tax disposable income in U.S. $30,000





Gross compensation (taxable) $50,000
3. Reimburse for U.S. and Foreign Taxes
U.S. and foreign taxes
(assumes a high tax country) $22,000
YEAR Two
1. Compute Hypothetical Tax
(same as Year One)





Add tax reimbursement (from Year One) 22,000
Gross compensation (taxable) $72,000
The advantage of tax equalization is that it neutralizes the
tax factor in moving employees from the United States to over-
seas locations and between foreign locations. Since the em-
ployer retains the $10,000 hypothetical tax by reducing the
employee's actual compensation by this amount, the $22,000
tax reimbursement inthe example represents an extra tax cost
of "only" $12,000. By deducting it from compensation in Year
One and reimbursing it in Year Two the increase in the em-
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ployee's taxable compensation (so-called "pyramid" effect) is
delayed and reduced. The deduction of the hypothetical tax
from compensation is the major feature which differentiates
tax equalization from tax protection.
The disadvantages are those inherent in any effort to reim-
burse employees for expenses and taxes abroad, especially
where large numbers of employees are sent abroad. First of all,
the employer must become more involved in the employee's
personal tax affairs than used to be considered desirable. This
involvement is usually mitigated by engaging outside consult-
ants to prepare the calculations and the U.S. and foreign tax
returns. This is one way employers can ensure that their em-
ployees comply fully with foreign tax laws.
The TRA will in many cases result in an acceleration of
payment of U.S. taxes and, consequently, in the reimburse-
ment by employers under tax equalization plans. By accelerat-
ing the reimbursement, the foreign tax base is also increased.
The acceleration in U.S. tax payments will generally result
from the U.S. wage withholding on that part of the U.S. salary
paid by the U.S. parent which exceeds the exclusion, now only
$15,000.
V. FURTHER LEGISLATIVE AcTION
U.S. citizens working abroad have responded to the TRA
with understandable outrage. There has been considerable
adverse comment in the press. The Wall Street Journal de-
voted an editorial to the implications for foreign trade.'4
Business Week called it a "foreign aid bill," because U.S. em-
ployees would be replaced by foreign nationals.'5 These com-
plaints have come to the attention of members of Congress in
Washington, and further proposals may be made in this area.
There are two schools of thought in Washington on U.S. busi-
ness abroad, with proposals reflecting these interests. There are
those who want American businesses to withdraw from abroad,
and who see no reason to give tax allowances along the lines of
section 911. One can, therefore, expect further proposals for the
complete repeal of section 911.
On the other hand, there is now a feeling in some quarters
14. Wall St. J., Nov. 1, 1976, at 14, col. 1.
15. Bus. WEEK, Oct. 11, 1976, at 31.
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that U.S. citizens working abroad are taxed excessively be-
cause of the inclusion in income of their housing and other
allowances. Thus, it seems possible that further proposals may
be made to liberalize the tax law, which should give recognition
to the fact that an expatriate employee's compensation pack-
age is made up not only of a base salary but also of allowances,
which are fully taxable, for housing, cost-of-living, education,
and home leave. Most of these allowances only enable the em-
ployee to live as he would have lived in the United States, and
it seems quite inequitable to treat as a taxable benefit the full
cost of Western-style living abroad. Such costs are in reality
business expenses and should not be taxed as benefits.
Meanwhile, for 1977 it appears that U.S. citizens abroad,
their employers, and their tax advisors must live with the com-
plex and costly changes of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.

Tax Reform Act of 1976: Controlled Foreign
Corporations
RICHARD W. GRAHAM*
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for
example, merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless proces-
sion: cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon excep-
tion-couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold
of-leave my mind only a confused sense of some vitally impor-
tant, but successfully concealed, purport, which it is my duty to
extract, but which is within my power, if at all, only after the
most inordinate expenditure of time. I know that these monsters
are the result of fabulous industry and ingenuity, plugging up
this hole and casting out that net, against all possible evasion;
yet at times I cannot help recalling a saying of William James
about certain passages of Hegel: that they were no doubt written
with a passion of rationality; but that one cannot help wondering
whether to the reader they have any significance save that the
words are strung together with syntactical correctness ....
I. INTRODUcTION
The Tax Reform Act of 19762 added to the sinuosities of
subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code3 but made no organic
changes in its "controlled foreign corporation" concept. The
Act made one "reform" (relating to the section 367 ruling pro-
cedure), added some minor exemptions, took away others, did
some loophole closing, and facilitated the investment of foreign
earnings in the United States.
The United States imposes an income tax on the world-
wide income of a domestic corporation. However, a foreign cor-
poration, even if owned by U.S. persons, is generally taxed only
on its U.S. source income; its foreign earnings are taxed only
to its U.S. shareholders and then only if and when distributed
to them. This principle-that no U.S. tax is imposed until the
income is "repatriated" -is sometimes referred to as "tax de-
ferral." A longstanding but narrow exception to deferral is the
* Member of the firm, Koster, Kohlmeier & Graham, P.C., San Francisco; A.B.,
1952, Stanford University; J.D., 1954, Stanford School of Law; Certified Specialist,
Taxation Law, California Board of Legal Specialization.
The author retains the copyright rights.
1. Hand, Eulogy of Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947).
2. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) [hereinafter cited as the Tax Reform
Act].
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 951-64 [hereinafter cited as I.R.C.]
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foreign personal holding company provisions,' which tax in-
vestment income of a foreign "incorporated pocketbook" di-
rectly to its U.S. shareholders as if it had been distributed to
them as a dividend.
A more sweeping departure from the rule of deferral was
created by the Revenue Act of 1962, 5 which added the infinitely
more complex6 subpart F7 to the Code. Under these subpart F
provisions business as well as investment income realized
through so-called tax haven devices is taxed directly to U.S.
shareholders even though it is earned and held by a foreign
corporation. This is done through the concept of a "controlled
foreign corporation" (CFC),' which is any foreign corporation
having more than 50 percent of its voting power held by "U.S.
persons," 9 each of whom holds 10 percent or more of the voting
power (herein called "U.S. shareholders").' 0 A U.S. share-
holder is taxed on his share of the CFC's "subpart F income"
and the "increase in its earnings invested in U.S. property.""
Subpart F income is composed of income derived from insur-
ance of U.S. risks and foreign base company (FBC) income.'"
FBC income is further broken down into a modified form of
foreign personal holding company income, FBC sales income,
FBC services income, and FBC shipping income.'" These rules
are then qualified by a labyrinth of definitions, exceptions,
exclusions, and rules of constructive ownership.
To supplement the denial of deferral under subpart F, the
1962 Act also added section 1248 to the Code. Subject to a
similar welter of qualifying rules, its general effect is to treat a
U.S. shareholder's disposition of CFC stock as a repatriation of
tax-deferred earnings. The treatment consists in taxing a por-
4. I.R.C. § 551-58.
5. Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960 (1962).
6. Often quoted is the wry observation that "the rules of Subpart F reach and
never leave a lofty plateau of complexity that the Internal Revenue Code had pre-
viously attained only in occasional subsections .... B. BIrrKER & J. EUSTCE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 17.31, (3d ed. 1971).
7. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, ch. 1 §§ 951-64, 76 Stat. 1006-27 (1962).
8. I.R.C. § 957(a).
9. I.R.C. §§ 957(d), 7701(a)(30).
10. I.R.C. § 951(b).
11. I.R.C. § 951(a)(1).
12. I.R.C. § 952.
13. I.R.C. § 954.
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tion or all of the gain from such a disposition as ordinary in-
come rather than capital gain.
. Thus the combined thrust of subpart F and section 1248
is to tax a U.S. shareholder at ordinary rates on certain income
of his CFC on a year-to-year basis as earned and on certain of
his gain when he disposes of his stock. The 1976 Act changes
some of the rules in both areas.
II. YEAR-TO-YEAR INCOME
A. Shipping Income
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975' 4 reversed the treatment of
shipping income'5 for CFC purposes. It had previously been
excluded from subpart F income;'" beginning in 1976 it is in-
cluded as a category of its own ("FBC shipping income") ex-
cept to the extent that it is reinvested in shipping operations.' 7
The House and Senate versions of the Tax Reform Act of
1976's would each have made several different changes in FBC
shipping income, but ony one change remained in the Act as
passed. This was the exemption of income derived from operat-
ing a vessel between two points in the foreign country in which
the vessel is documented and the CFC is incorporated. 9 The
committee reports state that the change was designed to bring
the treatment of shipping income into conformity with that of
sales and services income, which in general are treated as FBC
income only if earned outside the CFC's country of incorpora-
tion. 0 The change is effective concurrently with the FBC ship-
ping income rules themselves-that is, in years after 1975.21
The House bill would also have made clear that the exclu-
sion for shipping income reinvested in shipping operations in-
cludes payments on unsecured debts that constitute general
claims against the CFC's shipping assets.2 This was dropped
14. Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (1975).
15. "Shipping income" is defined, roughly, as income from the use of an aircraft
or vessel (I.R.C. § 954(f)), and the term "vessel" is used herein to include "aircraft."
16. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, ch. 1, § 954(b)(2), 76 Stat. 1010 (1962).
17. I.R.C. §§ 954(f), 955.
18. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
19. Tax Reform Act § 1024, amending INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, ch. 1, § 954(b), 76
Stat. 1010 (1962).
20. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1975) [hereinafter H.R.
REP.]; S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 231 (1976) [hereinafter S. REP.].
21. Tax Reform Act § 1024(b).
22. H.R. REP. 220-21.
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in the conference agreement on the assurance that the Treasury
Department would provide the same result in regulations.1
3
Also dropped in the conference agreement were two further
exclusions from FBC shipping income that would have been
added by the Senate bill, one for income from transporting men
and supplies between a point on shore and a nearby offshore
point (such as an oil drilling rig), and the other for a CFC that
does not own a vessel, lease a vessel on a long term basis to
another person, or produce any property shipped on a vessel
used or leased by the CFC. 4
B. Insurance
Income from an insurance company's investment of its
unearned premiums and reserves was exempted under prior
law from the foreign personal holding company constituent of
FBC income.15 The Act creates a further exception for passive
income from the investment of an amount of its assets equal
to one-third of a company's earned premiums on insurance
other than life insurance and annuities .2 The income must not
be received from, and the premiums must not be attributable
to the insurance or reinsurance of risks of, related persons as
defined in section 954(d)(3). This change is applicable to years
after 1975. 2
The House Committee explained that the one-third figure
represents the surplus that must be held by casualty compa-
nies to satisfy solvency requirements imposed by some state
regulatory agencies under a guideline set by the National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners. Since a foreign insurance
company is often effectively required to comply with this ratio
when participating in a reinsurance pool made up mainly of
companies doing business in the United States, the Committee
thought the income on this required surplus to be as much a
part of the active conduct of a business and as appropriately
excludable from subpart F as income on unearned premiums
and reserves.28
23. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 458 (1976).
24. S. REP. 231-32.
25. 1.R.C. § 954(c)(3)(B).
26. Tax Reform Act § 1023, amending INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, ch. 1, § 954(c)(3),
76 Stat. 1011 (1962).
27. Tax Reform Act § 1023(b).
28. H.R. REP. 219-20.
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The House Committee also stated that the risk insured or
reinsured by a company participating in a pool was not in-
tended to be treated as a risk of a related person merely be-
cause of the existence of the pool or of joint liability on the risk,
or because a related insurance company may jointly share in a
risk on a policy issued by one member of the pool. 9
C. Earnings Invested in U.S. Property
A U.S. shareholder of a CFC is taxed on his share not only
of its subpart F income, but also of its increase in earnings
invested in U.S. property." This latter requirement is to catch
the "constructive repatriation" of foreign earnings that is
thought to be effected whenever the foreign corporation's earn-
ings are put to use in the United States, even though not paid
to the U.S. shareholders. The measure of the constructive divi-
dend is the excess of the earnings invested in U.S. property at
the end of a year (which is the amount that would have been a
dividend if the property were then distributed) over that quan-
tum as of the end of the preceding year.3 ' This seems straight-
forward enough, at least by subpart F standards, but one writer
has warned that this is "perhaps the most understated section
in the Code . . . . [T]he full impact of the section-its full
potential-is simply not apparent in the initial reading . . .
[and it] can easily catch the unwary taxpayer in an unfortun-
ate tax web. 3 2 Without tracing this in detail, it will be noted
that the "earnings" can be from any source (the section has
nothing to do with subpart F income) and can have been
earned at any time. It is the interplay between the amount of
earnings and the amount of U.S. property that can cause unex-
pected results.Y
"U.S. property" includes practically all kinds of tangible
and intangible property connected with the United States, but
with the inevitable exceptions (for example, U.S. Government
debt obligations and bank deposits).31
29. Id. at 220.
30. I.R.C. § 951(a)(1)(B).
31. I.R.C. § 956(a).
32. 1 R. RHOADES, INCOME TAXATION OF FOREIGN RELATED TRANSACTIONS 3-101 to
-102 (1976).
33. It is possible for a U.S. shareholder to realize income from this source when
his CFC's U.S. investments have actually decreased during the year; see examples, id.
3-101 to -109.
34. I.R.C. § 956(b).
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The Act adds two more exceptions.3 5 One is stock or debt
of a U.S. corporation, provided that such corporation is not a
U.S. shareholder of the CFC and that the U.S. shareholders do
not together own as much as 25 percent of its stock." This latter
condition is to be met immediately after the CFC's investment
in the U.S. corporation. In determining the 25 percent owner-
ship the constructive ownership rules of subpart F are applied,
but without benefit of the exceptions that otherwise prevent
attribution of foreign persons' stock to U.S. persons.
The House bill would have narrowed the definition of U.S.
property more generously. The concept would have been re-
duced to stock and debt of a U.S. shareholder and tangible
property used by a U.S. shareholder.37 The Senate Committee
felt there was a "potential for abuse"3 in this approach, and
the lesser change was adopted by the Conference Committee.
Both the House and Senate committees stated that the pur-
pose of the amendment was to minimize any harmful effect of
section 956 on the balance of payments, while preserving the
taxability of investments that amount to an effective repatria-
tion of CFC earnings.
39
Both Committees also warned that if the facts indicate
that a CFC "facilitated" a loan to a U.S. shareholder, the CFC
would be considered to have made the loan. The House Com-
mittee gave as examples a CFC making a deposit in a U.S.
bank followed or preceded by a bank loan of a similar amount
to a U.S. shareholder, and a CFC supplying collateral for, or
guaranteeing a loan to, a U.S. shareholder. 0
The second new exception to U.S. property added by the
Act is "movable property (other than a vessel or aircraft) which
is used for the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing,
or transporting resources from ocean waters or under such
waters when used on the Continental Shelf of the United
35. Tax Reform Act § 1021, amending INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, ch. 1, §§ 956(b)(2),
958(b), 76 Stat. 1016-17, 1018-19 (1962).
36. I.R.C. § 956(b)(2)(F).
37. H.R. REP. 216-17.
38. S. REP. 227.
39. Id. at 226; H.R. REP. 216.
40. H.R. REP. 217 n. 21.
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States."'" This was added by the Senate Committee, which
stated that it is aimed at drilling rigs and other oil and gas
equipment, including barges, used on the U.S. Continental
Shelf (as defined in section 638), in the belief that "inclusion
of oil-drilling rigs used on the U.S. continental shelf acts as a
disincentive to explore for oil in the United States. Since these
rigs are movable, they can as easily be used in a foreign coun-
try."
42
Both these changes in the definition of U.S. property are
effective for years after 1975 and in determining the cumulative
amounts invested in U.S. property at the close of the last year
beginning before 1976.2
D. Export Trade Corporations
A further exclusion from FBC income is contained in sec-
tions 970-72 (which were inexplicably given subpart G as their
own) which concern "export trade corporations" (ETCs). The
exclusion was repealed prospectively for new corporations in
197144 because of an overlap with the DISC provisions but con-
tinues generally in effect for any CFC that qualified as an ETC
in a year beginning before October 31, 1971.11
The Act continued the lingering last rites for subpart G by
repealing section 972,46 which provided for the consolidated
treatment of a group of ETCs. The House Committee stated
that "this provision has been little used in the past and is not
currently being used." 47
III. DISPOSITION OF STOCK
The other half of the 1962 Congressional reach to tax for-
eign earnings is section 1248, which, in certain cases, taxes as
a dividend the gain on sales or exchanges of foreign corporation
stock. In general, section 1248 applies if at any time during the
five years preceding the sale the taxpayer was a U.S. share-
holder while the foreign corporation had CFC status. The divi-
dend treatment is limited to the corporaton's earnings attribut-
41. I.R.C. § 956(b)(2)(G).
42. S. REP. 226.
43. Tax Reform Act § 1021(c).
44. Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497 (1971).
45. I.R.C. § 971(a)(3).
46. Tax Reform Act § 1901 (the "deadwood" section).
47. H.R. REP. 391.
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able to the stock sold which were accumulated after 1962 and
during the period the stock was held while the corporation was
a CFC. Note that: (1) the taxpayer must have been a U.S.
shareholder at some point while the corporation was a CFC,
but once this requirement is met the taxpayer is taxed for the
entire period the stock was held during CFC status even though
the taxpayer might not have been a U.S. shareholder all that
time; and (2) neither U.S. shareholder nor CFC status need
exist at the time of sale. Also, the earnings that are the basis
for dividend treatment are not limited to subpart F earn-
ings-they are earnings from any source. In fact, subpart F
earnings previously taxed to the selling shareholder (but not his
predecessor) are excluded so they will not be taxed twice.4"
Threading through this general principle is the usual pano-
ply of exceptions and qualifications that one has come to ac-
cept as normal.
A. Less Developed Country Corporations
One such exception was for earnings realized while the
corporation was a "less developed country corporation"
(LDCC) on condition the taxpayer had held the stock for at
least 10 years.49 The Act eliminated this exception as such, but
left in effect an exception for earnings accumulated before 1976
while the CFC was an LDCC (under section 902(d) as in effect
before the Tax Reduction Act of 1975).1° This revised exception,
effective for years after 1975,-' is in one sense broader than
before since the 10-year holding period is eliminated.
2
The House Committee explained that "the extent to which
this exception has provided an incentive to invest in less devel-
oped countries is questionable ...your Committee believes
that it would be preferable to provide whatever assistance is
appropriate to less developed countries in a direct manner
where the economic costs can be accurately measured.
'5 3
48. I.R.C. § 1248(d)(1).
49. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, ch. 1, § 1248(d)(3), 76 Stat. 1043-44 (1962).
50. Tax Reform Act § 1022.
51. Tax Reform Act § 1022(b).
52. The House Committee stated that the "exclusion applies to pre-1976 earnings
regardless of whether the U.S. shareholder owns the stock for ten years as of that date"
(referring to January 1, 1976), but the wording of the Tax Reform Act makes irrelevant




B. Section 311, 336, and 337 Transactions
The Act fills another gap in the effort to tax the liquidation
of foreign earnings. Formerly, section 1248 imposed dividend
treatment on a disposition of stock only if gain in general was
recognized. The area of nonrecognized corporate organizations,
reorganizations, and liquidations under sections 332, 351, 354,
355, 356, and 361 was covered by section 367, which in effect
denied nonrecognition unless an advance ruling of no tax
avoidance was obtained. Here the foreign earnings were
reached through the I.R.S. practice of exacting a "toll charge"
for issuing a favorable ruling.54 For example, the liquidation of
an 80 percent owned foreign corporation into its domestic par-
ent, which absent section 367 would be tax-free under section
332, would be granted a favorable ruling if the parent agreed
to include in its income as a dividend its share of the foreign
subsidiary's earnings.55
This left certain other dispositions of foreign corporation
stock that were not covered by section 367 but that were also
not recognized and were thus outside section 1248. For exam-
ple, if a domestic corporation distributed "section 1248
tainted" stock as a dividend, gain would not be recognized
(under section 311 if it were a current dividend, under section
336 if it were a liquidating dividend), and the shareholders, if
they were individuals, would acquire a stepped-up basis for the
stock and would not be treated as holding the stock for the
period it was held by the parent corporation. Thus, although
the shareholders would be taxed on the dividend out of the
domestic corporation's earnings, there would be no corporate
tax on the foreign earnings. In addition, a domestic corporation
would not be taxed if it sold such stock as part of a complete
liquidation plan under section 337; the shareholders would pay
a capital gain tax on the liquidation but no ordinary income tax
would have been paid on the foreign earnings. The Senate
Committee believed "that the availability of non-recognition
treatment for distributions or exchanges of stock of controlled
foreign corporations in situations not presently covered under
section 367 or 1248 detracts substantially from the principle of
54. "Guidelines" for this were set forth in Rev. Proc. 68-23, 1968-1 CUM. BULL.
821.
55. Id. § 3.01(1); S. REP. 262.
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taxing accumulated earnings and profits of foreign corporations
upon repatriation."5
Accordingly, the Act57 amends section 1248 by adding a
new subsection (f) dealing with a domestic corporation that
holds foreign corporation stock which would be subject to sec-
tion 1248 if sold by it. If such a corporation transfers the stock
in a manner covered by section 311, 336, or 337, it is taxed
under section 1248 as if it had sold the stock, but based on the
excess of the stock's fair market value over its adjusted basis.56
This rule does not apply if the distribution is to a share-
holder which is also a domestic corporation, since here the
distributee does not get a stepped-up basis for the stock and
the "potential for the future application of section 1248 still
exists . . . ."I To satisfy this rationale and have the exception
apply, the distributee domestic corporation must be treated as
holding the stock for the period it was held by the distributor
and must satisfy the stock ownership requirements of section
1248(a)(2) immediately after the distribution. That is, the
distributee domestic corporation must be considered to have
owned the requisite 10 percent voting power at a time during
the preceding five years when the foreign corporation was a
CFC. This latter requirement would presumably make the ex-
ception inapplicable and would produce a dividend to the dis-
tributor if it had always owned, e.g., exactly 10 percent of the
voting power and it distributed less than its entire holding to
its domestic corporate shareholder.
New subsection (f) also contains another exception6 (this
one labelled a "Nonapplication"), not referred to in the com-
mittee reports, that is seemingly intended to avoid a duplica-
tion of tax in the case of section 337 sale proceeds that are
caught under subsection (e) of section 1248 (which treats a
domestic corporation as a first-tier foreign corporation when it
is "formed or availed of' principally to hold foreign corporation
stock) 2
56. S. REP. 264.
57. Tax Reform Act § 1042(c).
58. I.R.C. § 1248(f).
59. S. REP. 270.
60. I.R.C. § 1248(f)(2).
61. I.R.C. § 1248(f)(3).




The Act closed another potential loophole by amending
section 751, which deals with the "collapsible partnership"
concept, to add gain attributable to section 1248 stock to the
definition of "unrealized receivables" under section 751(c).1
3
This is intended to be similar to the treatment given sections
1245 and 1250 depreciation recapture under section 751(c).6
D. Section 367 "Other Transfers"
The Act contains another change which, though not
amending subpart F or section 1248 as such, will have a sub-
stantial impact on CFCs. Section 1042(a) of the Act completely
overhauls section 367, which required the advance ruling for
foreign corporations involved in certain normally tax-free
transactions. Amended section 367 distinguishes between such
transactions that are "outbound" transfers from a U.S. person
to a foreign corporation and transfers that are either into the
United States or are completely foreign ("other transfers").1
5
The former category does not generally involve the CFC con-
cept and will not be discussed except to say that it substitutes
a post-transaction clearance procedure for the advance ruling
formerly required. Its statutory aim was to "prevent the re-
moval of appreciated assets or inventory from U.S. tax juris-
diction prior to their sale ... ."" For this type of transaction
a judgment of the specific facts of each case to determine the
amount of tax required to prevent tax avoidance was still
thought necessary.67
The statutory purpose for the "other transfers" category
was "in most cases ... to preserve the taxation of accumulated
profits of controlled foreign corporations.""8 The Senate report
stated that taxpayers participating in this kind of transaction
"should be able to determine the tax effects . . .from the
statute and accompanying regulations rather than being re-
quired to apply to the Internal Revenue Service for a determi-
(e) and (f) that could occur when a domestic parent makes a liquidating distribution
of foreign corporation stock.
63. Tax Reform Act § 1042(c)(2).
64. S. REP. 271.
65. I.R.C. § 367(a),(b).
66. S. REP. 264.
67. Id. at 263.
68. Id. at 264.
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nation in advance. . . ."I Accordingly, under amended section
367 this kind of exchange no longer requires an advance ruling
or a post-transaction clearance. Instead, all such transactions
will in effect be nonrecognized as otherwise provided, "except
to the extent provided in regulations prescribed by the Secre-
tary which are necessary or appropriate to prevent the avoid-
ance of Federal income taxes."' " The section states that the
regulations shall provide as to when gain shall be immediately
recognized or taxed as a dividend, or both, or deferred for later
taxation, and for adjustments in earnings, basis of stock and
securities, and basis of assets."
The regulations are to deal with two kinds of "other trans-
fer." One is transfers into the United States, that is, those
constituting a present repatriation of foreign earnings, where
the intention is generally to impose an immediate tax. The
Senate Committee gave as examples of this group:
(i) the liquidation of a foreign corporation into a domestic parent;
(ii) the acquisition of assets of a foreign corporation by a domestic
corporation in a type "C" or "D" reorganization; and (iii) the
acquisition of stock in a foreign corporation by a domestic corpo-
ration in a type "B" reorganization.
2
The other group is transfers between foreign parties only
(which "involve a U.S. tax liability of U.S. shareholders only
to the extent of determining the amount of any deemed distri-
bution under the subpart F rules").13 The Senate Committee
gave as examples of these:
(i) the acquisition of stock of a controlled foreign corporation by
another foreign corporation; (ii) the acquisition of stock of a con-
trolled foreign corporation by another foreign corporation which
is controlled by the same U.S. shareholders as the acquired cor-
poration; (iii) the acquisition of the assets of a controlled foreign
corporation by another foreign corporation; (iv) the mere recapi-
talization of a foreign corporation (type "E" reorganization); and
(v) a transfer of property by one controlled foreign corporation to
its foreign subsidiary."
The Committee "anticipated" that for "these exclusively for-
69. Id. at 263.
70. I.R.C. § 367(b)(1).
71. I.R.C. § 367(b)(2).
72. S. REP. 268.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 268, 269.
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eign transactions... regulations will provide for no immediate
U.S. tax liability.""5 The Committee added that the regula-
tions may
establish rules pursuant to which an exchange of stock in a sec-
ond tier foreign corporation for other stock in a similar foreign
corporation will result in a deferral of the toll charge which other-
wise would be imposed based on accumulated earnings and prof-
its. This deferral could be accomplished by designating the stock
received as stock with a deferred tax potential in a manner simi-
lar to section 1248 without reference to the Decemker 31, 1962,
date; the amount includable as foreign source dividend income
upon the subsequent disposition of the stock in question results
in dividend income only to the extent of the gain realized on the
subsequent sale or exchange. In addition, if a second tier foreign
subsidiary is liquidated into a first tier foreign subsidiary, the
regulations may provide that the tax which would otherwise be
due in the absence of a ruling [citing Rev. Rul. 64-157, 1964-1
C.B. 139] is deferred until the disposition of the stock in the first
tier foreign subsidiary."
The Committee had earlier given as one reason for the amend-
ments:
The third area of difficulty in the present administration of
section 367 concerns situations where the IRS requires a U.S.
shareholder to include certain amounts in income as a toll charge
even though there is no present tax avoidance purpose but,
rather, only the existence of a potential for future tax avoidance.
This occurs under the section 367 guidelines because of limita-
tions in the carryover of attribution rules (sec. 381). The Internal
Revenue Service in some cases only has the option either of col-
lecting an immediate tax or of collecting no tax at all since the
IRS has in those cases no authority to defer payment of the tax
until the time that the avoidance actually arises, except by enter-
ing into closing agreement with the taxpayer."
Thus, we can expect regulations that will be far more com-
prehensive (and correspondingly more intricate) than the
guidelines of Revenue Procedure 68-2378 and that will provide
for deferral of tax in some instances where an immediate tax
has formerly been exacted. No doubt some of the techniques
of deferral that have been used in section 367 closing agree-
75. Id. at 269.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 263; for an example of such closing agreements, see Rev. Proc. 75-29,
1975-1 CUM. BuLL. 754.
78. 1968-1 CuM. BuLL. 821.
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ments (e.g., the "triggering events" in Revenue Procedure 75-
2971) will be continued in the regulations.
The amendments made by section 1042 of the Act are
generally applicable to transactions after October 9, 1975.80
However, to give the I.R.S. time to publish regulations for the
"other transfers" category, amended section 367(d) provides
that any exchange, i.e., whether "outbound" or "other," before
January 1, 1978, shall be governed by the post-transaction
clearance procedure that is thereafter applicable only to "out-
bound" transfers. Also, for any exchange described in section
367 as in effect December 31, 1974, that took place after 1962
and before October 4, 1976, which is not a transfer of property
to or from a U.S. person, a taxpayer will have until April 5,
1977, to request a nontax avoidance clearance. 8
79. 1975-1 CuM. BuLL. 754.
80. Tax Reform Act § 1042(e)(1).






With the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,' Congress
completed the most comprehensive and far reaching revision of
the Tax Code since 1969. Taxation of certain international
transactions received particular attention in the Act, especially
those implicated in the Congressional attempt to regulate tax
avoidance schemes. One of the most pervasive, or at least one
of the most attractive, of such tax avoidance schemes had been
the use of the foreign situs trust.
It is difficult to ascertain just how extensively foreign
trusts have been employed in the past.2 On one hand, it is easy
to succumb to the suspicion that foreign trusts have been more
* Assistant Director of the Program of Advanced Professional Development, Uni-
versity of Denver College of Law; B.A., 1972; J.D., 1975, University of Denver.
** A.B., 1975, Harvard University; J.D. candidate, University of Denver.
1. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 [hereinafter cited as the Act or the 1976 Tax
Reform Act] was passed by Congress and was signed by the President on October 4,
1976, as Pub. L. No. 94-455. Citations to the INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954
[hereinafter cited as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 and referred to as the Code] are to the
version in force immediately prior to the enactment of the 1976 Tax Reform Act, unless
otherwise noted.
2. Prior to the 1976 Tax Reform Act, there had never been any periodic reporting
requirements which would have enabled the Treasury Department to compile statistics
regarding the year-to-year operation of foreign trusts after their establishment by U.S.
citizens. The first of any foreign trust reporting provisions, in fact, was passed by
Congress in the Revenue Act of 1962, which simply required that, upon the creation
of, or the transfer of property to, a foreign trust, the grantor or transferor file such forms
as the Secretary might prescribe. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6048. Apparently, from
1962 until December 31, 1973, a total of 1391 of the prescribed returns, Form 3520, were
filed with the Service. Shop Talk, 42 J. TAX. 63 (1975). While these figures are perhaps
the best indication of the numbers of foreign trusts which have been created, they are
only approximate.
Comparable figures for the period prior to 1962 simply do not exist, and it is
necessary to rely on the opinions of practitioners whose impressions have appeared in
print. Several, in the early 1960s, referred to the increasing popularity of foreign situs
trusts at that time. E.g., Altman & Kanter, Current Tax Planning Through Foreign
Situs Trusts, 47 A.B.A.J. 635 (1961); Hammerman, Foreign Situs Trusts-Defining the
Undefined, 38 TAXES 529 (1960). Another wrote that, until 1960, not one trust had been
created by a U.S. grantor for U.S. beneficiaries in either the Bahamas or Bermuda,
two of the most obvious tax havens. Fine, Amazing Tax Advantages of Foreign Trusts
for United States Individuals, TENTH ANNUAL TULANE TAX INSTITUTE 163 (1961). Per-
haps the more realistic approach is to recognize that foreign trusts remained unfamiliar
to all but a highly sophisticated circle of attorneys and that the frequency of their use
was limited accordingly.
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a subject of scholarly commentary than a widespread element
of actual tax planning.' Certainly the costs of creating and
administering such a device must render it inexpedient for all
but the very wealthy.' Lending credence to this notion is the
fact that the anticipated revenue effects of proposals designed
to curtail the use of foreign trusts have always been insignifi-
cant.' On the other hand, the Treasury Department has consis-
tently urged Congress to adopt measures discouraging the use
of foreign trusts, arguing that they provided a vehicle which
permitted a number of wealthy Americans to defer, or even
avoid, their tax obligations. A similar concern has been ex-
pressed from other quarters as well. Testifying before the 1974
House Ways and Means Committee on the Tax Reform Act,
3. See Zimmerman, Foreign Trusts: Their Present and Future Estate Planning
Potential, 31 J. TAX. 258, 260 (1969), which implies that it was this mushrooming
publicity about foreign trusts, rather than the reality of their abuse, which in the past
led the Treasury Department to seek reforms limiting their use.
4. It has also been suggested that even the very wealthy may shy away from
foreign trusts, at least those established in Bermuda, the Bahamas, etc., either because
of the stigma of "tax dodging" associated with these localities, Comment, Foreign
Situs Trusts: The Option of Utilizing a High Taxation Jurisdiction, 52 TEX. L. REv.
949 (1974), or because of a "fear of persecution" by the Internal Revenue Service,
Grundy, The Off-shore Trust, 1971 BRITISH TAX REV. 336, 338 n.8.
5. E.g., Congress has estimated that the grantor trust rules of the 1976 Tax Re-
form Act, arguably the most stringent tax imposed on foreign trusts, will increase
federal revenues only by 10 million dollars annually. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 20 (1975) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 94-658]; S. REP. No. 94-938,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1976) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 94-9381.
6. William E. Simon, former Secretary of the Treasury, testified in a statement
prepared for the Senate hearings on the 1976 Tax Reform Act that, "[tihe House Bill
would end the tax loophole whereby many wealthy individuals avoid U.S. tax through
the creation of foreign trusts." Hearings on H.R. 10612 Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1976).
An even better indication of the attitude of the Treasury Department towards
foreign trusts is provided by a letter from Mr. Fred Hickman, Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury for Tax Policy, to Representative Vanik of the House Ways and Means
Committee. Mr. Hickman stated: "You asked whether the use of foreign trusts by
Americans constitutes a serious problem of tax avoidance. Although the seriousness
of the problem is debatable, it seems likely that in most cases the primary reason why
an American would choose to use a foreign trust rather than a domestic trust is to
reduce or defer U.S. taxes." Shop Talk, 42 J. TAX. 63 (1975).
Finally, several courts have rather cryptically referred to Project Haven, a grand
jury investigation into the use of foreign trusts, with respect to which the "morally
dubious tactics" of the Internal Revenue Service have been challenged on Constitu-
tional grounds. See United States v. Baskes, CCH 1977 STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S.
TAX CAS. (77-1, at 86,963) 9393 (N.D. II1. March 23, 1977); United States v. Matthies-
sen, CCH 1977 STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S. TAX CAS. (77-1, at 86, 792) 9351 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 11, 1977).
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one practitioner characterized foreign trusts as "among the
most flagrant types of tax abuse that the Committee should be
concerned with in the foreign area." 7
In several instances foreign trusts were designed strictly to
allow beneficiaries or grantors to completely avoid taxation.
For example, a foreign trust would be established in a country
with little or no income tax. Money from the trust would then
be deposited in a foreign bank with a branch office in the
United States. The U.S. beneficiary of the trust would then
apply to the American branch of the foreign bank for a loan in
the same amount as that deposited in the main office. Collat-
eral for the loan would be the money on deposit in the main
office. The U.S. beneficiary would then have free use of what
would ordinarily be taxable income, with the added benefit of
a tax deduction for the interest on the loan. As can be seen, it
was possible to establish a foreign trust the income of which
could be accumulated and eventually distributed to U.S. bene-
ficiaries without subjecting either the trust or its beneficiaries
to an income tax at any time, anywhere in the world.' Although
periodic Congressional efforts at reform succeeded in subduing
some of the most flagrant abuses, those efforts failed to elimi-
nate the lucrative opportunities for tax deferral provided by
foreign trusts.
Congress may have accomplished its goal in the Tax Re-
form Act of 1976. The reforms in the Act directed towards
foreign trusts approach the problem in three significant ways.
First, the Act broadens the scope of the excise tax provisions
to include appreciated property of whatever nature and in-
creases the rate applicable to such transfers to equal the maxi-
mum capital gains rate. Second, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, a new section has been added that treats income earned
by a foreign trust with one or more U.S. beneficiaries as if it
were still owned by those persons who transferred property to
the trust. Third, the Act modifies the so-called throwback
rules, principally by adding an interest charge to the distribu-
tions of foreign trusts. This, then, gives domestic trusts more
favorable treatment than foreign situs trusts.
7. Hearings on Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1934 (1975).
8. H.R. REp. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1962); S. REP. No. 1881, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51 (1962).
1977
678 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
This paper seeks to describe the provisions of the 1976 Tax
Reform Act which alter the tax treatment of foreign trusts and
to appraise their effectiveness in light of stated Congressional
goals. To place these provisions in their proper context, the
paper will first trace legislation designed to accomplish these
ends.
II. ATTRIBUTES OF THE FOREIGN TRUST
For a considerable period of time, foreign trusts gained
increasing popularity in spite of the dangers created by the
failure of Congress, the Treasury Department, and the courts
to identify precisely which criteria characterized a trust as a
foreign entity.? It has always been unquestionably clear that a
trust established by a foreign settlor and administered by a
foreign trustee for the benefit of foreign beneficiaries qualifies
as a foreign trust.'0 However, considerable difficulty arose once
the trust began to acquire limited contacts with the United
States.
In the face of this uncertainty, commentators reached a
general consensus that a trust created in a foreign jurisdiction
and administered there by a foreign trustee would be treated
as a foreign trust for federal tax purposes." Of critical import-
ance was the fact that the fiduciary was a nonresident alien and
that the trust was created under the law of a foreign jurisdic-
tion. While some weight might be given to the place of adminis-
tration and the location of the trust res, these factors were not
9. See generally Altman & Kanter, Current Tax Planning, supra note 2, at 635;
Hammerman, Foreign Situs Trusts, supra note 2, at 533-42; Hammerman, IRS Clari-
fies Foreign Situs Trusts as Bill to End Some Tax Benefits Dies, 13 J. TAX. 199 (1960);
Tovey, Structure and Tax Advantages of Foreign Situs Trusts, 49 GEo. L.J. 697, 699-
707 (1961).
10. Cf. Muir v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 819 (4th Cir. 1950). In a suit by the trustee
for a judicial determination on the apportionment of income between two beneficiaries,
one an alien residing in the United States, the other an English citizen, the Commis-
sioner did not contest the trustee's failure to file federal income tax returns, presuma-
bly on the basis that the trust was a foreign situs trust; here it had been created in
England by an English grantor, administered by an English trustee, and funded by
U.S. securities apparently held in England.
11. See sources cited in note 9 supra.
Congress has defined foreign trusts on the basis of these criteria in a committee
report which accompanied an unsuccessful bill to discourage such trusts; that report
indicated that the proposed amendments would apply to a "trust created by a U.S.
citizen in a foreign country with a non-resident alien as trustee." S. REP. No. 1616,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1960).
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controlling. Moreover, it remains well settled that a foreign
trust may be created by a U.S. grantor for the benefit of U.S.
beneficiaries; in fact, the provisions of the Tax Reform Act,
applicable to "[a] United States person who . . . transfers
property to a foreign trust . . . if there is a U.S. beneficiary,"' 2
compel such a conclusion. Accordingly, the following discus-
sion assumes the definition of a foreign trust to be a trust
created by a U.S. person in a foreign jurisdiction with a nonres-
ident alien as trustee.
III. TAXATION OF THE OPERATING FOREIGN TRUST, ITS GRANTOR,
AND BENEFICIARIES
A. Background and Historical Development
The fundamental premise underlying the entire system of
trust taxation is that the the trust and its beneficiaries are
treated as separate taxable entities.'3 To avoid double taxation,
the Code contains an elaborate set of rules designed to appor-
tion tax liability between the two. In general, the trust is al-
lowed a deduction for distributions made to beneficiaries, who
in turn are required to include those distributions in their gross
income. In simple trusts, where the income is distributed cur-
rently as earned, the trust simply serves as a conduit, channel-
ing all the year's income, together with the entire tax liability,
to the beneficiaries. In all other trusts-complex trusts-the
trustee may retain annual income, pay any tax due, and dis-
tribute the amounts accumulated in later years. In theory, in-
come is taxed to the trust when retained by it, and to the
beneficiaries when distributed.
The measure of the respective tax obligations of the trust
and its beneficiaries depends on distributable net income
(DNI).' 4 Defined as the taxable income of the trust, subject to
various adjustments,'" DNI establishes the maximum amount
which the trust may take as an annual deduction.'" When an
annual distribution falls short of DNI, the trust pays the tax
on the undistributed portion; the sum of that tax and the un-
12. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1013 (a), adding INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 679(a)(1).
13. Much of the following summary is based on H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 92 (1969).
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 643(a).
15. Id.; the most significant of these adjustments is that taxable income is com-
puted without regard to the deduction allowed for distributions to beneficiaries.
16. Id. §§ 651(b), 661(a).
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distributed income are termed "undistributed net income."' 7
Any distribution in excess of DNI is treated as an accumulation
distribution and is taxed to the beneficiaries under the throw-
back rules.
Clearly, when current income accumulates in the trust,
substantial benefits may be achieved under the progressive
rate structure whenever the rate applicable to the trust is less
than that of the beneficiaries. Accordingly, the Code has al-
ways contained provisions to vitiate these income-splitting pos-
sibilities by taxing beneficiaries on accumulated income dis-
tributed to them in substantially the same manner as though
they had received it in the same year the income was earned
by the trust. Every distribution in excess of DNI is treated as
consisting of undistributed net income accumulated in prior
years. 8 When "thrown back," the accumulation distribution is
deemed to have been received by the taxpayer in those prior
years in which the trust retained undistributed net income."
The peculiar advantages which have in the past attached
to foreign trusts resulted from the combined applications of the
above described principles of trust taxation and the rules set-
ting forth the tax treatment of foreign entities. For just as
trusts generally are taxed as individuals, 2 foreign trusts are
treated as nonresident aliens.2 ' In addition to the income-
splitting and tax deferral benefits available under all trusts, a
foreign trust accumulating income could escape paying U.S.
income tax or, for that matter, any income tax whatsoever.
A nonresident alien individual engaged in trade or busi-
ness within the United States is taxed at section 1 rates only
on that income which is effectively connected with the conduct
of a trade or business within the United States.2 Pursuant to
the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966,2 it is even possible for
17. Id. § 665(a).
18. Id. § 666(a).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 641(b).
21. See Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(a) (1977); Hearings on the Tax Recommendations
of the President Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
271 (1961). Compare INT. RED. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a)(31) with INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 872(a).
22. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 871(b).
23. Pub. L. No. 89-809, tit. I, 80 Stat. 1539 (1966) (codified in scattered sections
of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954).
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a foreign trustee to trade in domestic stocks or securities
through a resident broker, custodian, or agent, for such conduct
is excluded from the definition of "trade or business within the
United States."24 The exclusion will still be available if the
principal, i.e., the trustee, maintains an office or fixed place of
business within the United States," but doing so will likely
destroy the trust's status as a nonresident alien.
26
Otherwise, the Code imposes a tax of 30 percent, or lower
treaty rate if applicable, upon the fixed or determinable in-
come, such as rents, interest, dividends, and the like, of a non-
resident alien individual who is not engaged in a trade or busi-
ness within the United States." The tax is withheld at the
source, and the responsibility for its payment lies with the
person having the control, receipt, custody, disposal, or pay-
ment of the income. 2s No tax at all is placed upon the capital
gains realized by the foreign trust within the United States,
provided that the trust is not deemed to have been present in
the country for 183 days or more during the taxable year.
29
Finally, a foreign trust is not required to pay any U.S.
taxes on income derived from sources outside the United
States.30 Thus the trust itself will incur U.S. taxes only to the
extent that it earns ordinary income from sources within the
United States, assuming it is not present in the country for
more than 183 days.
In practice, the foreign trust, more likely than not, paid no
income tax, either to the United States or to any other taxing
jurisdiction. In other words, if the foreign trust were estab-
lished in a country with little or no income tax, and if it limited
its investments in such a manner that the income would not
be taxable either by the United States or by the country of its
source, then that trust would offer a lucrative method of accu-
mulating and compounding tax-free income. Moreover, while
the use of foreign trusts thus permitted the shifting of income
24. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 864(b)(2).
25. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 864(c) bars the exclusion where the taxpayer is
trading in securities, but not where the taxpayer is trading for his own account.
26. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
27. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 871(a)(1).
28. Id. § 1441(a).
29. Id. § 871(a)(2).
30. See id. § 871(a).
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to a nontaxable entity, the structure of the throwback rules
under the original version of the 1954 Code sanctioned not just
the postponement of taxation, but rather its avoidance alto-
gether, once the accumulated income was distributed to the
beneficiaries.
As originally enacted, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
limited the amount of the taxable accumulation distribution."
Thus, if a foreign trust minimized its undistributed net income
in the five years preceeding a distribution of accumulated earn-
ings, or at least if it made investments the income from which
would not be included in DNI, the beneficiaries were not taxed
on the distribution.32 Apart from this exemption, the Code also
contained numerous exceptions to the original throwback
rules.3 Perhaps the most expansive was an exclusion from the
definition of a taxable accumulation distribution of all
amounts paid to beneficiaries in a final distribution nine years
after the date of the last transfer to the trust. 4 If properly
created, trusts funded in successive years could, under this
exception, assure the beneficiaries of an annual income which
was not subject to taxation in their hands.
Not surprisingly, the preferential tax status of foreign
trusts, arising by virtue of their existence outside the reach of
the U.S. taxing authority and also by virtue of the inadequacy
of the throwback rules, stirred concern both in Congress and in
the Treasury Department. In the Trust and Partnership In-
come Tax Revision Bill of 1960,11 the Senate Finance Commit-
tee proposed amendments to the Code which would have elimi-
nated the application of the exceptions to the throwback rules
with respect to foreign trusts, and which would have broadened
the categories of foreign trust income subject to the new, ex-
31. Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 224 (1954) (current version at INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 666(a)).
32. Altman & Kanter, Current Tax Planning, supra note 2, at 639; Altman &
Kanter, Senate Finance Committee Looks at Foreign Situs Trusts, 38 TAXES 585, 592
(1960).
33. Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 223 (1954) (current version at INT. Rev. CODE
OF 1954, § 665(b)).
34. Id. (formerly codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 665(b)).
35. H.R. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); see S. REP. No. 1616, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 26, 60 (1960). Although the bill was reported out of the Senate Finance Commit-
tee, it failed to gain passage prior to adjournment.
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panded throwback rules.36 Significantly, the proposed mea-
sures would not have taxed income accumulated earlier than
the five years preceeding distribution. 7
The abortive Senate Finance Committee proposals clearly
charted the direction for future reform. In the following year,
the Kennedy Administration urged the revival of the Finance
Committee measures with respect to foreign trusts then exist-
ing. As for trusts created in the future, the Administration
advocated, rather presciently, that their income be taxed cur-
rently to the grantor.3 Then, in the Revenue Act of 1962, the
87th Congress succeeded in enacting the first significant re-
forms applicable to foreign trusts .
3
The 1962 amendments affected the taxation of foreign
trusts in several important ways. First, the Act repealed the
five year limitation to the throwback rules, as well as all other
exceptions, with respect to foreign, but not domestic trusts.'
Placed in a less advantageous position than the beneficiaries
of domestic trusts, beneficiaries of foreign trusts could no
longer escape taxation on accumulated earnings eventually dis-
tributed to them.
41
Secondly, the 1962 reforms expanded the applicability of
the throwback rules by broadening the definition of a foreign
trust's distributable net income. 4 Formerly, the DNI of a for-
eign trust had included, in addition to those items of income
computed in the DNI of a domestic trust, net foreign income.
43
Because neither capital gains nor income exempt from U.S. tax
by treaty were required to be included in the distributable net
income of a trust, they were not in the calculation of undis-
36. See Altman & Kanter, Senate Finance Committee, supra note 32, at 586, 651-
54.
37. Id. at 654.
38. Hearings on the Tax Recommendations of the President Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 272 (1961).
39. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 7, 76 Stat. 985.
40. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 7(b), 76 Stat. 985 (formerly codi-
fied at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 99 666(a), 665(c), repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 331(a), 83 Stat. 592).
41. See Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 258.
42. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 7(a)(1), 76 Stat. 985 (current
version codified at INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 643(a)(6), as amended by 1976 Tax
Reform Act, § 1013(c)).
43. Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 217 (1954) (current version codified at Mcr. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 643).
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tributed net income, to which the throwback rules applied.
4
By redefining DNI to embrace those items of income,45 the
1962 Act equalized the treatment of foreign and domestic
trusts.
Finally, the Act for the first time required the grantor or
transferor of a foreign trust to file an information return. Fail-
ure to file the return entailed a substantial penalty.47 It is diffi-
cult to ascertain whether the information submitted on these
returns has proven valuable for the purposee of drafting reme-
dial legislation; it has, however, been suggested that that infor-
mation is not sufficient to enable the Internal Revenue Service
to detect serious abuses of the foreign trust provisions."
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 contained provisions which
broadly restricted the usefulness of domestic trusts, at the
same time indirectly enhancing the relative attractiveness of
foreign trusts. Seeking to accord foreign and domestic trusts
identical treatment,49 Congress abolished all the throwback
rule exceptions with respect to domestic trusts .5 The effect of
this amendment was to restrict the utility of all trusts, foreign
and domestic, to tax deferral, rather than tax avoidance. None-
theless, since the foreign trust usually paid no income taxes
during the period of accumulation, the deferral benefits avail-
able to the foreign trust were relatively enhanced. While the
domestic trustee paid tax annually on its undistributed in-
come, such income accumulated tax-free in the foreign trust.
A second advantage accruing to the beneficiaries of foreign
trusts arose as a result of a revision of the rules relating to
capital gains. Pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1962, the capital
gains of a foreign trust were included in its distributable net
income, and each distribution to the beneficiaries was deemed
to be proportionally composed of capital gains. Under the 1969
44. Id.
45. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 7(a)(1), 76 Stat. 985.
46. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6048.
47. Id. § 6677(a).
48. New York State Bar Ass'n, Report on Foreign Trusts, 31 TAX L. REV. 265, 270
(1976).
49. See H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 94 (1969); S. REP.
No. 91-552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 127 (1969).
50. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 331(a), 83 Stat. 592, amending
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 223 (current version codified at
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 665(b), 666(a)).
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Act, however, the capital gains of domestic trusts were treated
separately from ordinary income. 5' As a consequence, amounts
distributed to the beneficiaries of a domestic trust were taxed
as ordinary income until all the ordinary income accumulated
throughout the existence of the trust had been exhausted."2 In
contrast, the beneficiary of a foreign trust could take advantage
of the preferential capital gains rates in each distribution,
without waiting first for all ordinary income to be exhausted.
53
On the eve of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, foreign trusts
appeared to provide a superior means of compounding income
realized in tax-free investments. Also, taxpayers had achieved
considerable savings by structuring complicated transactions,
the linchpin of which was one or more foreign trusts. It is in
light of these unintended statutory preferences granted to for-
eign trusts over domestic trusts, as well as the succession of
unsuccessful legislative efforts to eliminate those preferences,
that the provisions of the 1976 Tax Reform Act must be exam-
ined.
B. Changes under the Tax Reform Act of 1976
In many ways, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 represents a
departure from past Congressional attempts to regulate foreign
trusts. In prior years, Congress sought to vitiate the effects of
tax deferral through a fine tuning of the throwback rules. Now,
the principal approach of the Act is to attribute all ownership
of the trust to those persons who fund it, requiring them to pay
a current, rather than a postponed, tax on the trust's annual
income. As a "safety net" provision, the Act also imposes an
interest charge upon accumulation distribution taxes, when-
ever the grantor trust rules are inapplicable.
1. Grantor Trust Rules
By 1974, when the proposed amendments relating to for-
eign trusts were first considered by Congress,54 the House Ways
51. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 331(a), 83 Stat. 596 (formerly
codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 669), repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 701(d).
52. Id.
53. See generally Dale, Foreign Trust Now Offer Particular Estate Planning
Advantages, 36 J. TAX. 20, 21 (1972).
54. Originally, these amendments were introduced as sections 312-14 of the En-
ergy Tax and Individual Relief Act of 1974, H.R. 17488, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974),
which failed to gain passage prior to the adjournment of the 93d Congress. For a
summary of the provisons of this bill, see H.R. REP. No. 93-1502, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
120 (1974).
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and Means Committee had already identified what it felt to be
the single greatest deficiency of the foreign trust provisions of
the Code. The Committee clearly recognized that the likeli-
hood that a foreign trust might accumulate income free from
any tax whatsoever represented "an unwarranted advantage to
the use of a foreign trust over the use of a domestic trust."5
To remedy this defect, the 1976 Tax Reform Act adds a
new section especially tailored to foreign trusts, section 679.56
Section 679 provides that any U.S. person who directly or indi-
rectly transfers property to a foreign trust shall be treated as
the owner of that portion of the trust which is attributable to
such transferred property, if there is a U.S. beneficiary of any
portion of the trust. While the scope of this general rule is
extended by various accompanying attribution rules, the legis-
lative history reveals an intent that its applicability be even
broader than may be apparent from the face of the statute.
Several specific exceptions, however, may enable tax and es-
tate planners to employ foreign trusts under limited circum-
stances in the future.
Of the two prerequisites to the applicability of the rule,
only the question of the existence of a U.S. beneficiary is
treated by the Act in any detail; the other requirement, that
there be a U.S. transferor, is clarified only in the Committee
reports and will be discussed below. In general, a trust is
treated as having a U.S. beneficiary unless the terms of the
trust agreement satisfy both of two conditions. First, during the
taxable year, no part of the income or corpus may be paid to
or accumulated for the benefit of a U.S. person;57 and second,
if the trust were to terminate at any time during the taxable
year, no part of the income or corpus may be paid to or for the
benefit of a United States person."
A new set of attribution rules establishes when the income
or corpus of a foreign trust is paid to or accumulated for the
55. H.R. REP. No. 93-1502, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 121, 122 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 94-
658, at 207.
56. 1976 Tax Reform act, § 1013(a), adding INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 679(a)(1).
57. "U.S. person" is defined by INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a)(30) to include
any citizen or resident of the United States, domestic partnership, domestic corpora-
tion, or estate or trust other than a foreign estate or trust within the meaning of INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a)(31).
58. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1013(a), adding INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 679(c)(1).
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benefit of a U.S. person. A foreign entity will be deemed to be
a U.S. beneficiary if: (1) it is a foreign corporation, of which
more than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock is owned by United States shareholders; (2) it
is a foreign partnership, of which a U.S. person is a partner; or
(3) it is a foreign trust or estate which has a U.S. beneficiary. 9
In any taxable year in which a trust, which would have
otherwise been subject to section 679 in the immediately pre-
ceeding taxable year but for the lack of a U.S. beneficiary,
actually acquires a U.S. beneficiary, the United States trans-
feror is then treated as the owner of the trust. The transferor
will thus be required to include in his gross income for the year
in which the trust acquires a U.S. beneficary all the undistri-
buted net income retained by the trust as of the close of the
immediately preceeding taxable year, to the extent that such
undistributed net income is attributable to property trans-
ferred to the trust by the transferor. 0
The Committee reports indicate that these requirements
can be met only if the trust instrument (which is to be read to
include any related written or oral agreements between the
trustee and the transferor) specifically names all permissible
beneficiaries, no one of whom is a U.S. person, or if it describes
all beneficiaries as a class of unnamed persons which specifi-
cally excludes all U.S. persons." In other words, the trust may
be treated as a grantor trust if any person, whether or not
adverse to the grantor, possesses the power to appoint U.S.
beneficiaries or even to so amend the trust agreement in such
a way that the trustee might be authorized to distribute corpus
or income to a class which could conceivably include a U.S.
person.2 If a foreign trust does not have a U.S. beneficiary, it
will, nonetheless, fall under the reach of section 679 should any
of its beneficiaries become a U.S. person. 3
The liability created by section 679 is imposed on any U.S.
person who transfers property to a foreign trust which has or
acquires a U.S. beneficiary, regardless of whether such a trans-
59. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1013(a), adding INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 679(c)(2).
60. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1013(a), adding INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 679(b).
61. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 210; S. REP. No. 94-938, at 219.
62. Id.
63. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 210 n.12.
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fer is made directly or indirectly. If a U.S. person possesses
sufficient control over a domestic or foreign entity to cause that
entity to make a transfer to a foreign trust or if the entity
merely serves as a conduit for such a transfer by a U.S. person,
then the U.S. person will be considered to have made an indi-
rect transfer." For example, a foreign trust funded by a domes-
tic corporation in which a U.S. person has a controlling interest
may be regarded as owned by the shareholder. Also, Congress
apparently expects the term "indirect transfer" to encompass
loans to the trust, whether made by any U.S. person or merely
guaranteed by him, regardless of the formality or informality
of the guarantee. 5
The general rule of section 679(a) applies equally to trans-
fers that are donative as well as to sales or exchanges. 6 The
Act, however, does except sales or exchanges that are made of
property transferred at its fair market value in a transaction in
which the transferor realizes all gain at that time and recog-
nizes it either at the time or under an installment method of
reporting. "7 This exception was designed to protect parties in
ordinary business transactions, who transfer property to the
trust in return for full and adequate cash consideration or in-
stallment payments, and who otherwise risk being treated as a
partial owner of the trust assets. However, the exception is not
broad enough to cover transfers in return for a private annuity
or other "open transactions."
A U.S. person is regarded as the owner of a foreign trust
only during his lifetime. Section 679 is not applicable to trans-
fers to foreign trusts which take effect by reason of the death
of the transferor.70 Thus, the estate of a U.S. individual would
not be taxed on the income of a foreign testamentary trust.7'
64. Id. at 209.
65. Id. at 209 n.9.
66. Id. at 210.
67. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1013(a), adding INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 679(a)(2).
A transaction reported on an installment basis, however, will be subject to the section
1491 excise tax. See text accompanying notes 107-51 infra.
68. See Lerner, US.A.: Legislative Proposals Affecting the Taxation of Foreign
Trusts, 75-3 TAx MANAGEMENT-INT'L J. 10. 13 (1975).
69. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 210.
70. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1013(a), adding INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 679
(a)(2)(A).
71. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 209.
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Whether or not the foreign trust would be included in the gross
estate of the settlor of an inter vivos trust would depend on the
applicability of the estate tax provisions." Therefore, all the
advantages that were available by using a foreign trust prior to
the 1976 Tax Reform Act are still within reach of the testamen-
tary trust.
To facilitate the implementation of section 679, changes
have been made in two other sections. Section 6048 has been
amended to make it the responsibility of the grantor to file a
trust information return. The information to be required has
not yet been prescribed but will be provided at a later date by
regulations. Failure to file such a return is covered by amend-
ments to section 6677(a). In addition to any criminal penalty,
a person failing to file such information is subject to a penalty
equal to 5 percent of the entire trust corpus (not just the value
of property transferred to the trust by the grantor) or $1,000,
whichever is less.
It must be noted that the Tax Reform Act of 1976 makes
many of these changes retroactive. Section 679 and the amend-
ments to sections 6048 and 6677 apply to taxable years ending
after December 31, 1975 (which encompasses taxable years
beginning as early as February 1, 1975). This is, however, only
in respect to trusts created or transfers made after May 21,
1974.
Any appraisal of the new grantor trust rules must begin by
recognizing that, while they may be consistent analytically
with the principles of federal income taxation, they seem to
exceed what has customarily been the jurisdictional limit of the
taxing power of the United States.
While the contours of those rules of international law
which limit the extent of a country's tax jurisdiction have never
been defined with any clarity, it would seem that Congress does
not have the power to tax a foreign trust directly. One authority
states the relevant general principles of international law as
follows:
states have authority, as an incident of sovereignty, to tax aliens
resident within their territory and their property there situated.
In theory, states are presumed to limit the taxation of non-
resident aliens to their property situated within the jurisdiction
of the taxing states and to income derived from sources therein.7 3
Whether or not these principles are mandatory or merely per-
72. Id.
73. 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 575 (1942).
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suasive, U.S. practice has demonstrated compliance in the
past.74 In fact, foreign trusts, according to the definition set
forth in the Code, are entities "the income of which, from
sources outside the United States which is not effectively
connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the
United States, is not includable in gross income. . .. " It
should be clear that the United States is justified in taxing
currently the income of a foreign trust only by virtue of the
artificial attribution of its ownership to a U.S. grantor.
Even this justification fails in view of its departure from
the premises underlying grantor trust taxation. Traditionally,
the Code has denied a grantor the opportunity to shift tax
liability to a trust where the grantor has retained certain inci-
dents of ownership, such as a power to revoke or a right to
receive income. Preserving the practical effect, but not the ra-
tionale of the grantor trust rules, section 679 adds an entirely
new criterion, the residence of the trust and its beneficiaries,
qne which bears virtually no relation to the queston of actual
ownership. It is, in other words, all too possible for the grantor
to convey all rights and interest in the trust, both legal and
equitable, present and future, and yet still be treated as the
absolute owner pursuant to the highly contrived and anoma-
lous fiction created by section 679. Such a result might be
achieved simply because of the random migrations of a benefi-
ciary, factors over which the grantor can have little or no con-
trol.7" The artificial attribution of ownership of the foreign trust
should not be used to disguise what is in fact an expansion of
Congress's traditional and customary power to tax nonresident
aliens.
Further criticism of section 679 might be directed at its
unfairness and its inadequacy. First, as implied above, the
grantor is taxed on all the trust's income, whether accumulated
or distributed. This appears to be true even where the income
is paid and taxed currently to the beneficiaries, since there are
no provisions permitting the beneficiary to credit taxes paid by
74. Cf. text accompanying notes 23-30 supra.
75. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a)(31).
76. Of course, the grantor may draft provisions terminating the trust or at least
the migrant beneficiary's interest, taking care not to subject himself to any of the other
grantor trust pitfalls. This remedy is not, it should be noted, available to the transferor
who was not the settlor.
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the grantor. This increase in the grantor's tax liability will
carry through on a state and municipal level, since many juris-
dictions calculate state and local income taxes on the basis of
federal adjusted gross income.
Finally, as broadly as Congress intended section 679 to be
interpreted, its potential application remains in question. The
Act states that the transferor will be taxed on direct or indirect
transfers to a foreign trust," and the legislative history de-
scribes in remarkably sweeping terms what should be consid-
ered an indirect transfer."8 It seems likely that the Service will
construe this portion of the section in as broad a manner as
possible. Nonetheless, the statutory language does not foreclose
the possibility of circuitous transactions which might circum-
vent the purposes of the section. For example, it is now unclear
whether a trust whose governing instrument specifically pre-
cludes distributions to U.S. beneficiaries might nonetheless
make payments to a nonresident alien, perhaps to a foreign
bank, thereby permitting a U.S. person to obtain a loan from
the bank's domestic branch office secured by the deposit over-
seas. Section 665(c) of the Code initially seems to prohibit such
a transaction, for that section states as follows:
For purposes of this subpart, any amount paid to a United States
person which is from a payor who is not a United States person
and which is derived directly or indirectly from a foreign trust
created by a United States person shall be deemed in the year of
payment to have been directly paid by the foreign trust.
However, the subpart in which section 665(c) is codified is
subpart D. The new grantor trust rules, section 679, are in
subpart E.
Congress has indicated that a deposit in a bank which
loans or has loaned money to a foreign trust will be treated as
a transfer to the foreign trust. 9 Litigation may be required to
determine whether a similarly circuitous transaction in reverse
might be deemed a direct distribution to a U.S. beneficiary.
2. Taxation of Beneficiaries
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 makes several changes with
respect to the treatment of accumulation distributions to bene-
77. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1013(a), adding hr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 679(a)(1).
78. See H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 208-10.
79. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 209 n.9.
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ficiaries of foreign trusts. Three of those changes could be
highly significant. The changes involve a change in the charac-
terization of all gross income items on their distribution by a
foreign trust, a major revision of the throwback rules, and a
nondeductible interest charge imposed on distributions where
the grantor is not taxed.
Prior to the Act, foreign trusts created by United States
persons were required to aggregate both capital gains and ordi-
nary income in the calculation of DNI. The rule now extends
to all foreign trusts, including those created by nonresident
aliens.'* The Tax Reform Act now converts the character of any
undistributed capital gains included in the distributed net in-
come into ordinary income."' The Committee reports indicate
that the effect of this amendment will be to treat all distribu-
tions from a foreign trust as ordinary income and to deny the
benefit of the 50 percent deduction of net long term capital
gains to both the trust and the beneficiaries. 2 The trust may,
however, take into account the section 1202 deduction when
computing the undistributed net income of the trust accumu-
lated during each taxable year beginning on or before Decem-
ber 31, 1975 and distributed after that date.8 3 For all income
earned after that date, the Act does not permit the capital
gains deduction. 4
The Act has made some major changes in Code sections
665 through 669, the so-called "throwback" rules. These
changes are applicable to domestic and foreign trusts alike. Of
particular significance is the change in the method of comput-
ing the tax payable on an accumulation distribution. Pre-
viously, the taxpayer could elect to use an "exact" method in
such a computation. The Act eliminates the "exact" method
and modifies its former alternative, the "shortcut" method. 5
Briefly, the total tax paid by a beneficiary consists of the sum
of a partial tax computed on his total taxable income reduced
80. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 668.
81. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1013(c), amending INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 643
(a)(6)(C); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 213.
82. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 213.
83. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1013(c)(2), adding INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 643
(a)(6)(D).
84. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 213.
85. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 701(a)(1), amending INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 667(a).
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by all those amounts to which the throwback rules apply plus
the tax computed under the "shortcut" method."
The shortcut computation is made as follows. First, the
taxpayer examines his taxable income for the five years pre-
ceeding the accumulation distribution, discarding both the
year when his taxable income was the highest and the year
when it was lowest. Next, the taxpayer adds on to his taxable
income for each of the three remaining years an amount equal
to the average annual distribution, that is, the total amount of
the accumulation distribution divided by the number of years
on the last day of which the trust was deemed to have had
undistributed net income of which the accumulation distribu-
tion is composed. Then the taxpayer recomputes his tax for
those three years on the basis of this increased, recalculated
taxable income. The increase of his taxes so calculated over the
taxes actually paid is then averaged over the three years. Fi-
nally, the taxpayer multiplies that average increase in taxes
times the number of years on the last day of which the trust
was deemed to have had undistributed net income. This final
product is compared with the amount of taxes paid by the
trustee and deemed distributed to the beneficiary under sec-
tion 666(b) and (c). The excess, if any, is the tax payable by
the beneficiary.
8 7
Under Code section 668, the beneficiary of a foreign trust
must now pay a nondeductible simple interest charge on the
tax computed from the year in which the income distributed
was first accumulated. This charge is in addition to any taxes
that would be due on the distribution but is assessed only in
the event that the grantor trust rules are inapplicable."' The
computation of interest charge is made by multiplying an
amount equal to six percent of the partial tax computed under
Code section 667(b) by a fraction (the number of taxable years
between each taxable year to which distribution is allocated
under Code section 666(a) and the taxable year of distribution
over the number of taxable years to which the distribution is
allocated under Code section 666(a)). 89
86. Id.
87. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 701(a), amending INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 667(b).
88. An example would be if a trust were funded by a testamentary transfer or by
a nonresident alien settlor.
89. See text accompanying note 87 supra; the House Committee Report sets out
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The total amount to be charged under Code section 668 is
limited to the amount of accumulation distribution. 0 This
limit is computed by adding the interest charge to the partial
tax derived by Code section 667(b).
The interest charge computed under this section will be
applicable to any undistributed net income existing in a trust
as of January 1, 1977. This will be treated as if it were allocated
under Code section 666(a) to the first taxable year beginning
after December 31, 1976.11
IV. TAXATION OF TRANSFERS TO THE TRUST
A. Estate and Gift Taxes
One must recognize that the transfer to the foreign trust
itself may invoke tax consequences. Accordingly, it is impera-
tive that the draftsman devote careful attention to estate and
gift tax considerations.2 For it is not inconceivable that a for-
eign trust created with a view towards minimizing the income
tax on its earnings could expose the grantor to a gift tax as well
as bring the transferred property into his gross estate for inheri-
tance tax purposes, drastically reducing the benefits otherwise
obtained from the trust.
the following illustrative computation:
[I]f amounts distributed in year 8 were earned in years 2, 3, and 4, the
number of years for which interest is charged is determined first by calcu-
lating the number of years of accumulation for each year in which
amounts distributed were originally earned (in this case 8-2 or 6 years for
amounts earned in year 2, 8-3 or 5 years for amounts earned in year 3,
and 8-4 or 4 years for amounts earned in year 4). The total of these
number of years of accumulation (here 6+5+4, or 15 years) is then div-
ided by the number of different years from which the amounts distributed
were earned (3 different years). The result (5 years) is the average number
of years of accumulation and is multiplied by the 6 percent interest rate
to produce the total percentage of interest (30 percent) which is applied
against the amount of the tax.
H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 212 n.16.
90. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1014(b), amending INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 668
(c)(1).
91. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1014(b), amending er. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 668.
92. To the extent that a U.S. citizen transfers property for less than full and
adequate consideration, the Code imposes a gift tax on that part of the transfer which
is gratuitous and not exempt. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2501. The gift tax rules apply
whether the interests transfered are legal or equitable, present or future. See Treas.
Reg. § 25.2511-1 (1977). Thus the settlor of a foreign trust will become subject to the
gift tax whenever he creates a beneficial interest in someone other than himself. Simi-
larly, an estate tax will be imposed upon a testamentary transfer to a foreign trust.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2033.
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B. Interest Equalization Tax
Seeking to restrain the sale of foreign securitites to U.S.
investors and thus to reduce what it then perceived as a bal-
looning balance of payments problem,9 3 Congress passed the
Interest Equalization Act of 1964.11 That Act imposed a tax of
15 percent on the value of stock issued by a foreign issuer and
acquired by a U.S. person and instituted a graduated tax on
debt securities of foreign obligors. 5 Although foreign trusts did
not fall within the meaning of a "United States person" as that
term was defined by the Act," the concept of "acquisition" was
expanded by Congress to include transfers to such a trust for
the purposes of purchasing securities for the benefit of a U.S.
transferor. 7 In other words, any U.S. person who conveyed
money or property to a foreign trust without receiving full and
adequate consideration was treated as having made a taxable
acquisition of foreign securities to the extent the trust did in
fact acquire such securities.
The lack of any reporting requirements in connection with
the Act hampered the Internal Revenue Service in its enforce-
ment of the foreign trust provisions.9 To remedy this, Congress
in 1969 created a presumption that the foreign trust acquired
securities encompassed by the Act if a U.S. person simply
93. H.R. REP. No. 88-1046, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); S. REP. No. 88-1267, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess.(1964).
94. Act of Sept. 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-563, 78 Stat. 809. The Act was repealed
by the 1976 Tax Reform Act.
95. Id. § 2(a) (formerly codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4911(a), (b)).
96. Id. (formerly codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4920(a)(4)); cf. Rev. Rul.
66-281, 1966-2 CuM. BuLL. 483 ("U.S. Person" does not include a trust where a nonresi-
dent alien is treated as the owner of the entire trust.).
97. Id. (formerly codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4912(b)(1)). Within the
context of § 4912(b)(1)(A), loans were not considered to be adequate consideration
(i.e., sales or exchanges), and thus the lender was deemed to have made a taxable
acquisition. King v. United States, 545 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1976), aff'g In re King, 424
F. Supp. 117 (D. Colo. 1975); see also H.R. REP. No. 1046, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 27
(1964).
98. See generally Dale, supra note 53, at 21. It bears noting that these provisions
did not altogether encourage investment by the foreign trustee in domestic securities,
inasmuch as the income from domestic sources was subject to a 30 percent (or lower
treaty rate) tax that was withheld at the source. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 871(a)(1).
In contrast, the income derived from foreign securities was not taxed to the trust at
all and was taxed to the beneficiaries only upon its eventual distribution. Id. §§ 872,
661(a), 662(a). See Kroll, Foreign Trusts: Advantages and Problems, 112 TRUSTS AND
ESTATES 618, 620 (1973).
99. See S. RPp. No. 91-928, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1969).
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transferred property to the trust.'0° Only by filing prescribed
quarterly statements' evidencing that the trust had not in fact
acquired any taxable securities could the transferor rebut the
presumption.0 2 Clearly, this burden was placed on the tax-
payer in order to relieve administrative difficulties involved.,"'
These amendments further granted the President author-
ity to raise or lower the tax rates in order to achieve an optimal
balance of payments.04 By Executive Order, the rates were
lowered to zero for all acquisitions made after January 29,
1974.105 The 1976 Tax Reform Act repealed the Interest Equali-
zation Tax with respect to all acquisitions made after June 30,
1974.101
C. Tax on Transfers to Avoid Income Tax
In 1932 Congress recognized the possibility that a U.S.
individual could transfer appreciated securities to a foreign
corporation or trust and escape payment of a capital gains
tax.'0 While the corporation or trust could sell the securities
and realize the gain outside the tax jurisdiction of the United
States, the original transferor, assuming him to be a controlling
shareholder or a beneficial owner, would have lost neither con-
trol over nor benefits from the sale. 01 To discourage such avoid-
ance of the capital gains tax, which was then imposed at a
maximum rate of 25 percent, Congress included in the Revenue
Bill of 1932 provisons for an excise tax of 27 1/2 percent on
transfers of this nature. 00 The tax did not apply if the Commis-
sioner were satisfied that the transfer was not carried out for
the purpose of avoiding federal income taxes."0
100. Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-128,
§ 4(a)(1), 83 Stat. 261, (formerly codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4912(b)(1)(B)).
101. Act of Sept. 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-563, § 3, 78 Stat. 809 (formerly codified
at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6011(d)(1)). The quarterly returns were filed on Form 3780.
Tress. Reg. § 147.8-1(c)(1) (1965).
102. Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-128,
§ 4(a)(1), 83 Stat. 261.
103. See Dale, supra note 53, at 21.
104. Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-128, § 3(a),
83 Stat. 261.
105. Exec. Order No. 11,766, 3A C.F.R. § 127 (1974).
106. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1904(a)(21).
107. H.R. REp. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 51-52 (1932).
108. Id.
109. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 901, 47 Stat. 284 (current version codified at
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1491-94).
110. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1492(2).
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This excise tax remained in the Code as sections 1491 et
seq., substantially unchanged until the Tax Reform Act of
1976. On the whole, the tax had not proven too burdensome,
since it merely compelled the prospective settlor to fund a for-
eign trust with some asset other than appreciated securities. In
certain situations, however, United States grantors have found
it highly desirable to transfer securities rather than unappre-
ciated assets of another character."'
Often, the owners of highly appreciated stock, desirous of
preserving voting rights or simply maintaining a successful in-
vestment, were understandably reluctant to sell their shares,
pay the lower capital gains tax, and fund a trust with the
remaining proceeds. As a result, resourceful practitioners de-
vised ingenious schemes to circumvent, or at least postpone the
incidence of, both the excise and capital gains taxes. For exam-
ple, the settlor might have secured a loan with his appreciated
securities and contributed the borrowed money to the trust."'
The interest was deductible to a limit,"3 and the taxpayer
could conceivably repay the loan with the trust's accumulated
earnings once distributed to him." '
A far more common method of escaping the excise tax was
to sell appreciated securities to a foreign trust in exchange for
a private annuity." 5 Prior to 1976, section 1491 expressly ap-
plied only to the excess of the fair market value of transferred
stock over its adjusted basis in the hands of the transferor." 6
Arguably, the tax could have been imposed on this excess re-
111. For example, commentators have suggested utilizing foreign trusts as a de-
vice for cleansing "tainted" items, such as section 1298 stock, the sale of which would
otherwise produce ordinary income. By using the foreign trust, stock of such nature
could have been converted into capital gains. See Kroll, supra note 98, at 621, 647.
112. See Tovey, supra note 9, at 709-10.
113. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163(d), as amended by 1976 Tax Reform Act,
§ 209(a)(1). The deduction for an individual is limited to $10,000 plus the amount of
net investment income.
114. See Tovey, supra note 9, at 710 & n.50.
115. See generally Kanter, The Foreign Trust-A "One World" Concept of Tax
Planning, U. So. CAL. 1970 TAX INST. 467, 502; Kanter, Recent Tax Court Decisions
Shed Further Light on Private Annuity Transactions, 42 J. TAX. 66 (1975); Kanter,
New Decisions Delineate Tests for Foreign Situs Trusts-Private Annuity
Transactions, 38 J. TAx. 82 (1973); Kassoy, The Private Annuity and the Foreign Situs
Trust, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 86 (1968).
116. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1491, as amended by 1976 Tax Reform Act,
§ 1015(a).
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gardless of whether the transferor received the full fair market
value of his securities in the transaction-thus realizing all
gains at that time-or whether the transfer might have been
merely donative. However, it was fairly well settled that the
section 1491 tax applied only to gratuitous transfers."7 The
Internal Revenue Service apparently accepted the argument
that section 1491 was not intended to penalize transferors by
imposing an excise tax in addition to capital gains taxes. These
taxes were to be imposed in the alternative, and section 1491
applied only to that portion of a transfer which was not made
for full and adequate consideration.' 8
Normally the fair market value of the transferred securi-
ties was used to establish the present value of the annuity
purchased by the transferor in the exchange." ' The excess of
present value, equal to the fair market value of the securities,
over their adjusted basis in the hands of the transferor became
gain realized by the transferor/annuitant.120 But, while the
transfer was considered to be a completed transaction for the
purposes of avoiding the application of section 1491, it was not
a taxable event in the sense that the taxpayer had to report all
his gain at the time of the sale. Rather, he was deemed to
receive in each payment a pro rata mixture of part nontaxable
return of capital, part interest, and part capital gains.'2 ' The
117. This is at least the assumption on which Congress proceeded when consider-
ing the provisons in the 1976 Tax Reform Act which would have eliminated this
possibility. See H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 213; S. REP. No. 94-938, at 223.
118. See Kanter & Horwood, Section 1491 Tax and Private Annuity/Foreign Situs
Trust Transaction, 52 TAXEs 388 (1974).
It should be noted, however, that where the transfer to the foreign trust is made
without adequate consideration, a gift tax and the section 1491 tax may be imposed,
and the trustee's basis will be the same as the basis in the hands of the transferor.
Thus, while the sale by the trustee of the appreciated securities will not subject the
trustee to payment of any capital gains tax, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 862(6),
871(a)(2), such a tax will be paid upon distribution to the beneficiaries under the
throwback rules, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 643, 661-68. See Dale, supra note 53, at
22 n.16. But see Shop Talk, 34 J. TAX. 191 (1971).
119. Any excess in the fair market value over the present value of the annuity
would be treated as a gift to the transferee, Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 43, and
vice-versa. For a sample annuity agreement which would avoid the situation in which
a transfer would be treated as part gift, part sale, see Kanter & Horwood, supra note
118, at 406.
The present value of the annuity is calculated pursuant to Tress. Reg. § 20.2031-
10 (1977).
120. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 43.
121. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 43; Kanter, The Foreign Trust-A "One
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trustee could then sell the property with a stepped-up basis 2,
and reinvest the proceeds free from United States tax.2 3
Although not unique to foreign trusts, there were several
dangers inherent in the sales of annuities to trusts, the greatest
perhaps being that the sale would be disregarded and treated
as a transfer to the trust with a retained right to income for life,
thus subjecting the grantor to tax as the owner of the trust.'24
In Simon M. Lazarus, 25 for example, the Tax Court identi-
fied a number of factors which caused it to characterize such a
transaction as a transfer in trust with a reserved right to in-
come.'26 Most compelling in this decision were the facts that
the annual payments appeared intimately geared to the
amounts received as income by the trust; that no payments
could be made from the corpus, which would pass intact to the
remaindermen; and that the sale to the trust bore none of the
incidents of an arm's-length transaction.'
Nevertheless, the foreign trust/private annuity transaction
remained a viable vehicle for minimizing the tax burden on the
holder of appreciated securities. Amendments to section 1491
contained in the 1976 Tax Reform Act have severely limited the
usefulness of the device, however.
Whereas section 1491 formerly applied only to transfers of
stock and securities, the Act now extends the incidence of the
tax to the transfer of any property. 2 By doing this the Act has
in one broad stroke eliminated many schemes formulated to
circumvent the excise tax.' Another noteworthy change in this
World" Concept, supra note 115, at 503-504, 508-510.
122. Kanter, The Foreign Trust-A "One World" Concept, supra note 115, at 504.
123. See text accompanying notes 22-30 supra.
124. In such a case, the grantor who transfers the property to the trust will pay a
gift tax on the remainder, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2501(a); see Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-
3 (1977), from which no annual exclusion may be taken, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2503(b); the value of the assets of the trust will nevertheless be included in his
gross estate, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a)(1); and since the grantor will be treated
as the owner of the trust, he, and not the trust, will be liable for the tax on the trust
income. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671, 677(a).
125. 58 T.C. 854 (1972), aff'd, 513 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1975).
126. 58 T.C. at 867.
127. Cf. Mark Bixby, 58 T.C. 757 (1972) (transfer held to result in a grantor trust,
taxable under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 671).
128. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1491(1).
129. For example, the transfer of interests in a partnership, the principal assets
of which consisted of securities, might arguably have escaped the reach of section 1491,
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section is the increase in the excise tax rate from the previous
rate of 27 1/2 percent of the excess of the value of the securities
transferred over their adjusted basis. The Act has raised the
tax to 35 percent of the excess of the fair market value of the
property transferred over the adjusted basis of such property
plus the amount of gain recognized to the transferor at the time
of the transfer.
Although section 1491 was orginally intended to create a
substitute for the capital gains tax, the combined effect of
these two revisions in the 1976 Act will be to establish an anom-
alous tax structure which bears little relationship to the reali-
ties of the transactions involved. On one hand, the section
operates as a penalty provision, imposing a higher tax than
would otherwise be appropriate upon transferred property
which has not so greatly appreciated as to bring into effect the
maximum capital gains rate. On the other hand, a taxpayer
might seize the opportunity to transfer assets which would nor-
mally generate ordinary gain upon sale yet pay tax at only the
35 percent rate.
Congress was primarily motivated to amend the section in
response to abuses arising out of private annuity transactions
with foreign trusts. No longer will a taxpayer be permitted to
avoid the excise tax by selling appreciated assets to a foreign
trust and recognizing gain on a deferred basis. 30 The intent of
Congress is that the tax apply to all transfers, whether donative
or for full consideration,' and that the transferor be taxed on
the excess of the fair market value of the property over its
adjusted basis (i.e., inherent gain), reduced only by any gain
recognized at the time of the transfer. 32 In other words, as the
House Committee report states,
all sales and exchanges (including installment sales and private
annuity transactions), regardless of how any gain on these trans-
actions is reported, are within the scope of the excise tax provi-
sion. But to the extent the transferor immediately recognizes gain
although the taxpayer ran a considerable risk of having such interests themselves
classified as securities; now, however, such a transfer is clearly subject to the excise
tax. See Lerner, supra note 68, at 11.
130. See text accompanying note 121 supra.
131. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 213.
132. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1015(a), amending INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1491.
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in the transfer, the amount against which the tax is applied is
reduced.'
3 13
A principal drawback of the amended rule is its potential
for taxing gain twice, once by virtue of the excise tax on the
transfer and again by virtue of the capital gains tax upon distri-
bution. This situation arises as a result of the fact that the
transferee (i.e., the trust or the transferor to whom its owner-
ship is attributed) is permitted no step-up in the basis of the
transferred property, nor is the transferor allowed a credit
against income tax for the excise tax. 134 An even more harsh
application would result in the event the transferor is deemed
the owner of the trust pursuant to the newly enacted grantor
trust rule.
15
A less punitive, but equally anomalous, provision in the
section is the requirement that gain be calculated on the basis
of the fair market value of the transferred property. 36 While
probably no different in application from "value," use of fair
market value may result in a higher taxable gain than would
be possible were appreciation measured on the basis of
"amount realized.' ' 37 Even though the "fair market value" ter-
minology may be necessary to embrace donative transfers as
well as arm's-length sales, in the latter circumstance the tax-
payer may pay what is in effect a capital gains tax on more gain
than was actually realized.
Although not entirely relevant to a discussion of foreign
trusts, the excise tax is not applicable to transfers by or to
nonresident alien individuals. 3 ' Thus, while such a transaction
would probably not enable a taxpayer to elude the grantor trust
rules, 39 a sale of appreciated property to a foreign individual,
133. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 213.
134. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1014(a), adding INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 679.
This conclusion seems to follow logically from Rev. Rul. 69-450, 1969-2 CUM. BULL.
168, which held that a transferor who was deemed to be the owner of a foreign trust
and thus required to report all its income was nonetheless responsible for paying the
section 1491 tax. See New York State Bar Ass'n, supra note 48, at 282 & nn.35, 36.
135. Cf. id., at 284.
136. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1015(a), amending INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1491.
137. See Alpert & Feingold, Tax Reform Act Toughens Foreign Transfer Provi-
sions of 1491 and Liberalizes 367, 46 J. TAX. 2, 3 (1977).
138. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1491, as amended by 1976 Tax Reform Act,
§ 1015(a).
139. See H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 209; see generally text accompanying notes 64-
65 supra.
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who could not be subject to the 35 percent tax, would not create
problems of double taxation. In addition, section 1491 presum-
ably does not apply to transfers by an estate. No excise tax
would be imposed on the creation of a testamentary foreign
trust. 140 Such an exception may prove significant in light of the
enactment of provisons requiring a carryover of basis of prop-
erty acquired from a decedent.'
Finally, the amendments to section 1491 promise to in-
crease the difficulty of conducting ordinary commercial trans-
actions with a foreign trust. Even though a party completing
an arm's-length sale with a foreign trust may recognize all gain
at the time of the transfer, it may nonetheless be necessary to
file a return,' or at least obtain a determination by the Secre-
tary that the transfer was not one in pursuance of a plan whose
principal purpose is the avoidance of income tax.4 3 Moreover,
certain contributions to foreign corporations and transfers to
foreign partnerships are also included in the breadth of the
excise tax provisions. In view of the fact that the 1976 amend-
ments were enacted specifically in response to perceived abuses
out of transactions with foreign trusts,' it is certainly possible
to question the propriety of extending the complexity of these
amendments to circumstances where similar abuses have not
been documented.1
Pursuant to section 1057, which was added to the 1976 Tax
Reform Act by the Senate Finance Committee, 4 ' a taxpayer
may elect to treat a transfer otherwise taxable under section
1491 as a sale or exchange of property for an amount equal to
its fair market value.'47 The taxpayer must recognize as gain
140. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1491, as amended by 1976 Tax Reform Act,
§ 1015(a).
141. See Alpert & Feingold, supra note 137, at 2.
142. Treas. Reg. § 1.1494-1 (1977).
143. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1492(2), 1494(b).
144. This appears implicit in the fact that the only legislative history relating to
the excise tax can be found in the sections of the committee reports dealing with foreign
trusts. See, e.g., H.R. RP. No. 94-658, at 213-14.
145. Indeed, one might also doubt the need for such highly technical additions to
the Code where the potential for tax avoidance inherent in foreign trusts is great, yet
apparently only rarely ripens into actuality. See text accompanying notes 2-5 supra;
see also New York State Bar Ass'n, supra note 48, at 281, which questions the very
efficacy of section 1491.
146. See S. REP. No. 94-1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 456 (1976) (Conference Com-
mittee Report).
147. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1015(c), adding INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1057.
VOL. 6:675
FOREIGN SITus TRUSTS
the excess of the fair market value of the transferred property
over its adjusted basis in his hands.' 8 The problem of double
taxation posed by section 1491 would be avoided under such an
election, since the transferee in a section 1057 transaction is
permitted to increase his basis in the property according to the
amount of gain recognized by the transferor.",
There is scant legislative history on this provision, and the
precise contours of its applicability remain uncertain. As an
addition to subpart 0, it is clearly designed to approximate
more closely than section 1491 a tax on gains to property trans-
ferred to a foreign trust. As such, this new section presumably
imposes a tax only on transfers made for full and adequate
consideration. The computation of taxable gain, however, is
made on the basis of fair market value rather than amount
realized, again leaving open the possibility that the amount to
which the tax applies will not be equivalent to the actual gain
realized. 50
Most curiously, the section 1057 computation is no differ-
ent from that involved in section 1491 prior to amendment.
While the statutory context would seem to imply that all gain
be recognized at the time of the transfer,'"' failure of Congress
148. Id. The problem of double taxation posed by section 1491 would be avoided
since the transferee in a section 1057 transaction is permitted to increase his basis in
the property according to the amount of gain recognized by the transferor.
149. S. REP. No. 94-938, at 223.
Presumably, a taxpayer who elects to treat a transfer as a sale or exchange under
section 1057 of the Code, in lieu of paying the section 1491 excise tax, should not fall
within the scope of the grantor trust provisons. See Alpert & Feingold, supra note 137,
at 4.
It should be noted that while section 1057 merely requires the transferor to recog-
nize gain from the sale or exchange, section 679(a)(2)(B) requires that gain be recog-
nized and realized at the time of the transfer. It should not, then, be possible to fund
a foreign trust using a section 1057 election and take advantage of the section
679(a)(2)(B) exception, since the unfunded trust would not be capable of furnishing
the full and adequate consideration apparently required in a section 679(a)(2)(B) sale
or exchange. No conclusion is reached here whether it might be feasible to sell property
to a foreign trust at its fair market value in exchange for payments made by the trust
on an installment basis, where the payments might bear some relation to the expected
earnings of the trust and where the transferor would defer recognition of the section
1057 gain until the payments were received. If the transferor made such an installment
sale, but did not elect to pay the section 1057 tax, he would be subject to the section
1491 excise tax, since section 1491 taxes all appreciation that is not reduced by gain
recognized at the time of the transfer.
150. Cf. text accompanying note 137 supra.
151. See Alpert & Feingold, supra note 137, at 4. Indeed, it is possible that Con-
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to so state lends support to the argument that a taxpayer may
utilize the section 1057 election in, for example, a private annu-
ity or installment sale transaction, where recognition of taxable
gain is deferred. Congress surely cannot have intended to mod-
ify section 1491 so as to foreclose such transactions then reen-
act it in substantially similar form, yet the ambiguity of section
1057 does nothing to prevent one's reaching such a conclusion.
V. CONCLUSION
It is easily discernable that the creature known as the for-
eign trust has been substantially altered by the Tax Reform
Act of 1976. What was once a readily available form of tax
avoidance has been transformed into a mere shell of itself.
Unless used as an estate planning device a foreign situs trust
now may be more liability than asset to its creator.
Some of the changes implemented by the Act may be
thought of as harsh. Regardless of the seeming severity, Con-
gress's goal of closing a tax avoidance loophole appears to have
been met. Until the regulations concerning this portion of the
Act are released it is mere speculation to comment on the effec-
tiveness of the changes. However, it is to be expected that the
regulations will be in agreement with the legislative intent.
Therefore, based upon existing information, the foreign situs
trust can no longer be thought of as a means of tax avoidance.
gress simply assumed that the references to section 1491 in section 1057 were sufficient
to incorporate the legislative history behind the excise tax provisions into section 1057.
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Three consolidated cases, Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, ' Pfizer, Inc.
v. Republic of Vietnam,2 and Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of
India,3 are among the first cases in which foreign governments
have sought antitrust relief in the United States.' The India
case in particular represents the first parens patriae suit
brought by a recognized foreign government in the United
States.- Although the parens patriae suit for treble damages
* A.B., 1972, Dartmouth College; B.A., 1974, Oxford University; J.D. candidate,
Yale Law School. The author is indebted to Professor Michael Reisman of the Yale
Law School for thoughtful criticism of earlier drafts of this article.
1. 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 950 (1976).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See Note,
Antitrust-Standing-Foreign Nation Has Standing to Sue for Treble Damages, 5 VAND.
J. TRANS. L. 531 (1972); Note, The Capacity of Foreign Sovereigns to Maintain Private
Federal Antitrust Actions, 9 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 137 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Foreign Sovereigns]; Note, The Capacity of a Foreign Government to Bring an Action
for Treble Damages Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 44 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 287
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Government Antitrust Capacity].
India and Israel previously sought antitrust relief as part of the Electrical Equip-
ment Co. cases over a decade ago, but since neither suit reached the stage of decision
on the merits, neither case has precedential value. When Foreign Nations Sue Under
Antitrust, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 24, 1975, at 26; In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F.
Supp. 315, 316 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
5. In addition to India and Vietnam, governments involved in this appeal are Iran
and the Philippines. Other governments filed similar suits after the commencement
of the litigation and are not included in the instant cases. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d
at 613 n.1. The Vietnam case is complicated by the fact that the United States no
longer recognizes the government of Vietnam. "The rule is that unrecognized govern-
ments may not maintain suits in state or federal courts." Id., n.3. See Guaranty Trust
Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 136-41 (1938); Federal Republic of Germany v.
Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974); accord, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 408-12 (1964). Thus, although Vietnam was technically the first government to
file an amended complaint as parens patriae (Mar. 26, 1974), India's complaint (Oct.
11, 1974) represents the first parens patriae suit brought by a recognized foreign gov-
ernment and, hence, the first suit with a claim to formal validity.
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has received little attention in the past,' it has recently been
the subject of Congressional inquiry culminating in its inclu-
sion in the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.1 In the interna-
tional context the parens patriae suit is of major significance.
When combined with a treble damages recovery, parens
patriae can serve as an instrument of economic redistribution
to underdeveloped nations.
The South Vietnam case was dismissed by the district court after receipt of advice
that the United States no longer recognized any government as sovereign in the former
territory of that republic. Republic of Vietnam v. Pfizer Inc., No. 4-71 Civ. 402 (D.
Minn. Dec. 2, 1976), afJ'd, No. 77-1093 (8th Cir. June 15, 1977).
6. As distinct from the variety of parens patriae which involves minors, the in-
sane, and other legally incompetent persons, the type of parens patriae in which the
state acts on a broader political scale is specifically discussed by only a very few
published works. See Alioto, Toward a More Effective Enforcement of the Antitrust
Laws: Suits by the State as Parens Patriae, 1969 BEVERLY HILLS B.J. 12 (1969); Malina
& Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 65
Nw. U.L. REV. 193 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Malina & Blechman]; Comment, State
Protection of its Economy and Environment: Parens Patriae Suits for Damages, 6
COLUM. J.L. & SOCIAL PROBLEMS 411 (1970) [hereinafter cited as State Protection];
Note, Wrongs Without Remedy: The Concept of Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Dam-
ages Under the Antitrust Laws, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 570 (1970). See also Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 468-90 (1945) (dissenting opinion of Stone, C.J.); M.
FORKOSCH, ANTITRUST AND THE CONSUMER 311-34 (1956); Handler & Blechman,
Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: The Fallacy of Parens Patriae and a Suggested
New Approach, 85 YALE L.J. 626 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Handler & Blechman].
The best recent discussion of the general concept of parens patriae-the Latin refers
to the sovereign's role as "parent of the country"-is in Comment, State Standing to
Challenge Federal Administrative Action: A Re-Examination of the Parens Patriae
Doctrine, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1069 (1977). See also Note, The Proposed Antitrust Parens
Patriae Act: Overdue Antitrust Relief for Ultimate Consumers, 45 U. CIN. L. REv. 219
(1976).
7. Hearings on H.R. 12528 and H.R. 12921 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies
and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974); Hearings on H.R. 38 and H.R. 2850 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 38 and H.R. 2850]; Hearings on S. 1284 Before
the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See also AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, ANTITRUST PARENS
PATRIAE BILL: CONSUMER DAMAGE SUITS BY STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL (1975)
[hereinafter cited as PARENS PATRIAE BILL]. For favorable editorial comment on the
proposed legislation, see Washington Post, Feb. 29, 1976, at G6, cols. 1-2. For a more
reserved endorsement, see N.Y. Times, June 17, 1976, at 34, col. 2. The bill became
law as the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435,
90 Stat. 1383 (1976). Title I, governing parens patriae actions by state attorneys
general, constitutes additions immediately following and amending Clayton Act § 4B,
15 U.S.C. § 15B (1970). The practical effect of the bill may have been severely limited,
however, by the recent Supreme Court decision, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 45
U.S.L.W. 4611 (U.S. June 9, 1977).
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The potential impact of this redistributive function there-
fore requires a close examination of both parens patriae and the
damages recoverable thereunder. After briefly surveying the
history of the antibiotics litigation, this article will examine the
history and doctrine of parens patriae and employ some of the
conclusions reached therein to help answer questions concern-
ing India's capacity to sue under American antitrust law, its
preferable litigation posture in the instant case, and its re-
coverable damages. The article concludes that since India
does have capacity to sue, it has a choice from among parens
patriae, class action, or a suit on its own behalf in its proprie-
tary capacity, and that parens patriae is the most effective
strategy. Recovery is to be limited to actual damages, prefera-
bly to be realized through reduced prices on goods or services
sold in the future.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE ANTIBIOTICS LITIGATION
The suit by India' stems from a group of over 150 civil and
criminal antitrust suits,9 now mostly settled, against Pfizer,
Inc., and four other drug companies'0 for violations of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act" and related regulations. The actions grow
out of proceedings brought by the Federal Trade Commission
beginning in 1958 2 and criminal antitrust proceedings starting
8. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975). For a general history of the
antibiotics litigation through May 1975, see Wolfram, The Antibiotics Class Actions,
1976 A.B.F. REs. J. 251; for journalistic commentary, see von Hoffman, Operation
Moneyback: Of Price Fixing and Antibiotics, Washington Post, May 10, 1976, at Cl,
col. 1.
9. See also Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976
(1972); United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 426 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1970); Chas. Pfizer &
Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968); American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d
757 (6th Cir. 1966); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); In re Antibiotic
Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); In re Antibiotic Drugs, 320 F.
Supp. 586 (J.P.M.L. 1970); In re Antibiotic Drug Litigation, 309 F. Supp. 155
.(J.P.M.L. 1970), 303 F. Supp. 1056 (J.P.M.L. 1969), 301 F. Supp. 1158 (J.P.M.L.
1969), 299 F. Supp. 1403 (J.P.M.L. 1969), 295 F. Supp. 1402 (J.P.M.L. 1968); Ameri-
can Cyanamid Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 16,527 (FTC 1963), final order entered,
id. at 16,699 (FTC 1963). For a discussion of the last case, see Note, Improperly
Procured Patents: FTC Jurisdiction and Remedial Power, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1505 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Patents].
10. American Cyanamid Co., Bristol-Myers Co., Squibb Corp., and the Upjohn
Co. Olin Corp., formerly Squibb's parent company, however, appears as a defendant
in the present litigation.
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
12. In re American Cyanamid Co., Civ. No. 7211 (July 28, 1958), order vacated
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in 1961.' 3 The indictments charged: (1) combination and con-
spiracy in restraint of trade and (2) actual monopolization."
Pfizer claimed the discovery in June 1952 of tetracycline,
a broad spectrum antibiotic, generally regarded as greatly su-
perior to any of the other "wonder drugs" then on the market,
such as chlortetracycline, chloramphenicol, or oxytetracyc-
line.' 5 In October, Pfizer applied for a patent. Early in 1953,
Cyanamid also claimed discovery of tetracycline and applied
for a patent. In succeeding months, Bristol-Myers and other
companies filed patents for tetracycline based on a different
manufacturing process. It was then determined that for Pfizer
to produce tetracycline commercially processes patented by
Cyanamid had to be used.'6
At two meetings between Pfizer and Cyanamid held in
November 1953, it was agreed that Cyanamid would license
Pfizer under the patents Cyanamid held and that proofs of
priority on tetracycline would be exchanged. The party found
not to have priority on tetracycline would yield its claim to the
other; the company granted the tetracycline patent would then
and remanded, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966), order after remand aff'd sub. nom. Chas.
Pfizer & Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969).
13. United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 61 Cr. 772 (indictment returned Aug. 17,
1961), rev'd for new trial, 426 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1970), prior en banc hearing order
vacated, opinion of panel modified, and petition for rehearing denied, 437 F.2d 957 (2d
Cir. 1970), new trial determination aff'd by an equally divided court, 404 U.S. 548
(1972), on remand, 367 F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); see also North Carolina v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., 384 F. Supp. 265 (E.D.N.C. 1974), afJ'd 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,663 (4th
Cir. 1976).
14. See United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 426 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1970). In sub-
stance the alleged conspiratorial agreements were that: (a) the manufacture of tetra-
cycline be confined to Pfizer, Cyanamid, and Bristol; (b) the sale of tetracycline
products be confined to Pfizer, Cyanamid, Bristol, Upjohn, and Squibb; (c) the sale
of bulk tetracycline be confined to Bristol and bulk tetracycline be sold by Bristol only
to Upjohn and Squibb; and (d) the sale of broad spectrum antibiotic products by the
defendant companies and the coconspirator companies be at substantially identical
and noncompetitive prices. Id. at 33.
15. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 534 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., 426 F.2d 32, 35 (2d Cir. 1970). For further analysis of the early historical
background with special attention paid to the scientific and technical aspects of the
case, see West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 773-74 (6th Cir. 1966); Patents, supra
note 9.
16. The Duggar and Niedercorn patents for the mold fermentation process. West




license the other. When the proofs were made, Cyanamid
yielded to Pfizer, and Pfizer was issued a patent for tetracyc-
line in January 1955.18 Later in the year Pfizer granted licenses
under its patent to Bristol-Myers, Squibb, and Upjohn. 9
From 1951 to 1958 the Federal Trade Commission con-
ducted an investigation of the pricing policies of Pfizer and the
other drug companies. The FTC alleged that Pfizer had ob-
tained its tetracycline patent by conspiracy and fraud, that all
of the participating drug companies had withheld relevant in-
formation from the Patent Office, and that they were guilty of
monopolistic practices in the production and sale of antibiotic
drugs.20 The bulk of the litigation was over by 1969, ending
inconclusively with respect to findings of illegal activity.2'
The actions by India, Vietnam, and the other foreign gov-
ernments involved are among the less than 30 remaining anti-
biotic actions still pending.22 In the present Pfizer litigation,
the foreign governments prosecuted claims against the drug
companies based on three theories of recovery: (1) as sovereigns
with proprietary interests with regard to their own purchases;
(2) as parens patriae or "official representative" with respect
to the foreign nationals, institutions, and corporations who
purchased the drugs; and (3) as representatives of the class of
17. "If a patent on [Pfizer's tetracycline] invention were issued to Pfizer, then
neither Cyanamid nor Pfizer could make tetracycline except by agreement between
them. Each would be blocked by a patent of the other." Id.
18. Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d at 534-35; United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.,
426 F.2d at 35-36; West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. at 714. During
this time Bristol had begun to manufacture and market tetracycline, selling it in bulk
to Squibb and Upjohn. Cyanamid brought suit against Bristol in September 1954,
claiming infringement of its fermentation patents. The matter was settled when Cy-
anamid agreed to license Bristol, as well as Squibb and Upjohn, for the use of its
Duggar and Niedercorn processes. Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d at 535; West Virginia
v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. at 714.
19. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. at 714.
20. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d at 535.
21. There was, however, a finding of misconduct as to Pfizer and Cyanamid before
the Patent Office. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d at 535; West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer
& Co., 314 F. Supp. at 715-18. At one point the government pleaded that "in those
seven years [November 1953-September 1961, the alleged conspiratorial period] Bris-
tol made approximately $57 million in profits [$69 million minus production costs of
$12 million] . . . . In 1954 [100 tetracycline capsules] cost Cyanamid $2.26, in 1955
it cost them $1.57. That listed [retail to the consumer] for $51. The druggist paid
$30.60 - 2,000% mark-up." United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 426 F.2d at 38.
22. See Joint Brief for Petitioners-Appellants at 6; Joint Brief for Respondents at
3; Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975).
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all their citizens who have treble damage claims against the
companies.23 Defendant companies sought reversal of the dis-
trict court's interlocutory rulings24 that (1) foreign governments
are "persons" entitled to sue for teble damages under the anti-
trust laws and (2) that foreign governments can sue to collect
the damage awards of their citizens as parens patriae without
meeting the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure regulating the conduct of class action suits.2 5
The question whether foreign governments have capacity
to sue under our antitrust laws was originally left undecided by
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.26 The issue had
been presented to the Eighth Circuit on a writ of mandamus,
since the district court had declined to certify the question for
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) 7.2 Holding that
mandamus was appropriate for review only when abuse of judi-
cial discretion so warranted, 2 the court ruled that mandamus
would not lie merely to challenge the decision of a court when
the question was in its jurisdiction.29 Thus the court did not
reach the merits of the question, "since in our view mandamus
does not lie to review this ruling of the district court."30
On the subject of parens patriae, the circuit court held
that "[tihe plaintiff governments assert no quasi-sovereign
interest, their only interest is proprietary in nature."' 3' "We
reverse [the district court], and hold that the plaintiff govern-
ments may not sue on behalf of their citizens' antitrust damage
claims as parens patriae. ,32 Following the reasoning of the Su-
preme Court in Hawaii v. Standard Oil of California,33 the
court held that such injuries to the state as now contested
23. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1975).
24. The orders were not reported, but are reproduced in part in the briefs of the
foreign governments, passim.
25. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d at 614.
26. The district court held in the affirmative. 522 F.2d at 614, 617 n.8, comment
in 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 437 (1976).
27. 522 F.2d at 614.
28. Id.
29. Id. "Even if [the court's] decision were erroneous (and we intimate no view
on the merits), under the circumstances of this case it would not constitute a clear
abuse of discretion." Id. at 615.
30. Id. at 614.
31. Id. at 617.
32. Id. at 616.
33. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
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(denominated "injuries to the general economy") were not sus-
ceptible of measurement, being rather the sum total of injuries
to individuals;34 thus a class action and not a parens patriae
suit was the correct approach. 5 To the foreign governments'
argument that such a class action would be financially impossi-
ble in the wake of the notice requirements set out in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin,3" the court's response was simply:
While there are no reported decisions on the right of a foreign
government to prosecute such an action, in several recent instan-
ces domestic state governments have attempted to do so. So far
none has been permitted to recover on that theory, and the Su-
preme Court has expressed a strong preference for class actions
instead .
In the most recent major development," the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit on interlocutory appeal affirmed the
holding of the District Court for the District of Minnesota, that
foreign governments are "persons" entitled to sue for treble
damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act. 9
The Supreme Court has yet to pass definitively on the
legal status of foreign countries under American antitrust
laws,4 but even if foreign countries are granted capacity to sue,
as case law now stands, they could only bring class action suits
or suits in their proprietary capacity. But analysis of the princi-
ples involved in parens patriae doctrine suggests that a parens
34. But see text accompanying notes 200-15, infra.
35. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d at 617. "A parens patriae action cannot be
brought to collect the damage claim of one legally entitled to sue in his own right....
In our view, plaintiffs may represent their citizens' damage claims only if they can do
so within a Rule 23 class action." Id. at 616.
36. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). "[The foreign governments] ask that we expand the
concept of parens patriae to permit them to sue on behalf of persons legally entitled
to sue on their own behalf, but as a practical matter generally unable to do so." Pfizer,
Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d at 617.
37. 522 F.2d at 617.
38. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 1976-1 Trade Cas. 60,892 (8th Cir., May
19, 1976), aff'd en banc 1976-2 Trade Cas. 61,175 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45
U.S.L.W. 3690 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1977) (No. 76-749).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). The court also remanded to the district court the
question of the viability of Vietnam's suit.
40. This may be an issue of increasing importance; in addition to the governments
already mentioned, West Germany, Spain, Colombia, and South Korea have begun
or have been involved in suits against Pfizer and the other drug companies. Kuwait's
suit ended in a settlement and dismissal without prejudice. BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP., No. 697, A-23 (Jan. 21, 1975). The suits by South Korea and Spain have
also been withdrawn.
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patriae suit is the best solution in such circumstances and
should be seriously considered despite the Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari on that question."
III. THE THEORY OF PARENS PATRIAE
A. English Origins
The power of parens patriae reflects the tension between
the two contradictory attributes traditionally ascribed to sover-
eign dignity-unfettered liberty and the duty to maintain the
general welfare. In modern terms, the uncertainty lies in
whether parens patriae actions involve right or only privilege.
Blackstone, writing in the latter half of the eighteenth cen-
tury,42 defines the scope of parens patriae actions by saying
that the sovereign is "the general guardian of all infants, idiots
and lunatics"4 and "has the general superintendence of all
charitable uses in the kingdom."44 The single purpose underly-
41. 424 U.S. 950 (1976). The fact that the parens patriae question has been consid-
ered apart from foreign governments' legal status as a whole indicates fundamental
confusion as to what is meant by capacity and what is meant by standing to sue.
Capacity refers to the right of access to a court generally, the option of presenting a
claim for adjudication should the occasion arise. Capacity to sue is an entitlement
which may be granted or revoked on various prudential or political grounds whose
bases have nothing to do with the criteria for proving standing. Mental incompetents
and unrecognized foreign governments, for instance, lack the legal capacity to sue in
United States courts, although, since mental incompetents have cognizable rights,
alternative methods have been devised by which parties possessing capacity may sue
on their behalf. See note 5, supra; text accompanying notes 45, 79-90, infra.
Standing, by contrast, is less concerned with the identity of the parties than it is
with the nature of the alleged offense. Standing therefore assumes capacity and refers
to the determination of whether the actual injury complained of is contemplated by
the statute or whether the litigating party has a sufficient interest in or nexus to the
outcome of the case. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98-103 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 204 (1962); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Thus the central tlesis of this essay is that when
a parens patriae suit represents the only means of fulfilling the requirements of stand-
ing and practicality, especially when capacity has been specifically granted by treaty
(see note 205 infra), denial of the parens patriae claim forecloses all possiblity of
obtaining relief, and renders "capacity" an empty concept. If an entity such as a
foreign nation legally has access to the courts, then to cut off all avenues of access is
flatly inconsistent.
42. Blackstone began his law lectures at Oxford University in 1753. These lectures
formed the basis of the COMMENTARIES, published in 1765-69. Holdsworth, Some As-
pects of Blackstone and His Commentaries, 4 CAMB. L.J. 261, 262, 268 (1932).
43. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 47 (T. Cooley ed. 1872) [hereinafter cited
as BLACKSTONE]. See Malina & Blechman, supra note 6, at 197.
44. 2 BLACKSTONE at 47. The conflation of the power over charitable uses and
power over lunatics, idiots, and other legal incompetents under parens patriae as
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ing the combining of these two powers under the parens patriae
doctrine would seem to be that of helping those who are legally
(and in some cases actually) incompetent to help themselves.
[Tihe authority [over charitable uses] thus exercised ar-
ises, in part, from the ordinary power of the court of chancery
over trusts, and, in part, from the right of the government, or
sovereign, as parens patriae, to supervise the acts of public and
charitable institutions in the interests of those to be benefited by
their establishment; and, if their funds become bona vacantia, or
left without lawful charge, or appropriated to illegal purposes, to
cause them to be applied in such lawful manner as justice and
equity may require."
Blackstone is inconsistent as to whether the exercise of the
parens patriae power is discretionary or required by duty. On
the one hand,
as to private injuries: if any person has, in point of property, a
just demand upon the king, he must petition him in his court of
chancery, where his chancellor will administer right as a matter
of grace though not upon compulsion."
exercised by the chancellor was well established by Blackstone's time. 1 W. HOLD-
SWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 474 (1938) [hereinafter cited as HOLDSWORTH].
Originally, however, "[lj]urisdiction over those of unsound mind . . . was vested in
the Exchequer." Id. By the time of Elizabeth the chancellor had already assumed
jurisdiction to enforce a charitable legacy by the statutes of charitable uses. See 39
Eliz. I. c. 6 (1597); 43 Eliz. I. c. 4 (1601); G. JONES, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF CHARITY
1532-1827, at 18 (1969).
45. Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 56 (1890).
The common thread that runs through the history of the parens patriae
concept is the belief that where citizens have been injured, but are not
capable of obtaining relief for themselves, the State should act on their
behalf.
Originally,- the parens patriae concept was employed on behalf of
persons unable to protect their own interests because of mental incapac-
ity; today, we use the doctrine to protect those who, although injured, are
unable to seek relief because of lack of legal standing or adequate finan-
cial resources.
Hearings on H.R. 38 and H.R. 2850, supra note 7, at 21 (statement of James T.
Halverson).
46. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 241 (emphasis added). On the perquisites of
sovereignty, Blackstone writes:
And, first, the law ascribes to the king the attribute of sovereignty, or pre-
eminence. . . His realm is declared to be an empire, . . . by many acts
of parliament, . . . which at the same time declare the king to be the
supreme head of the realm in matters both civil and ecclesiastical, and
of consequence inferior to no man upon earth, dependent on no man,
accountable to no man. . . .[Tihe person of the king is sacred, even
though the measures -pursued in his reign be completely tyrannical and
arbitrary.
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On the other hand,
[t]he principal duty of the king is, to govern his people accord-
ing to law. . . . "The king," saith Bracton, . . . "ought not to
be subject to man, but to God, and to the law; for the law maketh
the king. . . . [H]e is not truly king, where will and pleasure
rules, and not the law."4
The "duties" that a monarch "owes" his people are expressed
in the coronation oath: "to govern according to law; to execute
judgment in mercy; and to maintain the established religion."4
A soverign subject to law in matters pertaining to the dispens-
ing of justice is in fact the crucial element of a constitutional,
as opposed to an absolute, monarchy,49 but this concept of
sovereignty is incompatible with purely discretionary exercise
of the parens patriae power.5 0
The traditions which ultimately came to be embodied in
the doctrine of parens patriae arose from political controversies
in which the legal principles were directly and deeply rooted.5 '
Blackstone, less an original theorist than a codifier of the law,
was profoundly influenced by these controversies.52 Hobbes, for
instance, whose treatise on government, Leviathan, appeared
in 1651, had argued that men organize, or can justify their
organizing, into political units out of inherent weakness:53 with-
out strong central authority civilization would be internecine
struggle,54 "and the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish,
Id. See also Malina & Blechman, supra note 6, at 198.
47. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 233-34. Bracton died in 1268.
48. Id. at 235.
49. Id. at 233, 234.
50. "Discretion" implies a choice on the part of the chancellor to recognize the
power of parens patriae or not, as he sees fit. But "law implies governance through a
system of rules that are generally applicable." 0. Fiss, INJUNCTIONS 74 (1972). See also
K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Con-
stitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1959).
51. "The contest between King and Parliament for predominance in the state
occupies the greater part of this [seventeenth] century; and the victory of the Parlia-
ment resulted in the settlement of the law of the constitution upon its modern basis."
6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 44, at 3.
52. Blackstone's debt (and hence that of subsequent Anglo-American jurisprud-
ence) to preceding political theorists, especially Hobbes and Locke, as well as to pre-
ceding legal scholars, is manifest throughout the CoMMENTARIES. See 6 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 44, at 273-301 (The Influence of Political Theories on the Development of
English Public Law).
53. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 40-41 (C. Macpherson ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as
LEVIATHAN].
54. Id. at 41.
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and short."5 Out of aversion to death and social chaos and
desire to enjoy the amenities of civilization,56 men contract
with a sovereign who is invested with absolute power to look
after their interests." The absoluteness of the sovereign Hobbes
sees as the lesser of two evils, the greater evil being civil war,58
the closest historical approximation to the hypothetical state
of nature.58 The function of the sovereign, Hobbes says, is "the
procuration of the safety of the people. . . . But by Safety here,
is not meant a bare preservation, but also all other Content-
ments of life . . ,,.0 Thus the sovereign comes into being
expressly for the benefit of the subjects, including those for
some reason unable to cope for themselves:
And whereas many men, by accident inevitable, become unable
to maintain themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left
to the charity of private persons; but to be provided for (as far-
forth as the necessities of Nature require) by the laws of the
Commonwealth. For as it is uncharitableness in any man, to
neglect the impotent; so it is in the sovereign of a commonwealth,
to expose them to the hazard of such uncertain charity."
As early as Hobbes, then, the care of the weaker or otherwise
less capable members of society was entrusted to the sovereign
less as a matter of the sovereign's "grace" than as a condition
of contract.
Locke followed Hobbes in all the essentials, except that
where Hobbes made the contract binding in perpetuity, Locke
made it revocable by the consent of the people.62 The increased
cohesiveness and stability of the middle class made political
disintegration upon termination of the social contract 3 less
likely, so that the bargaining power between sovereign and
55. Id. at 186.
56. Id. at 41, 223.
57. Id. at 41, 232, 260-61. The state is simply "organised force," L. STEPHEN,
HOBBES 211, quoted in 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 44, at 298.
58. LEVIATHAN, supra note 53, at 47, 233.
59. Id. at 41, 224.
60. Id. at 376 (emphasis in original). See also id. at 48, 385.
61. Id. at 387.
62. In his SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, published in 1690, Locke sought to
justify the Glorious Revolution of 1688, "to establish the throne of our great Restorer,
our present King William, and make good his title in the consent of the people." J.
LoCKE, Two TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT vii (W. Carpenter ed. 1940) [hereinafter
cited as LOCKE].
63. See LEVIATHAN, supra note 53, at 55, 58.
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subjects shifted to the latter. 4 Locke was thus able to confirm
the notion that power "shall be made use of for the good of the
nation." 5 For Locke, as for Hobbes, the safety and general
welfare of the people was the government's paramount con-
cern." Since the purpose of political organization was to avoid
the confusion and inconvenience of each citizen's taking the
law into his own hands, 7 and to preserve one's possessions, 8 a
government which failed to achieve these ends ceased to have
a reason for existence.
It was Locke's analysis of the function of sovereignty that
Blackstone followed more closely. For the jurist, as for Hobbes
and Locke, government has its origins in men's perception of
their individual weakness. "The only true and natural founda-
tions of society are the wants and fears of individuals." 9 The
contract between the governed and the government is not
rooted in any particular historical event, but rather is the theo-
retical justification for obedience to the king and the king's
duty to serve his subjects. 0 The king's gross abuse of power
constitutes breach of contract on his part, and the arrangement
may therefore be dissolved.7
Locke's analysis of political incompetency similarly fore-
shadows Blackstone's discussion of legal incompetency. Locke
states that a child "is in an estate wherein he has no under-
64. "For all power given with trust for the attaining an end being limited by that
end, whenever that end is manifestly neglected or opposed, the trust must necessarily
be forfeited, and the power devolve into the hands of those that gave it, who may place
it anew where they shall think best for their safety and security." LOCKE, supra note
62, at 192.
65. Id. at 202.
66. "Salus populi suprema lex [the welfare of the people is the supreme law] is
certainly so just and fundamental a rule, that he who sincerely follows it cannot
dangerously err." Id. at 197.
67. Id. at 181-82.
68. Id. at 180.
69. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 46.
70. Id. at 47.
71. "Indeed, . . . whenever the unconstitutional oppressions, even of the sover-
eign power, advance with gigantic strides, and threaten desolation to a state, mankind
will not be reasoned out of the feelings of humanity; nor will sacrifice their liberty
... .When King James the Second invaded the fundamental constitution of the
realm, the convention declared an abdication, whereby the throne was rendered va-
cant, which induced a new settlement of the crown." Id. at 244-45. Recall the conflict




standing of his own to direct his will"-i.e., the ability to un-
derstand and follow the law 7-and so needs someone who will
understand for him, to prescribe and regulate his actions."
Children and madmen are not free under the law; only he who
truly knows and is capable of following the law is legally com-
petent.74 Similarly for Blackstone the task of the guardian is to
take care of someone who can not (yet) manage his own affairs
and thus needs a substitute to act for him. "The guardian with
us performs the office both of the tutor and curator of the
Roman laws; the former of which had the charge of the mainte-
nance and education of the minor, the latter the care of his
fortune."75 By Blackstone's time, then, the weight of authority
indicated that an incompetent has some sort of right at
law-not merely a privilege-to be fully represented. The sov-
ereign himself is simply the last alternative substitute at bar,
after the possibilities of kin and guardians have been ex-
hausted.76 It is no longer an option for the king to care for his
subjects or not, as he chooses; the king must step into the
breach.77 The upshot of the duty-privilege debate over the
parens patriae power for present day American law is that
parens patriae as a duty is outside the Executive's discretion;
although the power of parens patriae resided long in the Chan-
cery, it is not in this respect like a pardon, which is within the
Executive's discretion.78
72. LOCKE, supra note 62, at 144.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 144-45.
75. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 460.
76. "The government itself is, in a sense, the supreme guardian, whom the indi-
vidual guardian represents in its solicitude for the welfare of the wards. Guardianship,
therefore, is a trust of the highest and most sacred character." 12 R.C.L. Guardian and
Ward § 60 (1916) (footnotes omitted). See text accompanying note 90, infra.
77. And so it remains in English law to this day:
[Tihe inherent jurisdiction of the court over minors is derived from the
sovereign as parens patriae. Traditionally the sovereign is interested in
the welfare of his minor subjects who because of tender years are incapa-
ble of looking after themselves. "It is in the interest of the sovereign that
children should be properly brought up and educated; and according to
the principle of our law, the sovereign, as parens patriae, is bound to look
at the maintenance and education (as far as it has the means of judging)
of all of his subjects." The sovereign accords protection to all who owe
him allegiance . ...
DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 401 (J. Morris ed. 1973) (footnotes omit-
ted).
78. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 ("[The President] shall have Power to grant Reprieves
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As a matter of explicit legal doctrine, the parens patriae
developed as a trust between the guardian and the ward. The
guardian was acting on behalf of, that is, presumptively fur-
thering the welfare of, his charge, the guardian himself having
no material interest and acquiring no unfair gain from his serv-
ices. 9
For the law judges it improper to trust the person of an infant in
his hands, who may by possibility become heir to him; that there
may be no temptation, nor even suspicion of temptation, for him
to abuse his trust."
Originally, "the lord [of the manor] was entitled to the
wardship of the lands and person of those of unsound mind.
The crown acquired this wardship, to the exclusion of the lord,
probably by virtue of some statute or ordinance of the latter
end of the reign of Henry III [died 1272]."' Although early
English law divided the mentally unsound into idiots and luna-
tics, 2 "the 'clemency of the crown and the pity of the juries'
gradually assimilated the condition of idiots to that of luna-
tics." '83 Jurisdiction was eventually given to the chancellor,84
perhaps again because he represented the king's moral sensibil-
ity. 5 The governing principle is that the king's agent, the chan-
cellor, acts in the lunatic's interest and on his behalf.86 The
and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeach-
ment.").
79. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 426-27; see also Beverley's Case (1603) 4 Co.
Rep. at f. 126 a; Tourson's Case (1611) 8 Co. Rep. 170 a; 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note
44, at 475.
80. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 461.
81. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 44, at 473.
82. Id. at 474. "The idiot is one that hath had no understanding from his nativ-
ity;" the lunatic "is one who hath had understanding, but . ..hath lost the use of
his reason." 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 292, 294. The significance of the distinc-
tion was that guardianship in the case of idiots "was a profitable right analogous to
the right of wardship: in the [case of lunatics] it was in the nature of a duty, and no
profit could be made from it," 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 44, at 474. Why the distinc-
tion ever arose at all is a mystery, unless the idiot, who was deemed never to have had
any mental ability at all, was regarded as inferior, somehow less a person, and so less
worthy of protection than the lunatic, who had once enjoyed the use of his faculties.
83. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 44, at 474: citation is to POPE, LUNACY 24 (1877).
84. Id. at 475. See also G. SPENCE, AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN OF THE LAWS AND
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY THOSE OF ENGLAND 561
(1826).
85. But see 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 44, at 475.
86. Id. at 476.
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situation was analogous in the case of equitable jurisdiction
over infants."7
The incapacity of the infant was not supplemented to any
very large extent by the powers of the guardian. The general
principle seems to be that the guardian must preserve the prop-
erty in statu quo, and strictly account."
By 1467 the essential notion behind suits in parens patriae
had already become settled case law. In that year, in a case
tried in Chancery, 9 defense argued that if the plaintiff had not
taken care to follow the rules of covenants, and if he thereby
suffered injury, it was injury justly incurred through the plain-
tiff's own foolishness. Nevertheless, the Chancellor proclaimed,
Deus est procurator fatuorum (God acts as attorney for fools),
and granted a subpoena against the defendant.
The maxim bears the stamp of rough and ready mediaeval
clericalism, and it opened the way for the Chancery to look be-
hind the external regularity of all sorts of transactions with a view
to the redress of wrongs committed by skillful miscreants who
had taken advantage of weakness of intellect, insufficient knowl-
edge, or casual negligence."
But whether it is God, the Chancellor, or the Attorney General
who brings suit on behalf of the incompetent, the doctrine of
parens patriae represents in essence the rectification of per-
ceived asymmetry or imbalance in the allocation of legal rights
and obligations.9
Thus the fundamental elements of the parens patriae doc-
trine in English law seem to be: (1) the party is incompetent
in law (and often in fact) to secure his rights; (2) there is no
other alternative than the sovereign or his representative; (3)
the sovereign has a duty to minister to his subjects' welfare;
(4) the sovereign as champion acts on someone else's behalf
and has no personal interest in the matter whatsoever.
87. 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 44, at 648-50.
88. Id. at 649.
89. Y.B.P. 8 Edw. IV, f. 4, 11 pl., reported in Vinogradoff, Reason and Conscience
in Sixteenth-Century Jurisprudence, 24 L.Q. REV. 373, 380 (1908), reprinted in 2 P.
VINOGRADOFF, COLLECrED PAPERS 190, 198-99 (1928).
90. Vinogradoff (1908), supra note 89, at 380.
91. See Attorney General v. Dublin (Mayor of), 1 Bligh N.S. 312 (1827), 4 Eng.
Rep. 888 (1901); Shaftsbury (Earl of) v. Shaftsbury, Gilb. Rep. 172 (1725), 25 Eng.
Rep. 121 (1903).
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B. American Doctrine
The American transformation of sovereignty under the
1787 Constitution was radical in two respects: it divided the
sovereign power between a federal government and its subordi-
nate states," and the sovereign thereby became no longer iden-
tifiable with a single individual or well-defined institution, but
rather became a totally corporate entity. 3
Dissolution of union with England brought to the fore
novel problems in redefining sovereignty as related to the union
of the thirteen states. In the pre-Constitutional era, the
newly-independent states governed themselves more as sepa-
rate commonwealths than as individual members of one na-
tion .15
Under the changing exigencies of their polemics and politics,
Americans needed some new contractual analogy to explain their
evolving relationships among themselves and with the state.
Only a social agreement among the people, only such a Lockean
contract, seemed to make sense of their rapidly developing idea
of a constitution as a fundamental law designed by the people to
be separate from and controlling of all the institutions of govern-
ment.11
The Federal Constitution, seen as a Lockean compact between
the member states and the central government,97 solved the
92. B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 198ff., 224-
29 (1971); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 282ff.
(1969) [hereinafter cited as WOODI. "In America the powers of sovereignty are divided
between the government of the Union and those of the States." McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1812).
93. See E. KANTOROWiCZ, THE KING'S Two BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIEVAL POLITICAL
THEOLOGY (1957). The trend toward dissociation of the king's private from his public
or political status had been going on for some time and was recognized by Blackstone.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at 155-57. The process of separating out the sovereign's
various legal capacities was continued into American law. In an important American
case the Supreme Court noted that "Georgia [had] sought to sue in four slightly
different capacities: its sovereign capacity . . . ; as a quasi-sovereign . . . ; its proprie-
tary capacity . . . ; and as protector of a general class of its citizens .... " Hawaii
v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 259 n.13 (1972), discussing Georgia v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
94. WOOD, supra note 92, at 282, 283.
95. Id. at 356-57. James Madison himself said: "Who are the parties to [the
Constitutional Convention]? The people. Not the people as composing one great body,
but the people as composing thirteen sovereignties." Quoted in C. WARREN, THE SU-
PREME COURT AND SOVEREIGN STATES 34 (1924) [hereinafter cited as WARREN].
96. WOOD, supra note 92, at 283 (footnote omitted).
97. LOCKE, supra note 62, at xvii-xviii; WOOD, supra note 92, at 283-84ff.
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problem of allotting sovereign power by implicitly recognizing
that the purpose of federation was not to detract from, but to
enhance and supplement, each state's governance of its own
citizens .9
In accordance with the Lockean scenario, then, the states
entered into the Federal Constitution out of perceived weak-
ness in the existing scheme of government, as exemplified in
the Articles of Confederation. On May 29, 1787, Governor
Edmund Randolph of Virginia introduced his proposal to the
Constitutional Convention for a new constitution, arguing that
"the federal government could not check the quarrels between
states.""0 In return for the protection afforded by having a su-
preme central tribunal for resolving disputes,0 0 the states for-
feited their rights to wage economic and military war.'"' In
return for acquiring some of the sovereign prerogatives of the
states, e.g., levying embargoes and armies, the central govern-
ment, for its part, accepted a duty to ensure the general welfare
of the states.02 Thus "[t]he state has a duty to its inhabitants
to provide for and protect their health, comfort and welfare"; 03
this duty, moreover, "is not merely a remote or ethical interest
but one which is immediate and recognized by law."''
Although a state could condescend to be brought before a
national court, by no means could a state be forced to so sub-
mit. The liability of a state to suits by citizens of another state
or a foreign country had in fact been promulgated by the Su-
98. The thinking of the colonial period had been heavily influenced by the theory
of Emmerich de Vattel: "[Sleveral sovereign and independent states may unite them-
selves together by a perpetual confederacy without each in particular ceasing to be a
perfect state . . . .The deliberations in common will offer no violence to the sover-
eignty of each member." E. DE VA'ITEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF NATURE (1759-60), quoted in WOOD, supra note 92, at 355.
99. 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 19 (1911).
See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17 (A. Hamilton), 10, 44 (J.
Madison); Woods & Reed, The Supreme Court and Interstate Environmental Quality:
Some Notes on the Wyandotte Case, 12 ARIZ. L. REv. 691, 705 (1970).
100. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; WARREN, supra note 95, at 4-5.
101. WARREN, supra note 95, at 34-35. See also Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324
U.S. 439, 450 (1945); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907);
Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890);
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 728 (1838); Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406-07 (1821).
102. See State Protection, supra note 6, at 431.
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923).
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preme Court in Chisholm v. Georgia, ' 5 a decision which
"created such a shock of surprise throughout the country that,
at the first meeting of Congress thereafter, the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution was almost unanimously pro-
posed, and was in due course adopted by the legislatures of the
States."' 10 Thus the United States at first retained the ancient
tension between sovereign duty and sovereign liberty.0 7
A corollary of the American transformation of royal sover-
eignty into federal supremacy was the depersonification of the
sovereign under the separation of functions doctrine. The Chief
Executive retained a few of the prerogatives of the sovereign,'"'
the Attorney General or his delegate represented the sovereign
in court, 09 and the judiciary became the American successors
of the English courts of equity."0 In this way the notion of a
sovereign indulging in caprice where matters of individual
rights were concerned was rapidly to become obsolete in the
American scheme of government. Thus the first distinctive
American contribution to parens patriae doctrine was the
transmutation of sovereignty from monarch and parliament to
a federal state system, each state as "quasi-sovereign" enjoying
some of the governmental powers once exercised only by the
central sovereign."'
105. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1792).
106. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890). "This amendment, expressing the
will of the ultimate sovereignty of the whole country . . . reversed the decision of the
Supreme Court." Id. U.S. CONST. amend. XI, ratified in 1798, provides: "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." See generally Tribe,
Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of
Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REV. 682 (1976).
107. See text accompanying notes 46-47.
108. For example, the pardon and appointive power, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
109. In the case of parens patriae, see, e.g., Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 1 (1819); Kansas v. American Standard, Inc., 1970 Trade Cas. 73,013
(E.D. Pa. 1969).
110. Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 51-58 (1890); Fontain v. Rave-
nel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 389 (1854).
[I]n this country, there is no royal person to act as parens patriae, and
to give direction for the application of charities which cannot be adminis-
tered by the court. . . . [In the United States,] the legislature is the
parens patriae, and, unless restrained by constitutional limitations, pos-
sesses all the powers in this regard which the sovereign possesses in Eng-
land.
Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1890).
VOL. 6:705
PARENS PATRIAE
The next task was to determine exactly what the exercise
of sovereign power now entailed. This the Supreme Court
began to do in Louisiana v. Texas. " Texas had set up a quar-
antine as a reaction to a single case of yellow fever reported in
New Orleans, an action which in effect placed an embargo on
commerce being shipped from New Orleans. Invoking the elev-
enth amendment,"3 the Court held that a suit in parenspatriae
could not be brought for the relief of particular individuals.
The harm or benefit involved must be public in nature, al-
though it is concededly difficult to distinguish a large number
of particular individuals from a segment of the public at large.
In order then to maintain jurisdiction of this bill of com-
plaint as against the State of Texas, it must appear that the
controversy to be determined is a controversy arising directly
between the State of Louisiana and the State of Texas, and not
a controversy in the vindication of grievances of particular
individuals....
... [I]n Debs, Petitioner, 158 U.S. 564, . . . it was ob-
served: "That while it is not the province of the Government to
interfere in any mere matter of private controversy between indi-
viduals, or to use its great powers to enforce the rights of one
against another, yet, whenever the wrongs complained of are such
as affect the public at large, and are in respect of matters which
by the Constitution are intrusted to the care of the Nation, and
concerning which the Nation owes the duty to all the citizens of
securing to them their common rights, then the mere fact that
the Government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy is
not sufficient to exclude it from the courts or prevent it from
taking measures therein to fully discharge those constitutional
duties."
It is in this aspect that the bill before us is framed. Its grava-
men is not a special and peculiar injury such as would sustain an
111. [W]hen this country achieved its independence, the preroga-
tives of the crown devolved upon the people of the States. And this power
still remains with them, except so far as they have delegated a portion of
it to the federal government. The sovereign will is made known to us by
legislative enactment. The State, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae.
Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 384 (1854). See also Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972); California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774, 776 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); 4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW
536 (W. Lacy ed. 1889); Wagner, The Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court, 2 ST. Louis U.L.J. 111, 147-52 (1952); Note, The Original
Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REv. 665, 671-80 (1959).
112. 176 U.S. 1 (1900).
113. Id. at 16.
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action by a private person, but the State of Louisiana presents
herself in the attitude of parens patriae, trustee, guardian or
representative of all her citizens. . . . [Tihe State [of Louis-
iana] is entitled to seek relief in this way because the matters
complained of affect her citizens at large.114
Thus a further major requirement for parens patriae suits is
that the state have some overriding transcendent interest, so
that "the State, as the representative of the public, has an
interest apart from that of the individuals affected.""' The
state's interest is in fulfilling its duty to secure and maintain
the general welfare.
In two cases decided in succeeding years, Missouri v.
Illinois"' and Kansas v. Colorado,"7 the Supreme Court sus-
tained a state's claim to injunctive relief as parens patriae in
order to protect not only the property but the actual health and
comfort of its citizens. These cases suggest the wide scope of
legitimate concerns which the state might have as parens
patriae, a range of interests certainly broader than the oversee-
ing of individual incompetents and charitable establishments
recognized in English law. In the twin cases
no question of boundary is involved, nor of direct property rights
belonging to the complainant State. But it must surely be con-
ceded that, if the health and comfort of the inhabitants of a State
are threatened, the State is the proper party to represent and
defend them. . . .The health and comfort of the large communi-
ties inhabiting those parts of the State situated on the Missis-
sippi River are not alone concerned, but contagious and typhoi-
dal diseases introduced in the river communities may spread
themselves throughout the territory of the State ...
114. Id. at 16, 19. For other suits denied parens patriae status on this criterion,
see North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry., 220 U.S. 277 (1911); Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331 (1907);
New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883). See also Massachusetts v. Missouri,
308 U.S. 1, 17 (1939) (state may not invoke original jurisdiction of Supreme Court to
enforce rights of individual citizens); accord, Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304
U.S. 387 (1938); Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l Bank, 350 F.2d 645, 648-49 (7th Cir.
1965) ("Federal courts will not entertain a suit at the instance of the United States if
the suit is in reality one between private individuals." Id. at 648.).
115. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592 (1923). "In [the quasi-
sovereign capacity of parens patriael the State has an interest independent of and
behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain." Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); see generally J. MOORE, COMMENTARY
ON THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CODE 624-25 (1949).
116. 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
117. 185 U.S. 125 (1902).
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[Slubstantial impairment of the health and prosperity of the
towns and cities of the State situated on the Mississippi River
...would injuriously affect the entire State.
That suits brought by individuals, each for personal injuries,
threatened or received, would be wholly inadequate and dispro-
portionate remedies, requires no argument."'
In this holding a third fundamental principle of American
parens patriae emerges: the generous conception of what the
common welfare includes." 9
Since the state as parens patriae can sue to protect the
welfare of its citizenry as a whole, a parens patriae claim could
actually oppose the interests of some of the state's citizens.
This possibility was appreciated by Justice Holmes in Georgia
v. Tennessee Copper Co., 20 a case in which Georgia as parens
patriae sought injunctive relief against a factory in Tennessee
which was pouring noxious fumes into Georgia from across the
state line. Though some workers from Georgia at that factory
stood to lose their jobs, "[ilt is a fair and reasonable demand
on the part of a sovereign that the air over its territory should
not be polluted on a great scale. . . .Whether Georgia by in-
sisting upon this claim is doing more harm than good to her
own citizens is for her to determine."'' The state's interest as
parens patriae, then, is a constructive, presumptive interest
applied to the major or most acutely affected portion 2 of the
class concerned-a class whose interests may in fact conflict.
The interests of a small group, therefore, may be subordinated
to the more compelling interests of the populace as a whole,
under this reading of the parens patriae capacity.
The doctrine of parens patriae in American law, therefore,
while retaining the essential elements of its English fore-
118. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1902); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S.
208, 241 (1901). See also New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1921).
119. The extent to which such broad protection may be construed is indicated by
recent dicta: "Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are
important ingredients of the quality of life in our society .... " Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972). See also Association of Data Processing Service Orgs., Inc.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
120. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
121. Id. at 238, 239. See also Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
122. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923). Land O'Lakes Crea-
meries, Inc. v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 160 F. Supp. 387, 389 (E.D. La. 1958),
implies that "Minnesota [would have] the right to sue as parens patriae in behalf of
all, or a substantial number, of her citizens." (emphasis added).
1977
726 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
bears, 2 ' developed four additional basic principles: (1) devolu-
tion of part of the sovereign's duty of protection to the states
as "quasi-sovereigns"; (2) protection not to be extended on
behalf of particular individuals; (3) extension of the scope of
protection to the various economic and noneconomic compo-
nents of the public good; (4) state's interest as parens patriae
presumptively, but not necessarily actually, coincides with all
the members of the patria.
Having seen how the seminal decisions in American case
law enlarged upon English policies, it remains to observe how
the American version of parens patriae has fared in subsequent
invocations of the doctrine. Only two parens patriae cases seek-
ing treble damages for antitrust violations have reached the
Supreme Court: Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R.,' 2' and Hawaii
v. Standard Oil Co.' In the earlier case, Georgia sued defen-
dant railroads for fixing noncompetitive and discriminatory
rates in (inter alia) her capacity as a quasi-sovereign or parens
patriae and in her proprietary capacity as the owner of a rail-
road and railroad facilities. Citing Georgia v. Evans,2 ' the
Court first ruled that Georgia, suing for her own injuries, is a
"person" within the meaning of section 16 of the Clayton Act;",
additionally, "she is authorized to maintain suits to restrain
violations of the anti-trust laws or to recover damages by rea-
123. For early cases in America depending primarily on English doctrine, see
Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369 (1854); In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 145 P.
871 (1915); Sporza v. German Sav. Bank, 192 N.Y. 8, 84 N.E. 406 (1908); McIntosh v.
Dill, 86 Okla. 1,205 P. 917 (1922); In re Hughes' Estate, 231 Pa. 475, 80 A. 1104 (1911).
124. 324 U.S. 439 (1945), comment in 32 VA. L. REv. 157 (1945).
125. 405 U.S. 251 (1972), aff'g 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'g 301 F. Supp.
982 (D. Hawaii 1969). See Handler, Twenty-Five Years of Antitrust, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
415, 423-30 (1973); Comment, Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.: Aloha to Parens Patriae?,
22 CATH. U.L. REv. 156 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Aloha]; Comment, State Recovery
of Money Damages, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 789 (1971). See also Case Comment, 15
ST. Louis U.L.J. 311 (1970).
126. 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
127. The Clayton Act § 16 provides in relevant part:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for
and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having juris-
diction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation
of the antitrust laws, . . .when and under the same conditions and
principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause
loss or damage is granted by courts of equity ....
15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
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son thereof." 2 ' The injury, moreover, was serious enough to
invoke the Court's jurisdiction.
If the allegations of the bill are taken as true, the economy
of Georgia and the welfare of her citizens have seriously suffered
as the result of this alleged conspiracy. Discriminatory rates are
but one form of trade barriers. They may cause a blight no less
serious than the spread of noxious gas over the land or the deposit
of sewage in the streams. They may affect the prosperity and
welfare of a State as profoundly as any diversion of waters from
the rivers. . . . They may arrest the development of a State or
put it at a decided disadvantage in competitive markets ...
These are matters of grave public concern in which Georgia has
an interest apart from that of particular individuals who may be
affected. Georgia's interest is not remote; it is immediate. If we
denied Georgia as parens patriae the right to invoke the original
jurisdiction of the Court in a matter of that gravity, we would
whittle the concept of justiciability down to the stature of minor
or conventional controversies. There is no warrant for such a
restriction. 2 9
The Court let the parens patriae suit lie. Georgia's com-
plaint was consistent with the criteria of public (as opposed to
private) protection, a presumptive interest in the welfare of its
citizens as an integral whole, and a grave problem falling under
the state's police power to resolve.'30 However, the Court dec-
lined to decide whether a parens patriae suit will support a
treble damage claim, here following Keogh v. Chicago & N. W.
Ry.' 3' to the extent that "damages under the anti-trust laws
may not be recovered against railroad carriers though the rates
approved by the [Interstate Commerce] Commission were
fixed pursuant to a conspiracy."'' 2 By all but eliminating treble
damages as a remedy in a parens patriae antitrust suit, the
Court strongly suggests that injunctive relief is indeed avail-
able, though the Court never explicitly says as much.'
33 Just
as Georgia strongly suggests (but does not conclusively prove)
that injunctive relief is available in parens patriae suits, so
128. 324 U.S. at 447.
129. Id. at 450, 451.
130. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), added the qualification that
a state could not act as parens patriae on behalf of its citizens against the United
States. Id. at 485-86. Accord, Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 485 (1976).
131. 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
132. 324 U.S. at 452.
133. Id. at 460.
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does Georgia strongly suggest that treble damages in parens
patriae antitrust suits may not be recovered. In the only parens
patriae claim considered in the opinion, Count 2 of Georgia's
bill of complaint,'34 Georgia did not seek treble damages under
the antitrust laws; where it did seek such damages was in
Count 3, in its proprietary capacity.'35
There matters stood until Hawaii. Like Georgia, the later
case was a parens patriae suit against defendant corporations,
seeking monetary and'injunctive relief under the federal anti-
trust laws-not section 16 of the Clayton Act this time, but
section 4.136 Nevertheless the Court ruled expressly that
"Hawaii plainly qualifies as a person under both sections of the
statute. ,",3 The Court rejected Hawaii's suit, emphasiz-
ing the fact that section 4's requirement of injury to "business
or property" was not repeated in section 16, which suggested,
at least to the five-man majority, that Congress intended dif-
ferent remedies to lie for the two provisions.'38
Thus, § 4 permits Hawaii to sue in its proprietary capacity
for three times the damages it has suffered from respondents'
alleged antitrust violations .... When the State seeks damages
for injuries to its commercial interests, it may sue under § 4. But
where, as here, the State seeks damages for other injuries, 39 it is
not properly within the Clayton Act. 4 '
To allow Hawaii to recover treble damages "for injury to its
general economy, [would be to] open the door to duplicative
134. Georgia sought treble damages as parens patriae on behalf of a limited class
of citizens in Count 4, but only Counts 2 and 3 were discussed by the Court.
135. Brief for Plaintiff at 11, Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
Ultimately, the Court, relying on Keogh, denied damages to Georgia, on the purely
technical ground that the allegedly excessive freight charges were in fact legal because
already approved by the ICC. 324 U.S. at 453.
136. The Clayton Act § 4 provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides
or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy,
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost
of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
137. 405 U.S. at 261. The Court relied, as did the State of Hawaii, on Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945). See also Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
138. 405 U.S. at 261-62.
139. That is, to its general economy, and not to its business or property as defined
by the Court. Id. at 263 n.14.
140. Id. at 262, 264.
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recoveries."'' The Court said that both individuals and the
state could seek injunctive relief for the same violation:
"[Olne injunction is as effective as 100, and, concomitantly,
...100 injunctions are no more effective than one."' 42
Two points about the Hawaii decision need to be made.
First, the opinion notes that "[tihe District Court dismissed
Hawaii's class action . . .because it was unwieldy,"'4 but it
fails to mention any alternative to the class action as an effec-
tive method of obtaining relief. The parens patriae posture was
rejected, but with the jettisoning of the class action suit as well
the parties are apparently without remedy. Recall that the
sovereign as parens patriae is the champion of those parties
who would otherwise be without remedy' 44-if there is a just
complaint, there should be a way of vindicating it. Second,
even if treble damages are not awarded,' the Court says noth-
ing in Hawaii or elsewhere about the possibility of other forms
of monetary awards, for example, actual damages.
IV. FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS' STANDING TO SUE
The Eighth Circuit has now held that foreign governments
are "persons" entitled to sue for treble damages under section
4 of the Clayton Act.4 ' Noting that a foreign government's
standing turns solely on statutory interpretation and hence
Congressional intent, the opinion contains a comment concern-
ing the paucity of pertinent material: "Two decisions of the
United States Supreme Court offer guidance, but beyond these
we find little relevant help in construing the statute."'4 7 The
two cases mentioned are United States v. Cooper Corp.4 ' and
Georgia v. Evans;'49 the latter case was found controlling. The
141. Id. at 263-64. According to the Court, this is because individuals in their
private capacity could sue the same companies for the same offense.
142. Id. at 261.
143. Id. at 266. See also id. at 254, 256 n.6; 431 F.2d at 1282 n.3.
144. See text accompanying notes 76-77, supra.
145. Treble damages were intended to induce private parties to participate in the
enforcement of antitrust legislation. 405 U.S. at 275.
146. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 1976-1 Trade Cas. 60,892 (8th Cir.,
May 19, 1976), aff'd en banc 1976-2 Trade Cas. 61,175 (8th Cir., Sept. 3, 1976), cert.
granted 45 U.S.L.W. 3690 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1977) (No. 76-749).
147. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 1976-1 Trade Cas. $ 60,892, at 68,877
[hereinafter cited as Pfizer].
148. 312 U.S. 600 (1941). See note 157, infra.
149. 316 U.S. 159 (1942). See note 157, infra.
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court relied on Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in Evans,
which stated that Cooper did not mean that a governmental
body could not be included in the word "person."' 5 ° This was,
nevertheless, a virtual about-face, since Cooper had held that
the United States Government was not entitled to sue for treble
damages because it had alternative sanctions given uniquely to
it." ' Foreign governments, according to the recent Eighth Cir-
cuit decision, are analogous to domestic states in lacking these
alternative sanctions and so have standing under section 4 of
the Clayton Act.'
Two points in the decision are especially remarkable: first,
the admission of the lack of articulate antitrust policy with
respect to foreign nations and, second, the desire to ensure that
a foreign government has redress against American corpora-
tions through one provision or another. To take up the first
point, India's capacity to sue for treble damages depends on
whether or not it is a "person" under section 4 of the Clayton
Act. 53 Generally speaking, the construction of key terms in
antitrust, as in other, legislation turns on the particular policy
Congress has decided to effect.'54 Yet Congressional policy with
150. Pfizer, supra note 147, at 68,878, quoting Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. at 161.
151. Pfizer, supra note 147, at 68,878.
152. Id. at 68,879.
153. 522 F.2d at 614 n.3. See also Foreign Sovereigns, supra note 4, at 139. See
generally W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTrrausT LAws (2d ed. 1973); E.
KuwrriFa & M. JOELSON, AN INTRNATIONAL ANTrruST PRIMER (1974); Kintner, Joelson
& Vaghi, Groping for a Truly International Antitrust Law, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 75 (1973);
Velvel, Antitrust Suits by Foreign Nations, 25 CATH. U. L. REv. 1 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Velvel]; Note, Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws: A Conflict
of Laws Approach, 28 STAN. L. REv. 1005, 1017-20 (1976).
It is well established that phrases such as "any person" (as in Clayton Act §§ 4,
16) and "every person" in a statute need not extend the statute's applicability beyond
the nation's borders ad infinitum. "The words 'any person or persons,' are broad
enough to comprehend every human being. But general words must not only be limited
to cases within the jurisdiction of the state, but also to those objects to which the
legislature intended to apply them." United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610,
631 (1818); accord McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372
U.S. 10, 19-21 (1963); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 576-79 (1953).
154. "[The antitrust] statutes do not provide a precise description of prohibited
activities. They are couched in broad terms and, for the most part, the terms are
undefined. A basic provision, for example, prohibits combinations 'in restraint of
trade,' but Congress has left it to the courts to decide case by case what particular
business practices fall under this rubric." PARENS PATRIaE BILL, supra note 7, at 3.
"Arguably, the words 'any person' appearing in section 4 of the Clayton Act evidence
an intent by Congress to confer a remedy upon every juristic entity injured by the
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regard to foreign governments' status under American antitrust
laws is virtually nonexistent:' from the Sherman Act to the
present, there has been no major and definitive discussion by
Congress of American antitrust policy vis-a-vis foreign sover-
eigns. 51 Not until 1941,111 in fact, did the Supreme Court have
antitrust laws. The term 'any person' has been broadly interpreted; as the Supreme
Court has pointed out, 'The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting
all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpe-
trated."' Foreign Sovereigns, supra note 4, at 150, quoting Mandeville Island Farms,
Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948).
Since, in common usage, the term 'person' does not include the sov-
ereign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude
it. But there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion. The purpose, the
subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive
interpretation of the statute are aids to construction which may indicate
an intent, by the use of the term, to bring state or nation within the scope
of the law.
United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05 (1941) (footnotes omitted).
"[Tihe most important thing to keep in mind is the result orientation with which the
Court has approached the whole area of private treble-damage litigation." West Vir-
ginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1087 (2d Cir. 1971) (emphasis added).
The pivotal concepts in antitrust law are thus defined functionally, i.e., based on
legislative decisions as to who and what to protect: who will constitute a "person" and
what will constitute "business or property" for purposes of the legislation. For defini-
tion of "person" as founded on legislative policy, see 139 A.L.R. 1019-20 (1942). For
open-ended concept of "business" as employed by the Hawaii court, 405 U.S. at 264,
see Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1942). For definition of
"property," see Waldron v. British Petroleum, 231 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1964): "The
word 'property' is, in a sense, a conclusory term, i.e., an interest which the law protects.
A determination whether plaintiff has 'property' involves a value judgment as to
whether that which plaintiff factually possesses should be legally protected." 231 F.
Supp. at 86.
155. "The most effective argument that can be made against permitting foreign
sovereign antitrust suits is that there was no such legislative intent. Nowhere in the
legislative history of the antitrust laws is there any indication that Congress contem-
plated foreign governments asserting treble-damage actions .... " Foreign Sover-
eigns, supra note 4, at 144. Silence, however, has generally been considered an unrelia-
ble guide to legislative intent. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). ("It is at
best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule
of law." Id. at 69); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-21 (1940). But see United
States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) ("The absence of any comparable
provision [in the Norris-LaGuardia Act] extending the term ["person"] to sovereign
governments implies that Congress did not desire the term to extend to them." Id. at
275).
156. Though the Congressional hearings on the parens patriae legislation, supra
note 7, contain over a thousand pages of prepared statements and personal testimony,
there is not a single extended analysis of how the then pending legislation would affect
foreign governments suing in parens patriae capacity.
157. In United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941), the Supreme Court
decided that the United States was not a "person" for purposes of the Sherman Act §
7, which grants the right of action for treble damages to "any person" injured in his
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to decide whether the United States itself qua sovereign was a
"person" for purposes of section 7 of the Sherman Act.'
The Sherman Act and its succeeding legislation were en-
acted to achieve two basic goals: (1) to protect and promote the
interests of Americans by providing the best products at the
lowest possible prices'5" and (2) to make sure that American
corporations were managing their businesses fairly.6 0 Until the
current Pfizer litigation, 6' these two objectives were seen in the
business or property by practices forbidden in the Act. In Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S.
159 (1942), the Court found the State of Georgia to be a person under the same
provision of the Sherman Act, since "[tihe State of Georgia, unlike the United States,
cannot prosecute violations of the Sherman Law. . . . If the State is not a
'person'..., the Sherman Law leaves it without any redress for injuries resulting from
practices outlawed by that Act." 316 U.S. at 162. See also Chattanooga Foundry v.
Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906), holding that a city is a person under Sherman Act § 7.
158. The decision was based on two factors: (1) If Congress had meant to include
the United States in the coverage of the provision, it would have done so explicitly.
312 U.S. at 607. (2) The remedy of treble damages would be "more appropriate for a
private litigant than for the United States." 312 U.S. at 606. Yet the Court implies
that the terms referred to both natural and artificial persons, i.e., individuals and
corporations, without remarking that Congress did not make this interpretation ex-
plicit by incorporating it into the Act. The appropriateness of treble damages for a
foreign sovereign is thus left unresolved. On the one hand, it can be argued that foreign
governments have sufficient resources not to require treble damage awards. On the
other hand, this assumption is severely strained with respect to the small-
geographically and economically-governments of the "emerging" nations.
In 1955, the United States was expressly declared a "person" under the Clayton
Act by Pub. L. No. 137, ch. 283, amending Clayton Act § 4 and repealing Sherman
Act § 7.
159. "[The Sherman Act's] best effect will be a warning that all trade and
commerce, all agreements and arrangements, . . . must be governed by the universal
law that the public good must be the test of all." 21 CONG. REc. 2462 (1890) (Remarks
of Senator Sherman). "Every violation of the antitrust laws is a blow to the free-
enterprise system envisaged by Congress. . . .This system depends on strong compe-
tition for its health and vigor .. " Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 262. See
also House Report 3-4, quoted in PAmms PATmsL BnL, supra note 7, at 9.
160. "A basic purpose of the [parens patriae] bill is to deter violations by pre-
venting 'unjust enrichment' of offenders." PARENS PATIR BiLL, supra note 7, at 13.
Thus the Supreme Court limited the "passing-on" defense in antitrust litigation,
because "[tihose who violate the antitrust laws by price fixing or monopolizing would
retain the fruits of their illegality because no one [would be] available [to] bring suit
against them." Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494
(1968). See also PARENs PATm.A BilL, supra note 7, at 14. See generally Schaefer, The
Passing-On Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 883 (1975). But see Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 45
U.S.L.W. 4611 (U.S. June 9, 1977).
161. The question whether a foreign sovereign is a "person" under American
antitrust laws is "apparently" a case of first impression. In re Antibiotic Antitrust
Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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single context of domestic regulation and were parallel and
complementary to one another. But by barring a foreign sover-
eign from American courts under our antitrust laws, the one
goal does not necessarily follow from the other. That is, the
American economy and balance of payments can actually be
improved, at least in the short run, by allowing American com-
panies to keep all their revenues from their foreign operations.
This was seen, however dimly, as early as the Webb-Pomerene
Act of 1918, '"2 which was enacted only four years after the Clay-
ton Act. It permitted the existence of "an association entered
into for the .. .purpose of engaging in export trade, . . . or
an agreement made or act done in the course of export trade
by such association, ' '6 3 as long as this (conceivably monopolis-
tic) combination does not act to restrain trade within the
United States proper. The historical background of this bill" 4
suggests that "[tihe dominant theme of the congressional
debates . . .was that American corporations should get the
highest prices possible for their products overseas, regardless of
what foreigners were made to pay."'65
Characteristically, and in this case probably prudently,
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit left to the legisla-
ture the resolution of the broad policy issues involved in grant-
ing capacity to foreign governments, 66 not even mentioning the
162. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1970). See United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United
States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945); Simmons, The Webb-Pomerene Act and Antitrust Policy,
1963 Wisc. L. Rxv. 426; Chapman, Exports and Antitrust: Must Competition Stop at
the Water's Edge?, 6 VAND. J. TRAs. L. 399 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Chapmanl.
163. 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1970).
164. The term typically used by the federal courts in connection with ascertaining
congressional intent in antitrust legislation is "legislative environment," i.e., the con-
text from which the policy conclusions are to be derived. Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S.
159, 161 (1942), citing Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 370 (1934).
165. Foreign Sovereigns, supra note 4, at 147. Thus Congressman Webb stated:
"I would be willing that there should be a combination between anybody or anything
for the purpose of capturing the trade of the world, if they do not punish the people of
the United States in doing it." 55 CONo. REc. 3580 (1917). In a similar vein, Senator
Pomerene said, "[W]e have not reached that high plane of business morals which will
permit us to extend the same privilege to the people of the earth outside of the United
States that we extend to those within the United States." Id. at 2787. See also the
remarks of a contemporary member of Congress: "I have no sympathy with what a
foreigner pays for our products; I would like to see the American manufacturer get the
largest price possible .. " Hearings on H.R. 16707 Before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1916).
166. Pfizer, supra note 147, at 3 n.4. For discussion of some of the policy issues
involved, see Foreign Sovereigns, supra note 4, at 150-52; Velvel, supra note 153.
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familiar doctrine of comity of nations. 7 In thus deferring to the
legislature, the court correctly hints that it is high time to settle
these issues, issues which are bound to figure even more promi-
nently in the near future. The court also correctly recognizes
that there is no legitimate reason for a foreign nation to be
deprived of a remedy against admitted wrongs committed by
American corporations under American antitrust laws: to this
point we now turn.
V. PARENS PATRIAE OR CLASS ACTION?
Since India has capacity to sue, it faces a choice of litiga-
tion strategy from among a parens patriae suit, a rule 23 class
action, and a suit in its proprietary capacity. The last possibil-
ity is not important given the circumstances, since India could
However, the Supreme Court has adumbrated a position that would seem to favor the
granting of standing to foreign governments:
[T]he provisions in the Sherman Act against restraints of foreign trade
are based on the assumption, and reflect the policy, that export and
import trade in commodities is both possible and desirable. Those provi-
sions of the Act are wholly inconsistent with appellant's argument that
American business must be left free to participate in international car-
tels, that free foreign commerce in goods must be sacrificed in order to
foster export of American dollars for investment in foreign factories which
sell abroad.
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951). See A. NEALE,
THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 342-72 (2d ed. 1970) and cases therein cited.
167. The doctrine of comity of nations might ironically be used against India's
cause: "[W]e should expect that other nations and communities will use their anti-
trust laws to protect their consumers against those who restrain competition in their
markets." Baker, Antitrust and World Trade: Tempest in an International Teapot?, 8
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 16, 41 (1974) (emphasis in original). See Chapman, supra note 162,
at 403, and see Judge Lord's narrow ground of decision:
A conspiracy among domestic producers of antibiotic drugs to reduce or
eliminate competition as to foreign sales would certainly have an adverse
effect on domestic competition. Not only would it enable the domestic
manufacturers to build up a substantial "war chest" from excessive prof-
its from foreign sales but such a conspiracy might prevent either a domes-
tic or a foreign manufacturer from entering into the foreign market in
order to build up its strength to enter into the restricted domestic market.
In an age of expanding world trade, a truly successful monopoly requires
control of both domestic and foreign markets. For these reasons, this
court is convinced that the fundamental goal of the antitrust laws could
be seriously frustrated by not permitting Kuwait to maintain a treble
damage action for damages resulting from the alleged conspiracy.
In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp.
315, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
The locus classicus of American comity of nations doctrine is The Sapphire, 78
U.S. (11 Wall.) 164 (1870).
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bring a suit in its proprietary capacity only for drugs brought
by the government itself, not for antibiotics bought by private
individuals or organizations. In a proprietary suit, the govern-
ment is not acting as a public representative but as a private
plaintiff appearing on its own behalf or as a guardian ad
litem. '""
The choice thus is finally between utilizing parens patriae
or class action to vindicate the rights of Indian citizens. The
federal courts have demonstrated a marked preference for the
class action suit;6 9 indeed the Supreme Court in Hawaii was
surprisingly unresponsive to the argument that a class action
suit was impractical under the circumstances. 70 Yet there is
nothing sacrosanct about a class action. The class action suit
itself was originally a concession to practicality and conveni-
ence in the consolidation of similar and related claims. 7' The
same considerations of prudence and practicality should like-
wise obtain here, where the Hawaii and Pfizer cases have so
dramatically shown the limitations of the class action's useful-
ness.
The Hawaii court in effectively eliminating the parens
patriae suit as an alternative to the class action ignored its
previous sound reasoning:
The judiciary is an indispensable part of the operation of our
federal system. With the growing complexities of government it
is often the one and only place where effective relief can be ob-
tained .... [Wihere wrongs to individuals are done by viola-
168. California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
908 (1973). See generally Fraenkel, The Juristic Status of Foreign States, Their Prop-
erty and Their Acts, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 544, 549-50 (1925). If India sought to bring a
class action suit (assuming foreign governments have capacity and standing to sue
under Clayton Act § 4), it would have to meet the typicality requirement of FED. R.
Cry. P. 23 (a)(3), and, thus, in any event would have to allege damage to a proprietary
interest. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d at 617. (Hereinafter "India" will be used for
illustrative purposes to designate a foreign country which has been found to have both
capacity and standing; under present treaty arrangements, only Iran among the named
plaintiffs in the current Pfizer case possesses both capacity and standing to sue, see
note 216, infra.)
169. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972); see also Velvel, supra
note 153, at 1. For an appraisal of the comparative merits of the parens patriae and
class action suits from the economic point of view, see Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency,
Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEG. STUD. 47, 64-66 (1975).
170. 405 U.S. at 266.
171. Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQuTY 200-01 (1950); Marcin, Searching for
the Origin of the Class Action, 23 CATH. U. L. REv. 515 (1974).
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tion of specific guarantees, it is abdication for courts to close their
doors. 72
The parens patriae suit is a valuable supplement to the class
action as a consumer remedy, especially in a transnational con-
text. In fact the only feature parens patriae and class action
suits have in common is the requirement of numerous wronged
parties.' Unlike the parens patriae suit, the class action (or
more specifically the federal rules of procedure for a class ac-
tion)' requires: (1) homogeneous interests; 7 ' (2) best possible
notification;' (3) a minimum jurisdictional amount.'77 Fur-
172. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 111 (1968).
173. See Land O'Lakes Creameries v. Louisiana, 160 F. Supp. 387 (E.D. La.
1958); Fed. Rules Advisory Comm. Report on Rule 23(a); cf. Smith v. Swormstedt, 57
U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853) (one of the first class action suits recognized by the Supreme
Court). On the problems concerning the size of the class, see Grossman, Manageability
and the Fluid Recovery Doctrine, 47 LAB. BULL. 415 (1972); Malina, Fluid Class Recov-
ery as a Consumer Remedy in Antitrust Cases, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 477 (1972); Comment,
Manageability Problems of the Class Action Under Rule 23(b)(3), 6 U. SAN FRAN. L.
REv. 313 (1972); Comment, Administrative Problems, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 1000 (1974).
See also Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CH1.
L. REV. 684 (1941). See generally 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 1751 et seq. (1969); 3B J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 23-1 et
seq. (1975).
174. Class action suits are authorized and governed by FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See
generally Developments in the Law of Federal Class Action Litigation - Catch 22 in
Rule 23, 10 HOUSTON L. REv. 337 (1973); Developments in the Law - Class Actions,
89 HAav. L. REV. 1319 (1976).
175. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2), (b)(1)(B), (b)(3). Homogeneity of interest ensures
that any plaintiff member of the class will fairly and accurately reflect the interests of
all the members of the class, whether present or absent. This is important since the
absent plaintiffs' interests are decided by the class suit as res judicata. Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); under revised rule 23(c)(3), the decision in a class action suit
is res judicata as to all members of the class who did not act to exclude themselves
from the suit. That such homogeneity was required by due process was stressed by the
Supreme Court in Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), and subsequent cases.
176. The adequacy of notice requirement of due process was first articulated in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The case did not
involve a rule 23 class action, but did involve judicial settlement of a trust fund with
numerous beneficiaries. The court ruled that notice would have to be mailed to those
beneficiaries whose addresses could be readily ascertained, and for those whose ad-
dresses were not known notice by publication was sufficient. 339 U.S. at 317-20.
For further commentary on the issues of due process raised by Mullane, see Com-
ment, Adequate Representation, Notice and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating
Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 889 (1968); Note,
Constitutional and Statutory Requirements of Notice Under Rule 23(c)(2), 10 B.C.
IND. & CoM. L. REv. 571 (1969). See generally 7A WRIGHT & MILLER § 1786.
The recent major case of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), a rule
23 class action against the two major odd-lot dealers on the New York Stock Exchange,
interpreted rule 23(c)(2) to require that "[i]ndividual notice must be sent to all class
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ther, the class action in general differs from the parens patriae
suit in that a class action seeks to protect individual and par-
ticular interests.
Two major issues in class action litigation deserve com-
ment with respect both to the present India suit and to parens
patriae suits in general. One is the binding effect of the notice
requirement; the other is the problem of financing such a suit.
The first issue revolves around the question: Is it fair to bind
all the members of the class on the basis of one decision?' The
class action arose as a measure in equity to ensure fairly and
efficiently the rights of plaintiffs too numerous to appear in
court, and also too numerous to inform adequately using the
average individual plaintiff's private means.7 ' But the courts
have generally come to hold, in a manner analogous to their
answer to the problem of conflicting interests within the group
represented by the parens patriae, 110 that the utilitarian calcu-
members whose names and addresses may be ascertained through reasonable effort,"
despite the cost to petitioner. 417 U.S. at 173-75. For commentary, see Note, Notice
and Due Process in Federal Class Actions: A Requiem for Revised Rule 23?, 2 HAST.
CONST. L. Q. 479 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Requiem]; Note, Managing the Large
Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARV. L. REV. 426 (1973); Note,
Manageability of Notice and Damage Calculation in Consumer Class Actions, 70
MICH. L. REV. 338 (1972). See also Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
177. This brings to light another shortcoming in the class action as
an effective remedy for consumer grievances. In many class actions, the
damage to the individual is minimal. . . .Under the Supreme Court's
holding in Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), individual claims may
not be aggregated in order to satisfy the in-excess-of-$10,000
jurisdictional-amount requirement in federal-question and diversity-
jurisdiction cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1332. The effect of Snyder in the
antitrust field is not felt because under 28 U.S.C. § 1337, the
jurisdictional-amount requirement is waived in cases arising under the
antitrust laws. In actions in which the jurisdictional amount is required,
Snyder is a real problem and reduces the effectiveness of the class action
device.
Aloha, supra note 125, at 166. See also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 266.
The jurisdictional amount requirement was tightened still further in Zahn v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), in which the Supreme Court held that the claim
of each member of the class must meet the dollar requirement. But see Supreme Tribe
of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1916).
178. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
179. In Eisen, it was estimated that individual notification of the 2,000,000 "easily
ascertainable" class members would cost over $200,000, while the plaintiff himself had
only a $70 stake in the outcome. 417 U.S. at 175-77. See also Requiem, supra note 176,
at 490.
180. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
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lus of efficiency and benefit to the wronged class outweighs the
possible harm to the interests of the nonrepresented parties in
the class action suit.'' As Judge (then Professor) Weinstein
wrote, class actions constitute an exception to two basic princi-
ples of procedural law:
[The first is that] each person is free to determine whether,
when and how to enforce his substantive rights; [the second is
that] each person is entitled to his day in court before his rights
are affected by a judgment. Powerful as they are, the abstract
objections to being bound by the actions of others yielded long
ago . . . to the practicalities of life and the law, to the need to
afford an effective remedy for the protection of rights and to the
reduction of repetitive litigation.
1 2
The second issue, that of the cost of notification and prose-
cution, is raised most acutely by Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 83 where the petitioner balked at bearing the cost of
notification,"' contending inter alia that
the prohibitively high cost of providing individual notice to
2,250,000 class members would end this suit. . . and effectively
frustrate petitioner's attempt to vindicate the policies underlying
the antitrust and securities laws.
8 5
The problem of financing such suits, stressed by Mr.
Eisen, tends to increase as the number of people involved in-
creases. 8 The class size in Eisen was ultimately determined to
be about 6 million worldwide; 17 the problems in financing a
class action on behalf of an entire country (especially a less
181. Rule 23 provides an "opt-out" clause, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). Recall also
that most members of a class have individually small or negligible claims.
182. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9
BUFFALO L. REV. 433, 433-34 (1960).
183. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
184. Id. at 175-76.
185. Id. at 156.
186. The more parties involved, the closer the class comes to fulfilling the parens
patriae criterion of "substantial number." Land O'Lakes Creameries v. Louisiana, 160
F. Supp. 387 (E. D. La. 1958). In addition, the closer the class comes to including the
entire state, the more the interest shifts from that of private individuals to that of the
public at large.
Significantly, New York, where Eisen arose, recently enacted a liberal class action
statute which rejects the federal requirement of mandatory individual notice to all
reasonably identifiable class members. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW & RULES §§ 901-09
(McKinney Supp. 1975-76). The court may dispense with notice of pendency entirely,
or require only "reasonable notice ... in such manner as the court directs." Id. at §
904.
187. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 257-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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prosperous country) are plain. Hence the state as parens
patriae ought to be competent to step in to vindicate the rights
of those who would otherwise be left without remedy. The more
obvious the inability of the present rule 23 class action suit to
meet certain acknowledged needs, the more essential it is for
the parens patriae to be recognized in appropriate cases as a
legitimate alternative strategy. 8'
But perhaps most importantly, the India suit points up a
vital but hitherto overlooked 8' aspect of class action suits-the
culture-bound nature of the notice requirements. 9 0 An Eisen-
188. This idea seems to underlie the recent ruling by the Fifth Circuit that, under
common law and Florida statutes and case law, the state attorney general has the
power to bring antitrust suits to recover for injuries sustained by administrative agen-
cies and other subdivisions of the state government, without obtaining their specific
authorization. Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1976). The
attorney general of a state would be here taking the role of parens patriae, since he is
not recovering on behalf of specific individuals, but exercising "all such authority as
the public interest requires." Id. at 268 (footnote omitted). The decision rendered into
law some of the major provisions of the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, then
before Congress. The notion of the government as most able bearer of cost is all the
more apt for countries with low per capita private wealth, such as India. In 1914,
however, Congress rejected proposed legislation that would have enabled the attorney
general of any state to institute criminal proceedings under the antitrust laws in the
name of the United States. 51 CONG. REc. 14519, 14527 (1914).
All this is not to say, however, that there will be no large-scale cases falling
between the acceptability standards of a class action and a parens patriae suit. For
example, the United States could not assume the expenses of Mr. Eisen's suit as parens
patriae because only 6 million individuals (not all of them from the same country)
would be involved, nor would such pecuniary interest be likely to outweigh in compel-
ling importance the relatively small numbers involved. These would then qualify only
as private, particular interests. A stronger case for a parens patriae suit could be made
if 200 million Americans had a direct interest in the outcome. By the same token, if
the Eisen case had occurred in a country not much larger than 6 million (and observing
the same standards for parens patriae relief), a parens patriae suit could be brought
with the original class size. This suggests two observations: first, that a suit may
emerge as a class action or a parens patriae depending on the size of the country;
second, that some cases because of the size of the class involved may not meet either
class action or parens patriae requirements. However, parens patriae as a supplement
to class action guarantees that most cases of acute or widespread importance can in
fact be litigated.
For comment on the Exxon case, see 1976 So. ILL. U.L.J. 527. See also Burch v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1977), af'g 420 F. Supp. 82 (D.
Md. 1976) (state attorneys general have standing to seek injunctive relief under Clay-
ton Act § 16).
189. Necessarily, since India's is a case of first impression.
190. FED. R. CIv. P. Rule 23 (c)(2), (d). See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417
U.S. 156 (1974); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950). That
is, the notice requirement more naturally developed in countries where the quality of
living was generally high. Cf.,
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type class action, in which the petitioner was required to send
individual notice "to all class members whose names and ad-
dresses may be ascertained through reasonable effort,"'' is
meaningless in a country whose literacy rate is under 30 per-
cent. "'92 Moreover, even among the literate in India, access to
information is extremely limited: for every 1,000 inhabitants,
there are only 16 individual copies of any daily newspaper. 9 3
As for other means of communication, for every 100 Indians,
there are 0.3 telephones' and 2.3 radio receivers. 5 And, even
Pakistan's Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. . .advanced the general
thesis during a recent discussion of events here that "the political system
is the servant of the conditions," meaning that the democratic system
might not be able to coexist with extreme national poverty.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1976 at 10, col. 3. Thus the notice requirement and similar legal
practices may be peculiarly appropriate in highly industrialized, prosperous, and liter-
ate societies, like England or the United States, but unlike India, Iran, Vietnam, and
so forth. Consequently, the same rule of law promulgated in two different cultures may
achieve radically different results. See Seidman, The Communication of Law and the
Process of Development, 1972 Wisc. L. Rav. 686. Seidman's "Law of the Nontransfera-
bility of Law" states: "A rule that induces one sort of activity in a particular social,
political, and economic milieu will not induce the same activity in another social,
political, and economic milieu, save fortuitously." Id. at 697.
191. 417 U.S. at 173.
192. UNESCO, INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK OF EDUCATION 190-91 (1967). As late as
1949, only 18% of India's total population of then over 500 million were literate. ALL-
INDIA EDUCATION YEAR BOOK 1 (1952). See also the latest UNESCO report on illiteracy,
which is on the increase around the world. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1976, at 1, col. 1. See
generally E. FAURE Er AL., LEARNING TO BE: THE WORLD OF EDUCATION TODAY AND
ToMoRRow (1972).
193. UNITED NATIONS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1974, at 856 (UNESCO figures)
[hereinafter cited as U.N. YEARBOOK]. The corresponding figures for the United
States, Sweden, and Paraguay are, respectively, 297, 534, and 38. Id. at 857. A journal
is considered "daily" if it appears at least four times a week; the size of a newspaper
may range from one sheet to 50 or more pages. Id. at 858.
The abysmal state of communications in India is dramatically illustrated by a
recent report from that country's hinterlands, which begins:
Roop Narain Shanti, a sinewy bare-chested villager who earns 36
cents a day plus one meal by tilling other people's fields, was surprised
today to learn of the Government's suspension of civil liberties eight
months ago.
"All I know is that it is so hard to earn enough to live on," he said.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1976, at 2, col. 4.
194. U.N. YEARBOOK, supra note 193, at 535. Corresponding figures for the United
States, Israel, and England are, respectively, 65.7, 20.8, and 34. Id. at 535-36.
195. Id. at 865. Corresponding American figure: 175.2. Id. at 864. In 1973, there
were fewer than 0.1 television receivers per 1,000 Indians. Id. at 865. Furthermore, in
India's antitrust suit against the drug companies, those with the most at stake in the
outcome, the sickest and the poorest, are those least likely to be literate or have
sufficient access to information. See also Leibowitz, The Applicability of Federal Law
to Guam, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 21 (1975), and authorities therein cited.
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if all could read and understand, consider the other countries
pressing suits, like Vietnam and Iran, that are not heirs of the
common law tradition; only experts in comparative law would
grasp the implications of a class action notification.
If a substantial number of people are denied necessary
resources, then, and a rule 23 class action is impossible because
of some of the considerations just mentioned, then it seems
that a parens patriae suit ought to be allowable' not only
because justice requires it but also because it is consonant with
expressly enunciated policies within our legal tradition.
Ironically, it was at the turn of the century, when Ameri-
can jingoistic fervor was at its height, that the Supreme Court
most clearly recognized the necessity of modifying constitu-
tional procedural requirements when prevailing cultural condi-
tions so dictated. In Downes v. Bidwell,' the Court upheld a
duty tax on a shipment of oranges from Puerto Rico to New
York on the theory that the newly acquired territory was not
exactly foreign soil, but nevertheless was not so integral a part
of the United States that the uniformity clause of the Constitu-
tion "'98 became applicable. Justice Brown, writing for the Court,
based this dual classification of American territory on the dif-
ference between "natural" or basic rights guaranteed to all
inhabitants of American territories, and "artificial" or instru-
Moreover, not even widespread literacy, if it is recently achieved, would make a
notice requirement truly workable. People newly come to literacy will not necessarily
appreciate all the possibilities and implications of literacy; they may not think imme-
diately of newspapers or radio as a regular reliable source as to their legal rights and
obligations. A tradition of literacy, as well as its bare acquisition, is needed for such a
skill to be exercised to its potential in all its various channels. See, e.g., J. TEaSEL,
THE MEDIA IN AMERICA (1974).
This argument of course holds equally with regard to the recent parens patriae
legislation, which contains notice requirements without provision for modification.
See, e.g., Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, tit. I, § 4C(b)(1); and PARENs PATRIAE
BILL, supra note 7, at 10. For discussions recognizing the culture-relative nature of
traditional readings of the American Constitution in alien settings, see Baralt, The
Origins of the Extension of the Constitution to the Territories Ex Proprio Vigore, 12
PHIL. L.J. 481 (1933); Note, El Derecho de Aviso: Due Process and Bilingual Notice,
83 YALE L.J. 385 (1973); McBride, The Application of the American Constitution to
American Samoa, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 325 (1974).
196. See Velvel, supra note 153, at 31-33.
197. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
198. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 provides:
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts
and excises, . . . but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States.
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mental rights, which were devised to safeguard basic rights,
but which may vary depending on the cultural community in-
volved.
It is obvious that in the annexation of outlying and distant
possessions grave questions will arise from differences of race,
habits, laws and customs of the people, and from differences of
soil, climate and production, which may require action on the
part of Congress that would be quite unnecessary in the annexa-
tion of contiguous territory inhabited only by people of the same
race, or by scattered bodies of native Indians.
We suggest, without intending to decide, that there may be
a distinction between certain natural rights, enforced in the Con-
stitution by prohibitions against interference with them, and
what may be termed artificial or remedial rights, which are pecu-
liar to our own system of jurisprudence. 9
India of course is not an annexed territory, but dominion is
irrelevant to the Court's main point, which is that alien cul-
tures and mores ought not to bar prosecution and recovery for
wrongs recognized as such under American law.
VI. THE QUESTION OF RECOVERY
Assuming a foreign government does sue as parens patriae
and is victorious, the next issue centers on the relative merits
of injunctive relief, financial awards in some amount, and in
some cases repayment in kind. That injunctive relief is obtain-
able by foreign sovereigns is fairly clear, both from precedent 2°°
and policy2°0 considerations. But an injunction is valuable to a
199. 182 U.S. at 282. See also De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Hawaii v.
Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 217-18 (1903) (certain rights, including the right to an indict-
ment found by a grand jury, "are not fundamental in their nature, but concern merely
a method of procedure which sixty years of practice had shown to be suited to the
condition of the islands, and well calculated to conserve the rights of their citizens to
their lives, their property and their well-being." Id. at 218); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U.S. 530, 544-47 (1962); Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 674 (1945);
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1922); Public Utility Comm'rs v. Ynchausti
& Co., 251 U.S. 401, 406-07 (1920); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914);
Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 332 (1911); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S.
138, 143, 147-49 (1904); In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans, 406 F. Supp.
931, 940-41 (N.D. Cal. 1975). For early comment, see Langdell, The Status of Our New
Territories, 12 Hsav. L. REv. 365, 371 (1899); Littlefield, The Insular Cases, 15 Hsav.
L. REv. 169, 281 (1901); Thayer, The Insular Tariff Cases in the Supreme Court, 15
HAgv. L. RFv. 164 (1901); Thayer, Our New Possessions, 12 HAtv. L. REV. 464, 471,
473, 478-82 (1899).
200. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); accord People ex. rel.
Att'y Gen. v. Tool, 35 Colo. 225, 236-37, 86 P. 224, 227 (1905).
201. See text at note 77, supra.
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plaintiff only if there is an ongoing violation; it is of little use
when the harm has been done. The relevant parens patriae
legislation 212 and cases203 have dealt solely with treble damages
as a monetary award. Treble damages, however, were insti-
tuted to provide incentive to private plaintiffs to share the cost
of enforcing the antitrust laws with the government .20 Foreign
governments, though often as not poorer than the United
States Government, nevertheless are not private plaintiffs205
202. Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, tit. III, § 4C (a)(2).
203. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Georgia v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975).
204. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 275-76; Georgia v. Evans, 316
U.S. 159 (1942); United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941). See also PARNS
PATRIAE BILL, supra note 7, at 13, 17ff. See generally Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395
U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); Perma Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139
(1968); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 & n.40 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 835 (1957); J. VAN CIsE, THE FEDERAL ANTrrusT LAws (3d rev. ed. 1975); MacIn-
tyre, The Role of the Private Litigant in Antitrust Enforcement, 7 ANTrrRUsT BULL.
113 (1962).
The remedy of actual damages for foreign sovereigns is of course only a recommen-
dation; under Clayton § 4 as currently enacted, only the United States government
may sue for single damages.
205. This is to make the state of India analogous to the state of Georgia in Georgia
v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942), and Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
Such parity of litigation status is precisely the effect intended by the relevant interna-
tional agreements. See, e.g., Treaty of Amity & Economic Relations with Iran, Aug.
15, 1955, [19571 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853, of which article 3, paragraph 2 reads
in pertinent part:
Nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party shall have
freedom of access to the courts of justice and administrative agencies
within the territories of the other High Contracting Party, in all degrees
of jurisdiction, both in defense and pursuit of their rights, to the end that
prompt and impartial justice be done. Such access shall be allowed in any
event, upon terms no less favorable than those applicable to nationals
and companies of such other High Contracting Party or of any third
country.
Quoted in Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d at 619 n.9. This provision guarantees to foreign
nationals access to American courts on the same terms as those available to United
States nationals, "practical difficulties notwithstanding." Id. at 619. The explicit un-
derstanding on the subject is important, for the broad principle of comity of nations
is relevant only when authoritative precedent suggests the appropriate ruling, but
more importantly it is not a principle which courts are specifically bound to apply.
Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485 (1900). "Comity is not a rule of
law, but one of practice, convenience and expediency. . . . Comity persuades; but it
does not command." Id. at 488. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). But
see I. BROWNUE, PmNcns OF PuBuc INTERNATIONAL LAw 572 (2d ed. 1973); The Janko
(The Norsktank), 54 F. Supp. 241, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1944). Two cases sometimes cited
for the proposition that a foreign country is entitled to sue as official representative
on behalf of its citizens both involved arguments based on explicit treaty provisions.
French Republic v. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co., 191 U.S. 427 (1903); United States v.
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when they sue as parens patriae, and should not require the
active encouragement of the United States to bring suits. Such
governments, after all, are acting at least theoretically out of
duty and should need no incentive other than the lower prices
which will result if they prevail. Respect, however, for the fin-
ancial burden faced by many foreign governments might sug-
gest that at least litigation fees should be recoverable2"' as well
as single damages.
Most discussions of damage recovery in a suit with the
scope of a parens patriae action have focussed on two aspects
of "general injury to the state's economy" (used, for example,
in Hawaii) as an actionable wrong: (1) such abstract injury is
not separable and distinct from individual wrongs to individual
citizens, hence prosecutions and relief would be duplicative2"7
and (2) even if such injury were separate and distinct, it is a
hopeless task to measure the damage in order to award accur-
ate compensation.0 8
Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520 (1875) (common law unfair competition and trade-name in-
fringement suits). See Foreign Government Antitrust Capacity, supra note 4, at 297
n.83; Velvel, supra note 153, at 25.
A provision relating to the rights of nationals in courts, similar to the one in the
treaty with Iran, is contained in article 2, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Amity &
Economic Relations with Viet-Nam, April 3, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 1703, T.I.A.S. No. 4890.
The United States does not have a treaty of amity and economic relations with either
India or the Philippines, and a similar provision is apparently lacking in other treaties
with these countries.
206. But see United States v. Cooper Corp.: "[Tihe concluding words of J§ 7 of
the Sherman Act] give the injured party, as part of his costs, a reasonable attorney's
fee,-[sic] a provision more appropriate for a private litigant than for the United
States." 312 U.S. at 606. However, the Supreme Court did not at this time contemplate
antitrust suits by foreign sovereigns. See note 161, supra. When Chisholm was decided,
it was feared by many state governments that their revenues would be depleted solely
through litigation expenses. See text at note 105; C. WARREN, 1 THE SUPREME COURT
IN U.S. HIsTORy 99 (1922).
207. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 265; Handler, Antitrust-Myth and
Reality, Senate Hearings on S. 1284, at 640, reprinted in 50 N.Y.U.L. REV. 211 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Handler, page citations to Hearings].
208. See Note, Damage Distribution in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39
U. Cm. L. REv. 448 (1972); cf.:
One need only ponder the myriad causes contributing to our current
economic plight to imagine the futility of singling out and measuring in
dollars the damage to a state's "general economy" purportedly attributa-
ble to an antitrust infraction. If, after years of study, eminent economists
cannot agree on whether or to what extent concentration contributes to
spiraling prices, how can we expect our courts, already strapped for time
and limited in resources, to make the kind of judgments that this bill
VOL. 6:705
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The first criticism ignores the fact that parens patriae is a
suit of last resort, to be used when other modes of litigation
have been found impermissible or impractical.2"9 The parens
patriae suit will be the only approach possible in such a situa-
tion, since the sovereign will be the only party with capacity
and standing to bring the suit. As for the possibility of duplica-
tive recovery, an appropriate statute of limitations could be
instituted. As Professor Posner sensibly suggests:
Why not make the measure of recovery in such an action simply
the sum of all of the overcharges paid by the residents of the state
as a result of the violation, and provide that the bringing of the
action is a bar to any separate actions by residents of the state
growing out of the same violation?1 0
The second criticism, concerning the difficulty of measure-
ment, overlooks the fact that other areas of the law have for a
long time awarded monetary relief for such unmanageable or
unquantifiable injuries as pain and suffering, wrongful death,
and loss of consortium.2"' The Supreme Court has held, in
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 12 that uncertainty as to the
contemplates? Where proof of injury is so attenuated that any eviden-
tiary effort is doomed to failure, there is no reason, in my mind, why the
assertion of the claim should be permitted at all.
Handler, supra note 207, at 641. See also Handler & Blechman, supra note 6, at 638-
49. See generally Comment, Due Process and Fluid Class Recovery, 53 ORE. L. REv.
225 (1974).
209. The practical effect of Eisen is to eliminate the Rule 23 class
action as a feasible means for recovery by a large class of individuals each
of whom has sustained relatively minor damages. In situations where the
costs of giving notice to the class are much greater than any individual
class member's stake in the outcome of the action, it is unlikely that any
suit will be brought. The person who deals in certain types of consumer
goods, where each transaction may involve only a few dollars, can now
fix prices, relatively free from the fear of substantial treble damage ac-
tions.
House Report, quoted in PARENs PATRIAE BILL, supra note 7, at 10.
210. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONoMIc NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 159
(1974). Posner's suggestion was taken up in the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,
tit. III, § 4C (a)(1)(A).
211. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 880, 327-35, 905 (4th ed. 1971).
Juries, being gifted with the power to put a dollar value on a person's
reputation, or his eyesight, or his wife's affections, or even his life itself,
should have little trouble with so relatively simple a proposition as mea-
suring in dollars the amount of injury a monopolist . . . or a conspirator
has inflicted upon his victim's business or property.
Rowley, Proof of Damages in Antitrust Cases, 32 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 75, 75 (1966).
212. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
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exact amount of damages should not preclude recovery; the
wrongdoer is to bear the risk of the uncertainty, provided the
jury can make a reasonable estimate based on reliable and
adequate data.2 13 The criticism has even less point in a transna-
tional context, where, in fairness, perhaps it was never meant
to apply. For where, as in the antibiotics litigation, the amount
of overcharge is known through domestic investigation, the
domestic operation serves as a "control" against which to mea-
sure the exorbitance of prices set abroad. Thus the difficulties
attendant upon proving the pass-on of an overcharge, as de-
scribed in the leading case of Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
States Shoe Machinery Corp., 21  disappear in cases like the
foreign governments' drug suits.
213. Id. at 262-66. Cf. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
In each case we held that the evidence sustained verdicts for the
plaintiffs, and that in the absence of more precise proof, the jury could
conclude as a matter of just and reasonable inference from the proof of
defendants' wrongful acts and their tendency to injure plaintiffs' busi-
ness, and from the evidence of the decline in prices, profits and values,
not shown to be attributable to other causes, that defendants' wrongful
acts had caused damage to the plaintiffs.
327 U.S. at 264.
See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 260-63 (5th Cir. 1974);
Shapiro, Processing the Consumer's Claim, 41 A.B.A. ANTITRuST L.J. 257, 270-73
(1972); Alpine Pharmacy, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 1973-1 Trade Cas. 74,593 (2d
Cir. 1973) (formula used to distribute settlement fund).
214. 392 U.S. 481 (1968). See Handler & Blechman, supra note 6, at 638-39; note
160 supra. Moreover, despite the argument that foreign operations or subsidiaries of
American businesses are largely autonomous and should therefore be immune from
American antitrust laws, the courts have been liberal in extending the reach of the
antitrust statutes. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 20 F. Supp. 13
(S.D.N.Y. 1937), a Canadian holding corporation was found to be within American
jurisdiction under Clayton Act § 12, which provides that process in an antitrust case
may be served in the district in which the corporation is an inhabitant or wherever it
may be found. The Canadian corporation maintained large offices in New York and
was "actively and continuously engaged in transacting business for which it was incor-
porated through its principal executive officers and a permanent organization." Id. at
19. In United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, 133 F. Supp.
40 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), a Swiss watch cartel composed entirely of foreign companies
operating in a foreign country under the terms of an agreement negotiated in Switzer-
land was held to have been "continuously present" and thus "found" in the United
States under Clayton Act § 12. through the activities of an American advertising
agency which had undertaken an advertising campaign for the cartel and its New York
information center, though the information center engaged in no business of its own.
See generally Kaiser, Conflict of Laws and the Extraterritorial Effect of Commercial
Regulation, 1 QuEm's L.J. 384, 393-94 (1972); Rahl, American Antitrust and Foreign
Operations: What is Covered?, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1974).
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Actual damages plus fees, then, would seem to be the ap-
propriate award. Some sort of fluid recovery system could also
be instituted, for the most equitable remedy in India's case
would involve distribution of the gross damages to the class as
a whole.21 Damages in kind (additional antibiotics) or propor-
tionately reduced prices on future drug shipments appear the
most logical alternatives. Obviously Congress can change the
scope and procedure of the parens patriae suit; but the present
analysis and recommendations are based on existing acknowl-
edged legal doctrine, the doctrine which would be applicable
to the remnants of the Pfizer litigation. It is to be hoped that
any changes made in the parens patriae suit would not dimin-
ish its usefulness but in keeping with both deep-rooted princi-
ples and enlightened policy, on the contrary, enhance it.
VII. CONCLUSION
Next Term the Supreme Court will decide the question of
whether a foreign country is a "person" under section 4 of the
Clayton Act. An appropriate line of reasoning, in light of the
foregoing analysis of the issues involved, would be as follows:
(1) The relevant provisions in treaties with foreign nations-
Iran and South Vietnam," ' among the named plaintiffs-give
foreign nationals the same rights under American law when
suing in United States courts as American nationals have.2'7
Capacity to sue is, thus, granted by treaty and safeguarded by
the parens patriae suit.
2 1"
215. Comment, Due Process and Fluid Class Recovery, 53 ORE. L. REv. 225, 227
(1974). But see Blechman, Class Actions-A Reappraisal in Light of Hawaii v. Stan-
dard Oil, 38 J. AIR L. & COM. 389 (1972).
216. See note 205 supra. Since Vietnam's suit has been dismissed, note 5 supra,
Iran is the only one of the named plaintiffs to have capacity under present treaty
arrangements.
217. See note 205 supra.
218. See note 41 supra. Whether a foreign nation can ever raise a § 4 claim at all
(i.e., is a "person" under that section) is a question of capacity; whether the particular
injury alleged is protected by § 4 is a question of standing. The Supreme Court recog-
nized this distinction in Hawaii when it stated: "The question in this case is not
whether Hawaii may maintain its lawsuit on behalf of its citizens, but rather whether
the injury for which it seeks to recover is compensable under § 4 of the Clayton Act."
405 U.S. at 259.
Acknowledging, moreover, that matters of foreign capacity are determined by
treaty and diplomatic agreement, while questions of standing are decided by domestic
case law and statutory enactment, restores the proper allocation of functions under the
separation of powers doctrine. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829);
accord, Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
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(2) A foreign state is analogous either to a national state (the
United States federal government) or to a subnational state, e.g.,
Hawaii. The latter alternative is the more likely, since the dis-
tinction between the two types of state for purposes of antitrust
legislation turns on the federal government's uniquely-given
sanctions to enforce the antitrust laws.219
(3) In either case, there is ample authority for holding both the
federal government and subnational states as "persons" under
the Clayton Act. The United States was expressly declared a
"person" under Clayton § 4 by statute in 1955,220 and "Hawaii
plainly qualifies as a person under both sections [4 and 161 of
the statute [Clayton Act].
22 1
Even though Iran thus has capacity under Clayton § 4, such a
plaintiff must still clear the standing hurdle, a feat made more
difficult by recent decisions such as Illinois Brick2 2 and
Pennsylvania v. New Jersey;2 1 only then can the actual merits
of the case be litigated. It is nevertheless important to realize
that once capacity has been granted with one hand, it should
not be taken away with the other by refusing to allow a plaintiff
to contest an alleged injury in at least one of the traditionally
accepted standing postures-proprietary claim, class action,
or parens patriae. One injunction is as good as 100,224 but only
if that one injunction is available.
The parens patriae suit is a viable and valuable alternative
to the class action as a means of vindicating consumer rights
on a large scale, especially in the international arena. Tradi-
tional due process objections are irrelevant to countries without
a common law jurisprudence or without the resources to make
the conventional wisdom of American constitutional law mean-
ingful. A perceptive and flexible approach to antitrust suits by
foreign governments suggests that serious reconsideration be
given to the parens patriae suit as an effective strategy.
217 (1962) (political questions not justiciable primarily because of separation of pow-
ers).
219. See text accompanying notes 151-52 supra.
220. See note 158 supra.
221. 405 U.S. at 261.
222. See note 7 supra.
223. 426 U.S. 660 (1976) (Pennsylvania's motion to file suit as parens patriae on
behalf of its citizens against allegedly unfair tax burden imposed by New Jersey on
nonresidents' New Jersey-derived income, denied).
For a review of recent trends in standing requirements in antitrust cases, see
Sherman, Antitrust Standing: From Loeb to Malamud, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 374 (1976);
Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809
(1977).
224. See note 142 supra.
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The Pitfalls of Act of State Analysis in the
Antitrust Context: A Critique of Hunt v. Mobil
Oil
DAVID K. PANSIUS*
Recognizing that the relevant competitive market can be
as encompassing as the world market, American courts have
consistently applied U.S. antitrust laws to acts overseas in an
effort to ensure the competitiveness of the domestic and foreign
commerce of the United States.' Unfortunately, foreign govern-
ments often harbor contrary policy considerations, consciously
or unconsciously encouraging the concentration of given indus-
tries.2 These anticompetitive acts by foreign governments cre-
ate dilemmas for domestic courts in which extraterritorial en-
forcement of the antitrust laws is sought.3 According to the act
* B.A., 1971, M.A., 1973, University of North Carolina; J.D. candidate, Univer-
sity of Denver College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690
(1962); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COM-
MERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS § 2.1 (2d ed. 1973). An excellent judicial review of the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws is found at Timberlane Lumber Co.
v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) as amended on denial of rehearing
and rehearing en banc, March 3, 1977.
2. The conduct of the OPEC nations, as a gross example, requires no citation.
Moreover, the temptation to monopolize apparently strikes everyone; for example, the
U.S. is considering an agreement with Canada to set world wheat prices. Wall Street
Journal, Feb. 28, 1977, at 2, col. 2. See also United States v. The Watchmakers of
Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order
modified, 1965 Trade Cas. 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
However, the general trend may well be toward greater international enforcement
of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Relating
to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, signed in Bonn 23
June 1976. Text of the agreement is reprinted in BNA 1976 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. No. 772, at D-1, D-2.
3. As the district court opinion to the principal case agonized:
It may well be that recent public disclosure of the dealings of multina-
tional corporations with foreign governments which have an adverse im-
pact upon American interests justifies a reappraisal of the act of state
doctrine to determine whether its scope should be confined. However, in
the absence of new doctrinal trends in Supreme Court opinions, reassess-
ment of the range of the doctrine must rest with that Court and not this
court.
Hunt v. Mobil Oil, 410 F. Supp. 10, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.
1977).
See Kintner, Joelson & Vaghi, Groping for a Truly International Antitrust Law,
14 VIRGINIA J. INT'L L. 75, 79-83 (1973).
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of state doctrine, an American court can not inquire into the
validity of acts committed by foreign sovereigns within their
sovereign authority.' Yet the court can not wish to permit large
multinationals to employ foreign sovereigns as agents through
which they can avoid the antitrust laws.5 At first glance, Hunt
v. Mobil Oil' poses such a dilemma.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobil Oil addressed an alleged antitrust violation imple-
mented through private efforts which motivated Libya's na-
tionalization of plaintiff's assets. The court, not wishing to en-
tangle itself in a potentially embarassing investigation of
Libya's nationalization policies, invoked the act of state doc-
trine: Libya was pursuing sovereign policies; the act of state
doctrine bars inquiry into sovereign acts;7 therefore, the moti-
vation behind those sovereign acts was nonjusticiable. 8
The above reasoning would apply except that, for purposes
of an inquiry into motivation, the sovereign was not really the
relevant actor. The act of state doctrine bars only inquiries into
the validity of sovereign acts; it says nothing concerning pri-
vate motivation of sovereign acts. The act of state doctrine
protects only the sovereign's legal authority; it does not protect
private efforts to misuse that authority.'
4. The universal judicial expression of the act of state doctrine is found in Under-
hill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897):
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory.
The doctrine, stated in modem terms, bars judicial examination of "the validity of an
act of a foreign state by which that state has exercised its juridiction to give effect to
its public interests." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 41
(1965). See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977).
5. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 1977) (dissenting opinion)
[hereinafter cited as Mobil Oil].
6. Id.
7. Id. at 73-74.
8. Id. at 77-78.
9. This Comment will repeatedly speak of authority. The concept is analogous, if
not identical, to jurisdiction. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS § 6 (1965) defines jurisdiction as "the capacity of a state under international
law to prescribe or to enforce a rule of law."
However, since capacity can be interpreted to mean power, and power alone, this
Comment employs authority to mean that which embodies only legal powers, New Era
Milking Co. v. Thompson, 107 Okla. 114, 230 P. 486, 487 (1924); Landry v. Daley, 280
F. Supp. 938, 959 (N.D. 11. 1968), i.e., the right to act. Board of Comm'rs v. Toland,
121 Kan. 109, 245 P. 1019, 1021 (1926). See People v. Wexler, 116 Ill. App. 2d 400, 254
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Although disguised in the opinion, it was the lack of a
showing of wrongful motivation, not the act of state doctrine,
which dictated the ruling against Hunt. The court found that
Libya's nationalization was politically motivated, and the
court found no evidence of wrongful influence such as bribery
by defendants. Rather than searching deeper, the court found
these facts sufficient to rule that a causal connection between
any wrongful acts of defendants and Libya's political act of
nationalization could not be established. Therefore, the claim
had to fail.' 0
The analysis which follows is in three parts. Placing pri-
mary emphasis on the court's ostensible holding, this Com-
ment will first attempt to demonstrate that the act of state
doctrine poses no bar to inquiries into the motivation of sover-
eign acts. Far more briefly, it will detail the "true" holding of
Mobil Oil. And finally, the essay will offer an alternative ra-
tionale to that of act of state through which this holding can
be implemented.
II. THE MOBIL OIL STORY
The facts in Mobil Oil are relatively straightforward.
Hunt, a nonintegrated, independent oil producer, worked an oil
concession in Libya. It competed with "The Seven Sisters,"
vertically integrated oil companies who produced oil in both
Libya and the Persian Gulf." The Libyan oil companies, at the
behest of the Seven Sisters and in response to growing pressure
for concessions from the Libyan government, decided to form
an agreement among themselves in order to augment their bar-
gaining power against Libya. This agreement provided that if
any party's production was reduced as a result of Libyan gov-
ernmental action, the loss would be shared by all producers on
a proportionate basis.
2
In late 1971 a dispute arose between Libya and British
Petroleum (B.P.). Libya asked Hunt to market B.P.'s oil for
them. Hunt, allegedly relying on the agreement and assurances
from the Seven Sisters, refused. The eventual result of the
N.E. 2d 95, 98 (1969) which distinguishes authority from jurisdiction on the basis that
authority embodies only the legal right to act, not the power to act.
10. Mobil Oil at 76.
11. Id. at 70.
12. Originally the Seven Sisters met secretly among themselves. The independent
producers were included in the proceedings in response to a letter from the Justice
Department. The original agreement was signed on January 15, 1971. Mobil Oil at 71.
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dispute was the nationalization of all of Hunt's assets by
Libya."
Hunt alleged that the agreement to limit the freedom of
exclusively Libyan producers was used by the Seven Sisters to
maintain their competitive advantage in Persian Gulf crude.'4
According to Hunt, the Seven Sisters manipulated the course
of the negotiations with Libya, knowing full well that Hunt's
required response would result in his nationalization.' 5 Conse-
quently, the agreement not only prevented Hunt from reaching
an independent settlement with Libya but served to eliminate
Hunt from the Libyan oil market altogether.
Although Hunt's broad allegations would be difficult to
establish, 7 they nonetheless asserted a conspiracy by the Seven
Sisters which, if proven, would constitute a violation of the
Sherman Act." The majority, however, ignored the Sherman
Act claim and, finding no distinction between inquiring into
the motivation behind a sovereign act and judging the validity
of that act, invoked the act of state doctrine to deny Hunt's
claim:
We conclude that the political act complained of here was clearly
within the act of state doctrine and that since the disputed plead-
13. Mobil Oil at 71-72.
14. The competitive advantage that the majors were allegedly seeking to preserve
was their virtual monopoly of Persian Gulf production. Libyan production enjoyed cost
advantages. Consequently the increasing share of Libyan production enjoyed by the
independents threatened the world dominance of the Seven Sisters. Therefore, alleg-
edly, the majors formed a conspiracy to eliminate the independents from the Libyan
market. 410 F. Supp. at 15.
15. Mobil Oil at 72 n.2.
16. Mobil Oil at 71-72.
17. Judge Van Graafeiland, who dissented, expressed doubts as to whether plain-
tiff would be able to prove facts sufficient to support his cause of action. Mobil Oil at
79. See text accompanying notes 94-99 infra.
18. Sherman § 1 states in part:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
Sherman § 2 follows:
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor .... 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). See, e.g. United States v. General Motors
Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (a conspiracy to eliminate competition violates the Sherman
Act even if the actions would have been lawful if done by the conspirators individu-
ally). American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93, 107 (6th Cir. 1944), aff'd,
328 U.S. 781 (1946).
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ings inevitably call for a judgment on the sovereign acts of Libya
the claim is non-justiciable."
III. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The court cited persuasive authority for the proposition
that the act of state doctrine remains a vital tool of American
jurisprudence. 0 The majority failed to show, however, how
such authority requires that a bar to an inquiry into the valid-
ity of a sovereign act bars an investigation of the private moti-
vation behind that act.21 A brief consideration of the origins
and applications of the act of state doctrine dictates a contrary
analysis.
Much of the foundation for the act of state doctrine can
be derived from the writings of Mr. Justice Story and his con-
temporaries. According to Story's analysis the court defers to
an act of a foreign sovereign not because he possesses the status
of sovereign, but because he exercises sovereign authority.
22
19. Mobil Oil at 73.
20 Besides Underhill v. Hernandez (see note 4 supra), the court relies on Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (see text accompany-
ing notes 37-41 infra) and Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)
(see note 25 infra).
21. The court employs Dunhill and Sabbatino for the proposition that
"[e]xpropriations of the property of an alien within the boundaries of the sovereign
state are traditionally considered to be public acts of the sovereign removed from
judicial scrutiny by application of the act of state rubric." Mobil Oil at 73. Such a
characterization broadens the act of state doctrine.
In fact, even in Sabbatino, which upheld a Cuban act of expropriation, the Court
consistently limited the doctrine to the validity of the sovereign act. The act of state
doctrine prevents a court from declaring a sovereign act "invalid" or "ineffective."
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 430 (1964). "[W]e decide only
that the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of taking of property within its
own territory by a foreign sovereign government .... " Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
Nothing in Sabbatino, Dunhill, or even Underhill interprets the act of state doctrine
to bar an inquiry into the motives behind that sovereign act.
22. Story expressed the notion of authority in terms of territorial jurisdiction "it
is plain that the laws of one country can have no intrinsic force, proprio vigore, except
within the territorial limits and jurisdiction of that country." J. STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 (6th ed. 1865). "This is the natural principle flowing from
the equality and independence of nations. For it is an essential attribute of every
sovereignty, that it has no admitted superior, and that it gives the supreme law within
its own dominions on all subjects appertaining to its sovereignty." Id. § 8.
Therefore, when a court defers to a sovereign act they defer to the sovereign's
authority, his right to make laws. Id. § 19. It is the "sovereignty" not the "sovereign"
which the act of state doctrine protects. See id. § 18. Thus Story consistently dealt
with the sovereign's laws, not the sovereign himself. The equal authority of nations did
not bar inquiries into the nature and effect of sovereign laws. See Story's discussion of
comity, id. §§ 29-38a.
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The act of state doctrine does not require judicial recognition
of every act performed by foreign sovereigns;23 the doctrine rec-
ognizes only authoritative acts. 4 Its purpose is to preserve the
integrity of sovereign authority by barring review of the valid-
ity of authoritative acts; that is, one sovereign cannot invali-
date the authoritative acts of another sovereign. To do so would
contravene the equal authority of sovereigns. 5
23. For example, where a sovereign confiscates assets of its citizens held in the
United States, the act will be denied effect as contrary to the policy of the United
States.
Tabacalera Severiano Jorge v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968); Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47
(2d Cir. 1965); Rupali Bank v. Provident National Bank, 403 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Pa.
1975); Vladikavsky Ry. Co. v. New York Trust Co., 189 N.E. 456 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1934).
24. An act loses its sovereign character when it is performed outside the limits of
one's sovereign authority. See discussion of Rose v. Himely in text accompanying notes
28-36, infra.
In The Appollon, the Court denied effect to a U.S. seizure of a French vessel on
the St. Mary's River, then the border between the United States and Spanish Florida.
[Hiowever general and comprehensive the phrases used in our munici-
pal laws may be, they must always be restricted in construction to places
and persons, upon whom the Legislature have authority and jurisdiction.
In the present case, Spain had an equal authority with the United States
over the river St. Mary's. The attempt to compel an entry of vessels,
destined through those waters to Spanish territories, would be an usurpa-
tion of exclusive jurisdiction over all the navigation of the river.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824).
25. In the Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Justice
Marshall discussed how the sovereign rights of nations inevitably force a nation to cede
a certain degree of its territorial powers.
The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing equal
rights and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by
intercourse with each other, and by an interchange of those good offices
which humanity dictates and its wants require, all sovereigns have con-
sented to a relaxation in practice, in cases under certain peculiar circum-
stances, of that absolute and complete jurisdiction within their respective
territories which sovereignty confers.
A nation would justly be considered as violating its faith, .... which
should suddenly and without previous notice, exercise its territorial pow-
ers in a manner not consonant to the usages and received obligations of
the civilized world.
Id. at 136-37.
The act of state doctrine encompasses this principle. A nation will not exercise
its territorial jurisdiction to invalidate another nation's exercise of sovereign authority.
See also J.STORY, supra note 22, §§ 29-38a.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) apparently rejects
authority as the basis for the act of state doctrine: "While historic notions of sovereign
authority do bear upon the wisdom of employing the act of state doctrine, they do not
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Consequently, since the act of state doctrine protects only
a sovereign's authority, the purpose or motivation of a sover-
eign act, as distinct from the legality of a sovereign act, re-
mains subject to judicial examination. An American court can-
not declare illegal another sovereign's law; it cannot judge its
validity. But, nonetheless, an American court can examine the
motivation of that act in the proper exercise of its extraterrito-
rial authority over American citizens violating American
laws.26
The mere presence of a sovereign actor does not in itself
halt judicial inquiry. In fact American courts have traditionally
examined the circumstances surrounding and motivating a
sovereign's act in order to determine if the act of state doctrine
is in fact applicable.27 In Rose v. Himely,25 for example, Chief
Justice Marshall expressed no reluctance in examining the pur-
pose behind and circumstances surrounding France's enforce-
ment of a maritime regulation. In Rose, a French public vessel
seized a ship doing business with rebel forces on Santo Dom-
ingo in violation of French law. The French captured the ship
outside French territorial waters and sold its cargo in Cuba, the
French court in Santo Domingo endorsing the seizure. The
original owner libelled the cargo when it reached South Caro-
lina.
29
dictate its existence." Id. at 421.
However, one must view Harlan's statement in the context of his decision to
restrict, not broaden, the application of the act of state doctrine. Harlan upheld Cuba's
nationalization in a Marshallesque manner, by creating an exception to the act of state
doctrine where international law is sufficiently defined to provide standards of judicial
inquiry. Id. at 428. These international standards in effect limit the authority of sover-
eigns-and thereby render the sovereign acts outside mandated standards subject to
judicial review. See Simson, The Return of American Banana: A Contemporary
Perspective on American Antitrust Abroad, 9 J. I"T'L L. & EcoN., 233, 252 (1974)
(characterizing Sabbatino as advocating a more independent role for the judiciary in
act of state cases); Wright, Reflections on the Sabbatino Case, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 304,
310 (1965) (arguing Sabbatino would overrule acts of state where those acts are beyond
sovereign jurisdiction as defined by international law).
26. See note 83 infra.
27. The dissenting opinion in Mobil Oil cites Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) and Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank,
114 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1940) as authority for this proposition. Dunhill is discussed in
text accompanying notes 37-41 infra. In Banco de Espana the court was forced to
examine the nature of the sovereign conduct in order to determine if it indeed had been
done by a foreign sovereign.
28. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808).
29. Id. at 268.
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The Court faced the issue of whether or not the French
seizure effectively passed title.30 In ruling that it did not Chief
Justice Marshall examined the purpose and circumstances sur-
rounding the sovereign act of seizure. Justice Marshall rea-
soned that had the seizure been an act of war, then France
would have had the authority to act outside its territorial wa-
ters. Since the seizure was to enforce only commercial regula-
tions, however, international custom limited France's author-
ity to France's own territory.' The seizure was not "within
those limits which circumscribe the sovereign power";32 there-
fore, the Court refused to give the seizure effect.
3
Chief Justice Marshall never questioned the validity of
France's regulations, nor France's potential right to seize the
vessel.34 However, Marshall did examine the nature of the act
(the fact that it took place outside of territorial waters) 3 as well
as the purpose of the seizure which was for commercial regula-
tion, not in pursuance of acts of war.
3
1
Spanning over 160 years, the continued willingness of the
Court to probe the circumstances surrounding sovereign acts is
illustrated by the recent decision in Alfred Dunhill of London,
Inc. v. Republic of Cuba.37 In Dunhill, certain cigar importers
mistakenly paid for cigar shipments by sending the money to
the Cuban government instead of the now-expropriated owners
of the cigar factories. When Dunhill tried to get its money back,
its demands were ignored. The Court faced the question of
30. The power of the French court in Santo Domingo then is, of
necessity, examinable to a certain extent by that tribunal which is com-
pelled to decide whether its sentence has changed the right of property.
The power, under which it acts, must be looked into; and its authority
to decide questions, which it professes to decide, must be considered.
Id. at 269.
31. The rights of war may be exercised on the high seas, because war
is carried on upon the high seas; but the pacific rights of sovereignty must
be exercised within the territory of the sovereign.
Id. at 279.
32. Id.
33. Justifying their examination of France's authority, Chief Justice Marshall
stated, "[Tihe law of nations is the law of all tribunals in the society of nations
.... "Id. at 277.
34. Id. at 274.
35. Id. at 279.
36. Id.
37. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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whether or not the Cuban refusal was a nonjusticiable act of
state. :"
In Dunhill the Court did not merely examine the motiva-
tion of the act but went further, passing judgment on the na-
ture of the Cuban political system itself. The majority decided
in favor of Dunhill by ruling that the refusal was without sover-
eign authority." The Court held that the Cuban bureaucrats
now running the cigar industries lacked the requisite sovereign
authority for their refusal to constitute a sovereign act. Cuba
did not prove that these officials had been invested with sover-
eign authority to repudiate all or any part of the debts incurred
by those businesses.40 Therefore the Court refused to grant act
of state immunity to the repudiation.4'
The inquiry requested by plaintiff in Mobil Oil was hardly
as dramatic as the issues faced by the Court in Rose and
Dunhill. Unlike these latter cases, plaintiffs did not ask the
Mobil Oil court to repudiate, or even deny effect to Libya's act
of nationalization. Rather, Hunt requested only an inquiry into
the motivation behind the act in order to pursue a private
remedy. This motivational inquiry would not impinge on
Libya's sovereign authority; in fact, the majority itself fre-
quently referred to the political, anti-American purposes of the
nationalization.4" Since the legality of the nationalization was
not at issue, the act of state doctrine should have posed no bar.
More generally, in the antitrust context act of state im-
munity is limited to those instances where the private defen-
dant acts as the sovereign.43 The American courts lack the au-
thority to deny effect to a foreign sovereign's exercise of sover-
eign authority. Therefore, in Mobil Oil, for example, the court
could not order the restoration of Hunt's production facilities
38. Id. at 689-90.
39. Id. at 695. In the portion of the opinion which follows Mr. Justice White
argues: "In their commercial capacities, foreign governments do not exercise powers
peculiar to sovereigns." Id. at 704. Therefore the act of state doctrine does not apply
"to acts committed by foreign sovereigns in the course of their purely commercial
operations." Id. at 706. Mr. Justice Stevens, however, did not subscribe to this portion
of the opinion, id. at 715, leaving only four of the nine justices advocating this "purely
commercial" exception to the act of state doctrine.
40. Id. at 691-93.
41. Id. at 694.
42. See text accompanying notes 92, 93 infra.
43. See text accompanying note 88 infra.
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nationalized by the sovereign in Libya. However, given the
extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act," the court did have
authority to prosecute American violators of that Act; the court
did have authority to impose liability on the Seven Sisters for
their alleged efforts to get Hunt nationalized. 5
IV. THE PRECEDENTIAL WEIGHT OF AMERICAN BANANA
The Mobil Oil majority relied heavily on American Ba-
nana v. United Fruit Co." as precedent for the view that the
act of state doctrine bars motivational inquiries. In American
Banana plaintiff sued for treble damages under the Sherman
Act, claiming that United Fruit prompted the government of
Costa Rica to seize plaintiff's banana plantation and railway. 7
Justice Holmes denied the claim stating that "seizure by a
state is not a thing that can be complained of elsewhere in the
courts."" The fact that Costa Rica acted "by virtue of its sover-
eign power" within its de facto jurisdiction necessarily made
that act legal;" therefore, the prior persuasion became legal as
well.5 0
However, the ruling cited above was not specifically re-
lated to the adjudication of the Sherman Act and, therefore,
carries little precedential weight. Holmes had earlier deter-
mined that the Sherman Act did not apply to acts outside the
territory of the United States.5 Although certainly the act of
the sovereign himself will be deemed lawful within his terri-
tory, 5 Holmes' statement that the private act of persuasion
was also per se lawful referred to whether plaintiff could main-
tain an action in tort against United Fruit. 3 Although antitrust
44. See note 1 supra.
45. The extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act is illustrated by courts now
imposing liability on American defendants where the only significant injury is to a
foreign plaintiff overseas. See Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi, S.p.A. v. Exxon
Research & Engineering Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1977-1 Trade Cas.) 61,256
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1977); Todhunter-Mitchell & Co., Ltd. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
383 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
46. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
47. Id. at 354.
48. Id. at 357-58.
49. Id. at 357.
50. Id. at 358.
51. Id. at 355-57.
52. Id. at 356.
53. The fundamental reason why persuading a sovereign power to do
this or that cannot be a tort . . . is that it is a contradiction in terms to
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violations can be classified as torts, the statutory cause of ac-
tion can hardly be limited to tort concepts." While tort has
peculiarly domestic connotations, the antitrust laws do not."5
Once one admits the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman
Act, which Justice Holmes did not,56 the identity between the
lawfulness of the private act of persuasion and its public con-
summation breaks down.5" Although overseas, a citizen re-
mains subject to the laws of his nation." Just because the act
say that within its jurisdiction it is unlawful to persuade a sovereign
power to bring about a result that it declares by its conduct to be desira-
ble and proper . . . It makes the persuasion lawful by its own act.
Id. at 358. Note how this statement conforms to the rule stated in Parker v. Brown
discussed in text accompanying notes 100-102 infra.
54. The Sherman Act, and the subsequent antitrust legislation, represent a broad
effort designed to preserve for the public the benefits of free competition. The purpose
of the Sherman Act was to condemn activity which "by reason of intent or the inherent
nature of the contemplated acts, prejudice the public interests by unduly restricting
competition or unduly obstructing the course of trade." Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United
States, 297 U.S. 553, 597 (1936); United States v. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 388-
89 (1923); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 376 (1913).
As Representative Stewart stated in his concluding speech before the House: "The
provisions of this trust bill are just as broad, sweeping, and explicit as the English
language can make them to express the power of Congress over this subject under the
Constitution of the United States .... " 21 CONG. REc. 6314 (1890), quoted in United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 n.46 (1944).
See also W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at § 1.1.
55. The Sherman Act specifically applies to commerce "with foreign nations." See
note 18 supra; Pacific Seafarers' Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969) (applying the Sherman Act to U.S.
shipping between two foreign ports).
56. The majority in Mobil Oil admits that Justice Holmes' "disaffection for [the
Sherman Act] needs little documentation;" (at 74 n.6) but distinguishes this bias
based on the unanimity of the American Banana decision. See Note, Extraterritorial
Application of United States Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 28 STAN. L. REv.
1005, 1009 & n.23 (1976).
57. Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291
(D. Del. 1970) granted act of state immunity to an antitrust defendant because the
court found that the sovereign compelled the defendant to perform the anticompetitive
acts. Nonetheless the court took time to distinguish the applicability of American
Banana, which also would have granted immunity. The court determined that
American Banana's bar to an inquiry into the motivation behind a soveriegn's act
applies "only in those cases where the conspiracy has no effect within the United
States." Id. at 1297 n.13. Once such effects are shown the motivation behind the
sovereign acts becomes a proper subject of inquiry.
58. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 415 (1932) (Court has power to subpoena
United States citizens residing overseas); Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924) (Congress
has power to tax income earned overseas); Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944)
(U.S. correspondence school barred from using fraudulent advertising in Latin Amer-
ica). See W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at § 2.22.
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he performs is legal according to the laws of his host country,
does not necessarily mean the act will be legal according to the
laws of the country of his citizenship.59 The authoritative reach
of the Sherman Act is not limited by geographic boundaries.
As Judge van Graafeiland noted in his Mobil Oil dissent, sub-
sequent cases have ignored the broad American Banana bar
once the extraterritorial applicability of the Sherman Act has
been recognized. 0
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has yet to expressly
overrule American Banana's refusal to inquire into the motiva-
tion behind a sovereign's acts. For example, in Continental Ore
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Co.' the Canadian government
appointed a wholly owned subsidiary of Union Carbide, Electro
Met, as its exclusive wartime agent "to purchase and allocate
vanadium for Canadian industries . . ."" In a suit alleging
monopolization of the vanadium industry,6 3 Continental
charged that Union Carbide used its exclusive agency to bar
Continental's access into the vanadium market in Canada.64
Both the district and circuit courts denied Continental's claim,
[Alithough the laws of a nation have no direct binding force, or effect,
except upon persons within its own territories; yet that every nation has
a right to bind its own subjects by its own laws in every other place.
J. STORY, supra note 22, at § 21.
59. A conspiracy formed and executed from Japan remains subject to U.S. anti-
trust laws, regardless of the lawfulness of the acts in Japan. United States v. R.P.
Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
Actions in Switzerland that restrained U.S. foreign commerce are actionable even
if they had the tacit approval of the Swiss government. United States v. The Watch-
makers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 70,600 at 77,456-
57 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas. 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
The antitrust laws apply where actions affect U.S. commerce "irrespective of the
citizenship of the actor and the place where the activity took place." Sabre Shipping
Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
See also United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 120 (1911) (An
agreement in restraint of trade, "although actually made in a foreign country where
not unlawful, gives no immunity to parties acting here in pursuance of it.").
60. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) (the
modern rule does not bar an antitrust claim merely because alleged injuries resulted
from acts of a foreign sovereign). See cases discussed in text accompanying notes 80-
89 infra; Mobil Oil at 80-81 (dissenting opinion).
61. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
62. The Court describing plaintiff's allegations in his complaint, id. at 695.
63. Vanadium is a metal used in the steel making process.
64. 370 U.S. at 695, 702-03.
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arguing that Continental's exclusion was a "transaction wholly
in the hands of the Canadian Government. . .. "I'
In overturning the rulings of the lower courts, the Court
seemingly drew the distinction between judging the validity of
a sovereign act and judging the motivation behind that act:
In the present case petitioners do not question the validity of any
action taken by the Canadian Government or by its Metals Con-
troller. Nor is there left in the case any question of the liability
of the Canadian Government's agent, for Electro Met of Canada
was not served. What the petitioners here contend is that the
respondents are liable for actions which they themselves jointly
took, as part of their unlawful conspiracy, to influence or to direct
the elimination of Continental from the Canadian market. (em-
phasis added)"
The act of state doctrine arguably limited the number of avail-
able defendants; Continental could not sue Canada's ap-
pointed agent acting in its agency capacity. 7 However, the
remaining parties continued to be liable for their private acts
of conspiracy." They were "not insulated by the fact that their
conspiracy involved some acts by the agent of a foreign govern-
ment.""
Nonetheless, despite the references to "influence" in the
opinion, Continental Ore does not explicitly endorse an anti-
trust suit based solely on wrongful motivation of a foreign sov-
ereign's anticompetitive acts. In the quote above referring to
efforts to influence Continental's elimination, one is not sure
if the Court is speaking of influencing the market, or influenc-
ing the Canadian government, or both.70 Consequently, the via-
bility of a purely motivational antitrust claim remains an unre-
solved question.
Proponents of a broad act of state defense point to United
65. Id. at 703, quoting the district court.
66. Id. at 706.
67. See discussion of Cantor v. Detroit Edison in text accompanying notes 100-
112 infra.
68. See discussion of Noerr doctrine in text accompanying notes 113-134 infra.
69. 370 U.S. at 706.
70. Arguably, the Court was referring to attempts to influence the Canadian gov-
ernment or its agents. The sentence immediately following the reference to "influence"
cites Sisal: "[Riespondents are not insulated by the fact that their conspiracy in-
volved some acts by the agent of a foreign government." Id. at 706.
However, no court has cited this specific language to impose liability solely for
attempts to influence foreign governments; therefore, the doubt remains.
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States v. Sisal Sales7' to support the continued viability of
American Banana's prohibition of inquiries into the motivation
of sovereign acts." In Sisal the United States charged defen-
dants with a conspiracy to monopolize sisal, a fibre used in
making twine. The alleged conspirators had persuaded foreign
governments to pass discriminatory legislation, legislation
which was employed by the defendants to destroy all competi-
tion in the sisal industry.73 The Court ruled that this discrimi-
natory legislation afforded defendants no protection. "True,
the conspirators were aided by discriminating legislation, but
by their own deliberate acts, here and elsewhere, they brought
about forbidden results within the United States."7
In Sisal, the Court found numerous antitrust violations
beyond the mere influence of foreign legislators. 5 Therefore,
the Court readily sidestepped the specific motivational issue of
American Banana: "The United States complain of a violation
of their laws within their own territory by parties subject to
their jurisdiction, not merely of something done by another
government at the instigation of private parties."76 However,
the fact that Sisal distinguishes, rather than overrules,
American Banana can hardly be considered an endorsement of
motivational act of state immunity."
71. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
72. The essential argument being the Sisal, rather than overruling American
Banana, took pains to distinguish it.
[Tihe holding of American Banana that has endured is that the act of
state doctrine bars a claim for antitrust injury flowing from foreign sover-
eign acts allegedly induced and procured by the defendant.
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 110 (C.D. Cal.
1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972);
accord, Mobil Oil at 75-76. See also W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at § 2.21. But see text
accompanying notes 51-60 supra.
73. 274 U.S. at 274.
74. Id. at 276.
75. Among other things the Court found exclusive dealing arrangements and
"constant manipulation of the markets." Id. at 274-75.
76. Id. at 276. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 280, 288 (1952).
77. Joel Davidow, Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, in analyzing Sisal and Continental Ore, came to the conclu.
sion, albeit tenuous. "that the act of state doctrine does not apply if the foreign
government officials were mere pawns in a private conspiracy, rather than a major
moving force behind the scheme." Davidow, Antitrust, Foreign Policy, and Interna.
tional Buying Cooperation, 84 Ymuz L.J. 268, 283 (1974). The test Davidow articulates
is quite similar to the analysie derived from Cantor v. Detroit Edison concerning state
action immunity. See text accompanying notes 103-108 infra.
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V. AUTHORITY ANALYSIS APPLIED IN THE ANTITRUST CONTEXT
Barring a definitive Supreme Court ruling on the motiva-
tional issue, one must return to the nature of the act of state
doctrine itself for guidance. The fundamental purpose of the
act of state doctrine is to protect sovereign authority, not sover-
eigns."8 Applying this authority analysis, the act of state doc-
trine quarantines only those private acts genuinely compelled
by the invocation of sovereign authority. The majority of mod-
ern cases adopt this approach, limiting the act of state defense
to compulsion only.79
For example, in striking down restraints on the imports of
watches into the United States, United States v. The Watch-
makers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc."0 ignored non
authoritative acts of the foreign sovereign. The court found
immaterial "the fact that the Swiss Government may, as a
practical matter, approve of the effects of this private activity
... ,,81 "In the absence of direct foreign governmental action
compelling the defendants' activities," the conspirators re-
mained liable for their infractions of the antitrust laws.82 Other
courts faced with similar anticompetitive policies of foreign
sovereigns have followed the rule of Watchmakers, denying
immunity. 83
78. See text accompanying notes 20-26 supra.
79. The principal exception being Buttes Gas, discussed at note 72 supra.
The dissenting opinion in Mobil Oil finds this case "clearly distinguishable" in
that plaintiff's claim was premised on alleged wrongful acts of the sovereign, as well
as of the private parties. Mobile Oil at 81 n.3.
80. 1963 Trade Cas. 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas.
71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
81. Id. at 77,456-57.
82. Id. at 77,457.
83. "[Mlere governmental appproval or foreign governmental involvement
which the defendants had arranged does not necessarily provide a defense [to the
antitrust laws]." Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 606
(1976). See Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949,
954 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), cert. denied, 407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940
(1969).
Even Continental Ore implies that sovereign compulsion is the only available act
of state defense: it was immaterial that defendant "was acting in a manner permitted
by Canadian law. There is nothing to indicate that such law in any way compelled
discriminatory purchasing, and it is well settled that acts which are in themselves legal
lose that character when they become constituent elements of an unlawful scheme."
370 U.S. at 707 (emphasis added).
Perhaps the most dramatic example of the need to show compulsion has been the
furor arising from Arab efforts to coerce U.S. companies into boycotting Israel. In
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As Watchmakers indicates, the only real act of state de-
fense is sovereign compulsion; Interamerican Refining Corp. v.
Texaco Maracaibo, Inc."4 further explains this defense. Intera-
merican Refining alleged that defendants were engaged in a
boycott designed to bar its access to Venezualan crude oil."
The court, however, found "that defendants were compelled by
regulatory authorities in Venezuala to boycott plaintiff.""'
Such compulsion constituted "a complete defense to an action
under the antitrust laws based on that boycott." 7
The court explained the compulsion defense in terms of
the act of state doctrine's function of protecting the legal au-
thority of sovereigns:
January 1977 the Justice Department and Bechtel Corporation reached a tentative
settlement of the Justice Department's suit charging Bechtel with conspiring to boy-
cott companies blacklisted by the Arabs. BNA 1977 ANTrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No.
796, at A-17-18.
The Competitive Impact Statement filed with the proposed consent decree vividly
illustrates the compulsion doctrine. The Justice Department would not direct Bechtel
to perform "foreign conduct [which] directly conflicts with foreign law valid in a
foreign sovereignty," but did enjoin actions to implement the boycott "within the
sovereign jurisdiction of the United States." "Such implementation in the United
States could not be excused on the ground that it was directed by a foreign state, since
that would intrude on the terms of trade within the sovereign territory of the United
States where United States law is paramount." Id. at E-5.
As dictated by the act of state doctrine, the Justice Department expressly limited
the sovereign compulsion defense to the narrow scope of the sovereign's authority.
"[Floreign sovereign compulsion may not override enforcement of conflicting United
States law expressing a sovereign and public interest as to conduct within the United
States .... " Id. at E-6.
Consequently, although Bechtel was granted permission to contract and work on
projects for Arab nations implementing the boycott, it was barred from making any
discriminatory selection of subcontractors based on boycott directives (provided that
at least one U.S. subcontractor was solicited). Where discriminatory criteria was to be
applied, the Arab nation itself must "specifically and unilaterally" choose the subcon-
tractors. Id. at E-8 (emphasis in original). Thus the Department limited immunity to
the specific commands of the sovereign.
One must note that the Justice Department apparently considers foreign sovereign
compulsion and the act of state doctrine to be two separate defenses. Id. at E-6.
However, applied in practice, the Department draws no clear distinction between the
two defenses. UNITED STATES DEPARrMENr oF JUsTI cE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL OPERATIONS (1977), reprinted in BNA 1977 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No.
799, at E-1; see id. at E-15, E-16. See also UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.
MEMORANDUM CONCERNING ANTITRUST AND FOREIGN COMMERCE (1972), reprinted in
[1972-77 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 50,129, at 55,211. See W. FUGATE note
89 infra for an attempt to rationalize the act of state-sovereign compulsion distinction.
84. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
85. Id. at 1292.
86. Id. at 1296.
87. Id.
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[Slovereignty includes the right to regulate commerce within
the nation. When a nation compels a trade practice, firms there
have no choice but to obey. Acts of business become effectively
acts of the sovereign."
Since the act of state doctrine protects only authoritative acts,
the defense extends only to "genuine compulsion." The Texaco
court explicitly refused to base its opinion on American
Banana; attempts to influence or manipulate a foreign sover-
eign in order to defeat the antitrust laws remain subject to
liability. 9
Since the act of state defense applies only in cases of gen-
iune compulsion, the doctrine serves more as a bar to available
remedies than as a bar to liability. Generalizing, the act of
state doctrine prevents the courts from countermanding the
authoritative acts of another sovereign. This will limit courts
to remedies which do not conflict with established foreign law."
The cause of action is barred altogether only when the corpora-
tion stands directly in the shoes of the sovereign, that is, when
88. Id. at 1298 (emphasis added).
89. See discussion of Texaco holding at note 57 supra.
Noting in the materials before the Court indicates that defendants either
procured the Venezualan order or that they acted voluntarily pursuant
to a delegation of authority to control the oil industry. The narrow ques-
tion for decision is the availability of genuine compulsion as a defense.
307 F. Supp. at 1297 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Fugate argues that the sovereign compulsion defense is distinct from the act of
state defense. The act of state doctrine prevents "inquiry by U.S. courts into the
validity of a foreign's act; the antitrust foreign compulsion principle, on the other
hand, concerns antitrust liability for acts of private parties done pursuant to foreign
law or at the direction of a foreign government." W. FUGATE, supra note 1, § 2.21, at
82.
Fugate has in fact drawn no distinction at all. The sovereign compulsion principle
represents nothing more than the act of state doctrine applied to the antitrust context.
One does not sue the sovereign in an antitrust suit (see note 79 supra); rather, one sues
the private wrongdoer. The private actor becomes immune from suit only because,
through sovereign compulsion, he stands in the shoes of the sovereign. By acting in
the sovereign's place, the private actor obtains the sovereign's act of state immunity.
See note 83 supra for the Justice Department's current approach to this distinc-
tion.
90. The sovereign compulsion doctrine has been incorporated into a number of
consent decrees. Thus an injunction does not apply "to any act in a foreign country
which defendant. . . can show was officially required of defendant. . . by the govern-
ment thereof." United States v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 1957 Trade Cas.
68,836 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 1960 Trade Cas.
69,849 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); United States v. United Fruit Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 68,941
(E.D. La. 1958); United States v. American Type Founders Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 1
69,065 (D.N.J. 1958). See also discussion of Bechtel note 83 supra.
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its actions are compelled by the sovereign." Essentially the
cause of action is barred because there is no available rem-
edy-the only wrongdoer is the sovereign himself.
VI. THE RULE TO BE DERIVED FROM MOBIL OIL
If the act of state doctrine applies only in cases of sovereign
compulsion, on what theory, then, can the Mobil Oil majority
legitimately rest its holding?
Primarily, the court applied act of state rationales, not act
of state rules. The court deferred, not to the sovereign authority
of Libya, but to her sovereign status. Libya seized Hunt's prop-
erty, in part, as retribution against the United States for failure
to properly accomodate Arab interests.2 Thus, although a re-
view of the motivation behind the nationalization would not
have violated the commands of act of state, it might have
proven personally embarrassing to Libyan President Qadhafi
for the court to judge if these ostensibly nationalistic acts had
been engineered by private American oil interests. 3
The court, although it did not articulate it, in effect
weighed this embarrassment against the likelihood that an an-
titrust violation had in fact taken place. 4 The court noted that
91. The compulsion doctrine has apparent application in the domestic setting as
well. See note 109 infra.
92. Any possible doubt about [the issue of political motivation] is
in any event removed since upon the seizure of Hunt's property on June
11, 1973 President alQadhafi announced "[w]e proclaim loudly that this
United States needs to be given a big hard blow in the Arab area on its
cold insolent face . . . . The time has come for the Arab peoples to
confront the United States, the time has come for the U.S. interests to
be threatened earnestly and seriously in the Arab area, regardless of the
cost."
Mobil Oil at 73.
93. The court characterized an inquiry into the Libyan nationalization as a
"Serbonian Bog." Mobil Oil at 77.
94. At first reading the language would suggest a blanket application of the act
of state doctrine: "we cannot logically separate Libya's motivation from the validity
of its seizure." But the language immediately following stressed heavily the delicacy
of the inquiry. Mobil Oil at 77.
The court cites Dunhill and Sabbatino as authority for the proposition that the
function of the act of state doctrine is to avoid embarrassment of sovereigns and our
State Department. The quote from Dunhill applies only to "adjudications involving
the legality of acts of foreign states. ... Mobil Oil at 77 (emphasis added); Alfred
Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. at 697. As discussed earlier, the
Dunhill court felt no inhibitions in dissecting the nature of Cuban sovereign processes.
See text accompanying notes 37-41 supra.
Because of the language cited in Mobil Oil referring to separation of powers,
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there was no allegation of scandalous behavior, such as bribery,
committed by the Seven Sisters." Although not mentioned by
the court, Hunt's pleadings also appear to be deliberately
vague." Consequently, given the proven element of at least
some political motivation behind the nationalization, the court
must have concluded that Hunt could not demonstrate a suffi-
cient causal connection between the acts of the alleged conspir-
ators and the sovereign act of nationalization to warrant an
antitrust recovery.
[Alppellants admit that antitrust liability cannot be attributed
to the defendants unless Hunt can prove that but for their combi-
nation or conspiracy Libya would not have moved against it.'
Quite reasonably, Hunt's vague allegations, coupled with the
unchallenged political component of the nationalization, failed
to meet this "but for" standard.
However, rather than so ruling, the court sought safer
grounds." The court stretched the act of state doctrine in order
to avoid a serious judicial inquiry into the nationalization. To
inquire into the motivation of an act was to inquire into the
validity of the act; this inquiry was barred by the act of state
doctrine. By employing this "reasoning" the court avoided a
specific ruling on the causal issue."
Sabbatino may generate some confusion. Mobil Oil at 77; Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423. Nonetheless, the full opinion clearly indicates that the
separation of powers analysis derives from the political nature of the controversy, not
the potential embarrassment to the participants. The Court indicated that had there
been sufficient international standards regarding the illegality of nationalizations,
Sabbatino's claim would have been justiciable. 376 U.S. at 428.
95. Mobil Oil at 79.
96. Mobil Oil at 72 n.2.
97. Mobil Oil at 76 (emphasis in original).
98. Technically, one is not penalized for vague pleadings; failure to specifically
define one's antitrust allegations should not defeat the complaint. Harman v. Valley
National Bank of Arizona, 339 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1964). However, if one must rely
on distinguishing private from public activity in order to maintain a cause of action,
perhaps a rule requiring specific causal allegations should be applied. Even in complex
antitrust suits, where public policy demands, allegations in complaints must be more
than conclusory. Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint
Executive Board of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 1976) (public
policy interest was the protection of first amendment rights).
99. "Another inquiry could only be fissiparous, hindering or embarassing the con-
duct of foreign relations which is the very reason underlying the policy of judicial
abstention expressed in the [act of state] doctrine .... " Mobil Oil at 77.
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VII. ALTERNATIVE RULES FOR JUDGING THE MOTIVATION OF
FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS
The majority in Mobil Oil erred, not in its holding, but in
its ostensible rule of law. To equate an inquiry into the motiva-
tion behind an act with an inquiry into the validity of a sover-
eign act affords future wrongdoers a broad shield by which to
avoid antitrust liability. The sovereign political interest to
which Mobil Oil was sensitive can be protected through less
sweeping measures.
This comment proposes a two-part test which incorporates
the Mobil Oil rationales into a limited rule specifically de-
signed for the antitrust context. For a plaintiff to recover
against a defendant for alleged antitrust violations: (1) the
sovereign act which results in injury must be significantly at-
tributable to the independent behavior of the private defen-
dant, and (2) the private efforts to motivate the sovereign, if
they employ a state's policymaking processes, must
"wrongfully" employ those processes.
The first test derives from Parker v. Brown. 00 In upholding
a state program designed to restrict competition in, and main-
tain the prices of, California raisins, the Court held that the
Sherman Act did not apply to restraints of trade by officers and
agents of the State of California."' The raisin program "derived
its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of
the state and was not intended to operate or become effective
without that command.' ' 2
However, sovereign participation in itself does not bar the
application of the Sherman Act. In Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co., 10 the Court declared illegal Detroit Edison's practice of
giving free light bulbs to its customers. 04 The fact that this
practice was approved in a tariff issued by the Michigan Public
Service Commission did not bar Sherman liability. The Court
found that Detroit Edison "exercised sufficient freedom of
100. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
101. Id. at 346.
102. Id. at 350.
103. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
104. The effect of this practice was to eliminate sellers of light bulbs. Id. at 584,
581 n.3.
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choice" in embarking on the program "that [it] should be held
responsible for the consequences of [its] decision."'' °
Respondent could not maintain the lamp exchange program
without the approval of the Commission, and now may not aban-
don it without such approval. Nevertheless, there can be no
doubt that the option to have, or not to have, such a program is
primarily respondent's not the Commission's.1'
The Cantor Court, in imposing liability on Detroit Edison,
avoided specific causal analysis. Rather, defendant's "parti-
cipation in the [Commission's] decision [was] sufficiently
significant" to invoke the antitrust laws.'0 7 The exact levels of
required significance remain unarticulated.' 8
Despite the lack of an explicit rule, Cantor offers a stan-
dard which the Mobil Oil court could have used to advan-
tage.'0 1 Although Cantor does not mention the but for test em-
ployed in Mobil Oil, that test could be implied from Cantor.
The necessary "mixture of private and public decisionmak-
ing" '0 implies that the sovereign act must be one which the
sovereign would not have performed but for the additional im-
105. Id. at 593. See Litton Systems, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 539
F.2d 418, 424 (5th Cir. 1976).
106. 428 U.S. at 594.
107. Id.
108. For an excellent article which argues for a broad application of Parker im-
munity written before the Cantor decision see Handler, The Current Attack on the
Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COL. L. Rsv. 1 (1976).
109. The dissent in Mobil Oil cites Cantor to support the argument that sovereign
participation alone does not confer antitrust immunity on a wrongdoer (at 80). State
action immunity is close to, if not but a particular application of, the act of state
doctrine. For example note the compulsion language in Goldfarb:
The threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity is
state action of the type the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe is
whether the activity is required by the State acting as sovereign .... It
is not enough that as the County Bar puts it, anticompetitive conduct is
"prompted" by state action; rather, anticompetitive activities must be
compelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign.
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790-91 (1975). The principal distinction
between Parker immunity and the act of state doctrine is that the former requires
inquiry into the motivation of sovereign acts, the latter apparently does not. However,
should the Supreme Court ever specifically adopt the act of state analysis posited in
this Comment, the two doctrines would become so nearly identical that the act of state
doctrine could be ignored in the antitrust context. See W. FUGATE, supra note 1, § 2.21,
at 79 n.14. See generally Cofinco Inc. v. Angola Coffee Co., 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,456
at 67,056-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (illustrating that the act of state defense often requires
resolving significant issues of fact).
110. Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 428 U.S. at 594.
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petus of private influence. The added possibility of conflict of
laws problems might further justify a narrow application of
Cantor in the international setting."'
However qualified by the international context, the
Parker-Cantor analysis directly addresses the problems inher-
ent in the semipublic antitrust violation. It affords an analyti-
cal tool for divorcing private behavior from public behavior in
order to determine if private acts violate the antitrust laws."'
The immunity employed through Parker is only as broad as the
involvement of the sovereign's authority itself. As a result
Parker-Cantor avoids the overly-broad prophylactic immunity
which results from the application of the act of state doctrine
to semipublic sovereign acts.
VIII. NOERR ANALYSIS APPLIED TO FOREIGN POLITICAL
PROCESSES
Where the relevant private involvement is in the form of
attempts to utilize the policymaking process to influence the
foreign sovereign, plaintiff must further show that that influ-
ence was a "wrongful" use of that foreign political process.",
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc. provides the initial standards of wrongful use of
the political process."' Noerr ruled that a conspiracy in pursuit
of one's right to petition is not subject to the Sherman Act,",
provided that these efforts to influence government were not "a
mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of
a competitor .. ". ."I" United Mine Workers of America v.
111. In one sense Cantor itself involves conflict of law questions. Although federal
policy normally dominates state policy, the determination of public utility rates and
tariffs represents a peculiarly state function. In fact Congress has restricted federal
judicial review of state rate determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1970).
112. Baker, Antitrust & World Trade: Tempest in an International Teapot?, 8
ComN. INT'L L.J. 16, 38-39 (1974).
113. The Court in Cantor denies the application of Noerr-type immunity to De-
troit Edison apparently on the grounds that Detroit Edison's behavior was not directed
toward the political process. 428 U.S. at 601-02.
114. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
115. Id. at 136.
116. Id. at 144 (emphasis added). Noerr involved a suit by a group of trucking
companies against a railroad trade association for alleged unfair efforts to deter pas-
sage of laws favorable to the trucking industry and to encourage unfavorable laws.
Three factual considerations may well have influenced the Court's decision. This was
a fight between two large industries; one could not drive the other out of business.
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Pennington elaborated on Noerr, dramatizing the rule that
even a showing of wrongful intent does not invoke the Sherman
Act where the focus of that intent is the influence of public
works projects,' efforts to intimidate public officials."'
However, later cases distinguishing Noerr clearly demon-
strate that there exists a distinction between use and misuse
of the right to petition. California Motor Transport Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited"' denied Noerr protection where defen-
dants' activities were such as to effectively deny plaintiff's ac-
cess to the regulatory body from which it procured its required
licenses." 9 The effect of defendants' acts were "to usurp that
decisionmaking process."''2 Other examples of wrongful use of
one's right to influence government include bribery,' 2' efforts to
foreclose bidding on public works projects,'22 efforts to intimi-
date public officials through threats, 2 3 and misrepresentation
of key facts to an adjudicatory agency.'
24
Although one would be hard pressed to derive an absolute
rule from the cases interpreting Noerr, a certain theme pre-
dominates: Was the influence an attempt to interfere directly
with the business relationships of a competitor, 2 5 or, put an-
other way, was the influence directed at the policymaking pro-
cess or designed to subvert and thwart that process?
2
Second, the truckers also participated in their own publicity campaigns. And third,
the focus of the influence was on legislative, not adjudicative, bodies, the former
apparently better equipped to handle misleading information.
117. United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).
But see also Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. 1972 Trade Cas. 74,234
(D. Haw. 1972) (predatory intent with the purpose of eliminating competition invokes
the sham exception to Noerr).
118. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
119. Id. at 511. See Israel v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., 466 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
120. 404 U.S. at 512.
121. Ranger, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc., 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966). But see Cow Palace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Produ-
cers, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 696 (D. Colo. 1975).
122. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
123. Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Local 150, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 440
F.2d 1096 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971).
124. Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d
1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
125. Israel v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., 466 F.2d 272, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cow
Palace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 696, 704 (D. Colo. 1975).
126. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 33
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v.
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Although somewhat undefined in their domestic applica-
tion, these Noerr standards, by their very vagueness serve the
foreign context well. Vague standards of misuse will permit the
courts to adjust to the varying political processes of foreign
nations. Moreover, by focusing on the policy process as the
source of immunity, conflict of laws problems are minimized.
The court has automatically accomodated, at least to some
extent, the policy considerations of foreign governments by
granting immunity for use of that government's policy pro-
cesses.'
It has been argued that the Noerr doctrine, being derived
from the first amendment, is inappropriate for the foreign set-
ting.' 21 Such analysis distorts the rationale of Noerr. Noerr
immunity derives more from the fundamental functioning of
every state than from the magic of the first amendment. A
state needs informative inputs in order to act with a modicum
of efficiency. Similarly, citizens require some right to petition
in order that government might make some effort to meet their
social demands.' 9 If anything is common to all nations, it is the
right, albeit subject to varying limits, to petition one's own
government. 1
30
Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1298 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1047 (1972).
In intepreting sham as used by Noerr, the 10th Circuit states:
[T]he term "sham" in this context would appear to mean misuse or
corruption of the legal process. Therefore, the utilization of the court or
administrative agency in a manner which is in accordance with the spirit
of the law continues to be exempt from the antitrust laws.
Semke v. Enid Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361, 1366 (10th Cir. 1972). See Franchise
Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Work-
ers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976).
127. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws § 6 (1971) for a list of
the general factors examined in conflict of laws cases.
128. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D.
Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972),
for example, found Noerr analysis inappropriate for the foreign context, based upon
the doctrine's roots in the first amendment. Id. at 108.
129. H. LASSwELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SocIgrY: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL
INQUIRY (1950).
130. For example, the Supreme Court in Continental Ore did not question the
potential applicability of Noerr in the foreign context. In fact, the Court spent time
distinguishing the case based on the fact that defendants did not petition the political
process but rather "engaged in private commercial activity." 370 U.S. at 707.
The Justice Department has expressed a similar view:
While the Noerr case turns in part on U.S. domestic constitutional con-
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Contrary to the district court's view in Mobil Oil, applica-
tion of the rule granting immunity for use of the policy process
might well bar Hunt's claim.131 As stated, the act of nationali-
zation was a peculiarly political act, an executive decree. Un-
like Cantor, which involved "private action taken in complic-
ance with state law" and was thus not subject to Noerr, 3 argu-
ably the Seven Sisters appealed to the executive in his role as
policymaker.133 Therefore, whatever influence the Seven Sisters
exerted, whatever their anticompetitive intent, as long as they
remained properly within the Libyan political processes their
acts were immune from antitrust liability.'3
The recent Timberlane decision offers dramatic evidence
of the potential utility of Cantor and Noerr analysis in the
foreign setting. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America'
35
found actionable defendants' alleged use of spurious claims in
the Honduran courts to thwart plaintiff's entry into the local
timber industry exporting to the United States. 30 The court
declined to judge the Timberlane claim according to a rigid act
of state rule, declaring: "Whether forbearance by an American
court in a given situation is advisable or appropriate depends
upon the 'balance of relevant considerations." '1 37 Those rele-
siderations, the Department does not consider it to be limited to the
domestic area. The Supreme Court's discussion in Continental Ore Co.
v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., implies as much.
ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, supra note 83, at E-18 (footnotes
omitted). See also Rahl, American Antitrust and Foreign Operations: What is Covered,
8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 9-11 (1974).
131. The district court stated that Noerr did not apply to Mobil Oil since that
immunity applied only to action "to procure passage or enforcement" of a law. 410 F.
Supp. at 20. As amply illustrated above, such an interpretation overly restricts Noerr.
See, e.g., note 126 supra.
132. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 601-02 (1976).
133. According to paragraph 64 of Hunt's complaint, the Seven Sisters
"manipulated the course of Libyan negotiations." Mobil Oil at 72 n.2. Presumably oil
negotiations, given their critical importance to the entire nation of Libya, is an execu-
tive policy making function within the scope of Noerr.
134. What constitutes misuse of the foreign political process may be tempered by
our own biases, however. In many countries bribes, or "baqsheesh," are customary
means of influencing the political process. The FTC has initiated investigations into
whether foreign bribes by the Lockheed Aircraft Corp. might constitute "unfair trade
practices." BNA 1976 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 779, at A-11. It will be
interesting to see if the Federal Trade Commission tempers their prosecution based
on foreign political customs.
135. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
136. Id. at 605.
137. Id. at 606.
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vant considerations are primarily whether the sovereign agent
"has exercised its jurisdiction to give effect to its public
interests. "13 The court determined:
A judgment of a court may be an act of state. Usually it is not,
because it involves the interests of private litigants or because
court adjudication is not the usual way in which the state exer-
cises its jurisdiction to give effect to public interests.'3'
Since the Honduran judicial action did not reflect the exercise
of public policy for the public interest, the court ruled that the
act of state doctrine did not apply.
Although couched in act of state terms, Timberlane's pub-
lic interest test more appropriately addresses the significant
private action test of Cantor and the abuse of process-sham
exception-of the Noerr doctrine. For example, Cantor would
weigh the involvement of the state's public interest by assess-
ing the relative degree of independent private and public deci-
sionmaking involved in the act. Noerr would weigh public in-
terest by immunizing acts properly petitioning the sovereign's
public policy processes. Most important, Cantor and Noerr
would offer the additional advantage of focusing only on pri-
vate, not public, behavior. As a result the Cantor-Noerr ap-
proach avoids the dangers of unwarranted blanket immunity
that results from the inappropriate application of act of state
rules to private behavior. Thus, at a minimum, Timberlane
presented a classic Cal-Motor abuse of process fact pattern'"
and should have been judged on those grounds.
IX. CONCLUSION
With potentially justiciable international interaction con-
stantly on the rise, courts can no longer employ the act of state
doctrine as a safe harbor for weathering difficult foreign anti-
trust cases."' The act of state doctrine must be limited to those
circumstances for which it was designed, i.e., acts of sovereign
compulsion and direction. Private acts must be judged accord-
138. Id. at 607 (emphasis in original).
139. Id. at 607-08.
140. See text accompanying notes 118-124 supra.
141. As the Justice Department has commented the sovereign act defenses "often
are claimed much more broadly than seems appropriate if the Department is to carry
out its essential function of protecting the competitiveness of U.S. markets and export
opportunities." ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, supra note 83, at E-
3.
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ing to appropriate antitrust rules, adapted for the international
setting. To stretch the act of state doctrine to apply to private





INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, 1976 YEAR BOOK OF LA-
BOUR STATISTICS, ILO Publications, International Labour Off-
ice, CH-1211 Geneva 22, SWITZ. (1976); ISBN 92-2-001628-1
(cloth), 92-2-001627-3 (paper); xxvii, 965 p.; footnotes, tables,
appendix, index, references, sources. Text, headings, and notes
in English, French, and Spanish.
Published in trilingual form, this extensive statistical sur-
vey documents the principal labor statistics of some 180 coun-
tries or territories and covers the 10-year period 1966-1975. All
data are classified according to standard international classifi-
cations. The various subjects are arranged into 10 chapters
each with an introductory note: Total and Economically Active
Population, Employment, Unemployment, Hours of Work,
Labour Productivity, Wages, Consumer Prices, Industrial Ac-
cidents, Industrial Disputes, and Exchange Rates. This ambi-
tious compilation is supplemented quarterly by the trilingual
Bulletin of Labour Statistics.
POZEN, R.C., LEGAL CHOICES FOR STATE ENTERPRISES IN THE
THIRD WORLD; New York University Press, Washington
Square, New York, NY 10003 (1976); $15.00; ISBN 0-8147-
6564-5, LC 75-27045; xxiv, 263 p.; footnotes, bibliography,
charts, appendices, index. Prefaces by Lawrence Friedman and
Anthony Killick.
Professor Pozen's investigation of the efficacy of the public
corporation as a key to the development of the economies of
third world nations will primarily interest scholars and public
administrators. Pozen conducted an empirical study of
Ghanaian public corporations which were fashioned on the Bri-
tish legal model used for nationalized industries following
World War II. He concludes that while this form of state-owned
enterprise did not achieve its theoretical promise of a combina-
tion of business efficiency through managerial autonomy and
political accountability through governmental policy control,
the public corporation does have important symbolic func-
tions. An inherent question within the scope of his study, and
one specifically addressed by Pozen, is whether legal instru-
ments can be transported from one society to another.
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SAID, A.A. & SIMMONS, L.R. (editors), THE NEW SOVEREIGNS:
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS As WORLD POWERS; Prentice-
Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ 07632 (1975); $8.95 (cloth),
$3.50 (paper); ISBN 0-13-615799-8 (cloth), 0-13-615781-5
(paper), LC 74-11043; vi, 186 p.; footnotes, tables.
The primary hypothesis in this collection of papers edited
by Said and Simmons is that multinational corporations
(MNCs) threaten to replace the nation-state as the dominant
actor in an emerging world order. This hypothesis is examined
through a consideration of whether the growth of the MNCs
will create a better world community or merely widen the gap
between the "haves" and "have-nots." Three aspects of this
hypothesis are analyzed: the MNC as an actor in the interna-
tional system (structural aspect), the interaction of the MNCs
with nation-states (functional aspect), and the emerging pat-
terns and poesible future consequences (developmental as-
pect).
TODARO, M.P., INTERNAL MIGRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES;
International Labour Organisation Publications, International
Labour Office, CH-1211 Geneva 22, SWITZ. (1976); ISBN 92-
2-101599-8 (cloth), 92-2-101598-X (paper); vi, 106 p.; footnotes,
tables, appendices, bibliography. World Employment Pro-
gramme Study.
Originally prepared as background material for the Inter-
national Labor Organization's research project on migration
and employment, this analytical study examines the effects of
internal migration in general and rural-urban migration in par-
ticular on the ubiquitous phenomenon in developing countries
of urban surplus labor. Professor Todaro reviews the various
extant migration models, methodological approaches, and
quantitative migration studies in an effort to identify major
priorities for migration research. As the book focuses on the
implications of internal migration for economic growth in gen-
eral and its distributional manifestations, it provides a valua-
ble tool for economists and developmental policy analysts.
ZAHN, H., DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS; Fritz Knapp
Verlag, Frankfurt, GER. (1973); ISBN 3-781-92009-7; xiii, 702
p.; list of abbreviations.
The advent of the multinational corporation has resulted
in the ongoing development of a common vocabulary to meet
the organizational, financial, and legal needs of corporations
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operating abroad. This dictionary, the entries of which are orig-
inally expressed in German, with reference to their English and
French counterparts, is designed to facilitate international cor-
porate communications. Of interest is the fact that English
entries are noted as being either British or American, as the
case may be.
International Law
BASSIOUNI, M., INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL
CRIMES; Charles C. Thomas, 301-27 E. Lawrence Avenue,
Springfield, ILL. (1975); $28.50 (cloth), $19.75 (paper); ISBN
0-398-03257-2 (cloth), 0-398-03296-3 (paper), LC 74-12120;
xxvi, 594 p.; appendices, footnotes, bibliographies, index.
Terrorism to one may be heroism to another. What consti-
tutes an act of terrorism and how terrorism (however defined)
is to be dealt with is the focus of this volume. Consisting of
papers presented at the Conference on Terrorism and Political
Crimes sponsored by the International Institute of Advanced
Criminal Sciences in Italy in 1973, this book provides the view-
points of experts from some 22 countries.
SCHERMERS, H.G., INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW VOLUME
III: TEACHING AND MATERIALS, A.W. Sijthoff International Pub-
lishing Co. B.V., P.O. Box 26, Leyden, NETH. (1974); ISBN
90-286-0394-8, LC 72-76421; vi, 300 p.; footnotes.
Volume III divides the course materials in Volume I
(Structure) and Volume II (Functioning and Legal Order) into
25 course sessions. Each session plan is composed of assign-
ments in Volumes I and II, suggested additional literature, and
questions to be answered and problems to be solved by the
student. Professor Schermers, Professor of Law at the Univer-
sity of Amsterdam, also includes applicable cases before the
International Court of Justice and the Court of Justice of the
European Communities in this well-organized teaching aid.
WHITEMAN, M.M., DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW; Kraus Re-
print Co., Route 100, Millwood, NY 10546 (1976); ISBN 0-527-
95970-7, LC 76-13520; 2 vols., viii, 1549 p.; footnotes, tables.
This treatise on the methods and theories in measuring the
amount of damages in international law is a reprint of the two
volumes of the 1937 edition published by the United States
Government Printing Office. Originally issued as No. 960-961
of the Department of State Publication Series, this study pre-
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sents suggestions which are timely today for use in the determi-
nation of the amount of damages.
International Politics and Government
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN: AN
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT; Amnesty International Publi-
cations, 53 Theobald's Road, London WC1X 8SP, ENG.
(1977); $1.25; ISBN 0-900058-57-9; 92 p.; appendices.
Human rights on the subcontinent is a lively topic of cur-
rent debate. This report, based upon a visit to Pakistan in the
spring of 1976 by an Amnesty International delegation, dis-
cusses the constitutional basis for human rights in Pakistan,
the problem of political prisoners and the repression of opposi-
tion parties, and the role of the Pakistani legal profession. Dur-
ing its visit, the delegation interviewed the Minister of Law,
the Chief Justice, and other judges, as well as opponents of the
regime.
ASHKENASI, A., MODERN GERMAN NATIONALISM; Schenkman
Publishing Co., 3 Mt. Auburn Place, Cambridge, MA 02138
(1976); distributed by Halsted Press, a Division of John Wiley
& Sons, Inc., 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10016; $12.50;
ISBN 0-470-03492-0, LC 75-33702; xv, 222 p.; footnotes, tables,
updated preface.
Dr. Ashkenasi presents an analysis of the forces of nation-
alism (latent, active, and potential) in the economic giant of
Western Europe, West Germany. Through the use of polls,
election results, and other statistical material, he traces the
path of German nationalism from the end of World War II to
the present. The updated preface reflects the recent fall of the
Brandt Government and its implications for modern Germany
and Europe.
BONACHEA, R.L. & SAN MARTIN, M., THE CUBAN INSURRECTION
1952-1959; Transaction Books, Rutgers University, New Bruns-
wick, NJ 08903 (1974); $4.95; ISBN 0-87855-074-7 (cloth), 0-
87855-576-5 (paper), LC 72-94546; xxi, 451 p.; endnotes, bibli-
ography, maps, appendices, photos, illustrations, index.
This product of firsthand knowledge and painstaking re-
search traces the first stage of the Cuban Revolution, the years
1952-1959. The authors examine the beginnings of the conflict,
the fall of Batista, the major revolutionary movements, and the
rise of Fidel Castro. They characterize the struggle as an urban,
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as well as a rural, guerilla war. Replete with illustrative maps
and charts, this book presents a detailed and fascinating analy-
sis of the Cuban Revolution.
DAWISHA, A.I., EGYPT IN THE ARAB WORLD: THE ELEMENTS OF
FOREIGN POLICY; Halsted Press, a Division of John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10016 (1976);
$24.50; ISBN 0-470-19960-1, LC 76-7517; 234 p.; footnotes, bib-
liography, index.
Dawisha presents the reader with a concise and cogent
exploration into the dynamics of Egyptian foreign policy. Al-
though the analysis concentrates on the more charismatic Nas-
ser, the author dutifully surveys the recent activities of Presi-
dent Sadat as well. The unique element of Dawisha's approach
is his utilization of foreign policy modeling techniques in order
to isolate the factors which cause shifts in Egypt's foreign pol-
icy. For this reason, the book offers valuable insights for both
the practicing diplomat as well as the academic theoretician.
DIKSHIT, R.D., THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF FEDERALISM;
Halsted Press, a Division of John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 605 Third
Avenue, New York, NY 10016 (1975); ISBN 0-470-21553-4, LC
75-29388; xi, 273 p.; footnotes, appendix, tables, maps, bibliog-
raphy, index.
Originally designed as a doctoral thesis for the Australian
National University, this general geographical study of the ori-
gins and stability of federalism utilizes an interdisciplinary
approach. Professor Dikshit considers economic, social, politi-
cal, and spatial dimensions and applies them to countries of all
continents in an effort to explain the dynamics of federalism.
His interdisciplinary perspective presents an original contribu-
tion to the body of knowledge of the geography of federalism.
The general reader as well as the specialist will find this study
a handy compendium on modern federalism.
FITzGERALD, C.P., MAO TSETUNG AND CHINA; Holmes & Meier
Publishers, Inc., 101 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10003
(1976); $9.50; ISBN 0-8419-0268-2 (cloth), 0-8419-0270-4
(paper), LC 76-3700; vi, 166 p.; photos, map, index. Foreword
by A.L. Rowse.
Professor FitzGerald explores the phenomenon of Mao
from his early life through the Cultural Revolution. Among the
ingredients of this fascinating account of the world's largest
and most populous country from a state of anarchy and chaos
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to a nation unified in its sense of purpose and already remarka-
ble for its social and technological achievements are: the fa-
mous "Long March" of 1935, the conflict with Chiang
K'aishek, the brief interlude of "the Hundred Flowers," the
"Great Leap Forward," and the growing rift with the Soviet
Union.
MOORE, J.N. (editor), THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT; Princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ 08540 (1977); $30.00 (cloth),
$13.50 (paper); ISBN 0-691-01066-8, LC 76-45905; xxxvi, 1285
p.; footnotes, bibliography, tables, maps. Sponsored by the
American Society of International Law.
This comprehensive volume is an abridged edition of a
three volume compilation of readings and documents on the
Arab-Israeli conflict published under the auspices of the Amer-
ican Society of International Law. Although heavily weighted
toward scholarly works, the focus of the collection is on the
practical aspects of conflict resolution in the Middle East. The
documents concluding the edition are particularly useful to the
scholar desiring to trace the flavor, as well as the history, of this
decades-old international problem.
PERLMUTTER, A., EGYPT: THE PRAETORIAN STATE; Transaction
Books, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08903 (1974);
$9.95; ISBN 0-87855-085-2, LC 73-85100; xvii, 234 p.; tables,
footnotes, glossary, index by subject.
Perlmutter examines past and present political power in
Egypt through the concept of "praetorianism." He deplores the
"pseudo-science" of modern comparative-theoretial political
science yet is dissatisfied with the traditionalist point of view.
With the "praetorian" analysis, Perlmutter seeks to avoid both
extremes by employing elements of each. The study first docu-
ments the development of praetorian regimes in general, then
focuses on Egypt and in particular on the impact of Nasserism.
PLISCHKE, E., MICROSTATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS: POLICY PROBLEMS
AND OPTIONS; American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20036 (1977); $3.00 (paper); ISBN 0-8447-3241-9, LC 77-1351;
153 p.; footnotes, tables, appendices. American Enterprise In-
stitute Studies No. 144.
Like Gulliver held captive by the Lilliputians, the United
States and other powers are seeing their influence being eroded
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by the rapid proliferation of tiny countries in the world com-
munity. This is the conclusion of Microstates in World Affairs.
The study is concerned with the nature, status, and problems
of small states as members of the world community. It reviews
the progress of the proliferation and the role of the microstates
as an important and expanding component of the family of
nations.
STEVENS, C., THE SOVIET UNION AND BLACK AFRICA; Holmes &
Meier Publishers, Inc., 101 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10003
(1976); $24.00; ISBN 0-8419-0251-8, LC 75-38653; xii, 229 p.;
endnotes, appendices, bibliography, tables, index.
Stevens' book fills the gap between continental histories
and individual case studies and analyzes in some detail the
contacts between a small, carefully selected group of African
states and the Soviet Union. By isolating a number of apparent
trends, Stevens gives depth to the histories while providing a
perspective for future case studies. He accords a central posi-
tion to the economic aspects of the relationship as the most
tangible and pervasive area of Afro-Soviet interaction. Soviet
attempts to influence seven states-Ghana, Guinea, Kenya,
Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and Tanzania-are presented, includ-
ing descriptions of the variety of propaganda efforts, overt pres-
sures, trade provisions, and other forms of influence. Following
the case studies, the author concludes with an overall history
of Soviet policy toward Black Africa that traces Soviet recogni-
tion of the role of the bourgeoisie in African nationalization,
describes various shifts in Soviet policy, and explains the com-
plex interactions between the declared support for Marxist rev-
olutionary governments and the actual tendency to ally with
countries most interested in cooperating with the Soviets.
Law of the Sea
AMACHER, R.C. & SWEENEY, R.J. (editors), THE LAW OF THE SEA:
U.S. INTERESTS AND ALTERNATIVES; American Enterprise Insti-
tute for Public Policy Research, 1150 Seventeenth Street,
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 (1976); $4.00; LC 76-1303; 196
p.; index of persons.
This volume presents the proceedings of a conference
sponsored by the U.S. Treasury Department and the American
Enterprise Institute to help focus attention on U.S. interests in
the law of the sea negotiations and to discuss possible alterna-
tives to a comprehensive treaty. It provides fresh insights into
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U.S. security and economic interests that will aid in formulat-
ing negotiating priorities. Two conference participants contrib-
ute a theoretical perspective on the law of the sea negotiations.
Also presented is a review of the 1974 Caracas and 1975 Geneva
sessions of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea.
U.S. Foreign Policy
PRANGER, R. (editor), DETENTE AND DEFENSE: A READER; Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1150 Sev-
enteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 (1976); $4.50;
ISBN 0-8447-3227-3, LC 76-44607; 445 p.; footnotes, tables.
American Enterprise Institute Foreign Affairs Study Series No.
40.
This volume presents a collection of articles relating to the
diplomatic and defense objectives of the United States in its
relations with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the Peo-
ple's Republic of China. Written from a wide range of view-
points, the articles explore three major topics: the problems of
future U.S. foreign policy, the rationale for and arguments
against detente, and the military requirements of U.S. defense
strategy. Among the contributors are Les Aspin, Leonid I.
Brezhnev, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert Conquest, J. William
Fulbright, Fred C. Ikle, Henry M. Jackson, George F. Kennan,
Henry A. Kissinger, Melvin R. Laird, Paul H. Nitze, Richard
M. Nixon, William P. Rogers, Donald H. Rumsfeld, and Alex-
ander Solzhenitsyn.
ROSENBERG, M. (editor), BEYOND CONFLICT AND CONTAINMENT:
CRITICAL STUDIES OF MILITARY AND FOREIGN POLICY; Transaction
Books, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08903 (1972);
$9.95 (cloth); ISBN 0-87855-038-0 (cloth), 0-87855-534-X
(paper), LC 79-189565; ix, 341 p.; bibliography, index of per-
sons. Society Book Series.
Professor Rosenberg has assembled 16 essays by such emi-
nent scholars and commentators as Richard A. Falk, Lucien M.
Hanks, Hyman Minsky, and himself, among others. Treating
generally the broad topics of military and foreign policy, the
essays offer fresh perspectives on the policies pursued by the
United States. The book is a stimulating alternative to the





BROWN, B.F., AROUND THE WORLD IN SEVENTY DAYS: ON THE
BEAM OF THE NATURAL LAW, A PROGRAM FOR PEACE; Vantage
Press, Inc., 516 West 34th Street, New York, NY 10001 (1976);
$7.50; ISBN 533-01999-0; xxii, 231 p.; endnotes.
Ten lectures given on a United States Information Agency
Speaker Service world tour illustrate the author's conception
of natural law legal philosophy and its relationship to world
peace. Topics covered include the U.S. Constitutional system
and Puerto Rico, legal education, overpopulation and abortion,
outer space, equity, extradition, and international environ-
mental law. The common thesis throughout is the establish-
ment of some moral limitations upon national conduct.
WILLIAMS, P., CRISIS MANAGEMENT: CONFRONTATION AND DIPLO-
MACY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE; Halsted Press, a Division of John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10016
(1976); $16.95; ISBN 0-470-98899-1, LC 76-40605; viii, 207 p.;
footnotes, index.
This essay seeks to discuss superpower crisis behavior and
management during the Cold War era with a view to discover-
ing some lessons for the current diplomacy of detente. The
author initially presents an overview of the concept of crisis
management distinguishing the prenuclear and nuclear con-
text of the contemporary international system; the second por-
tion of the book critically examines the concept in practice.
Particular attention is given to the decisionmaking process, the
dynamic nature of events, and coercive bargaining in crisis
settings. Of special interest is the discussion of "groupthink"
theory on decisionmaking processes. The essay draws upon a
wide range of excellent sources and is useful reading for stu-
dents of international conflict resolution.
Miscellaneous
COMMITTEE ON LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
LEGAL EDUCATION IN A CHANGING WORLD; International Legal
Center, 866 U.N. Plaza, New York, NY & Scandanavian Insti-
tute of African Studies, Uppsala, SWED. (1975); ISBN 91-
7106-092-8; 94 p.; appendices.
Under the auspices of the International Legal Center, an
international committee of legal scholars reports that the im-
portance of legal education, both as an educational experience
1977
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and as a source of valuable practical skills for the development
of a society, has been consistently underestimated in the devel-
oping countries. The report recognizes that legal education has
to be planned within the context of and related to the local
social and developmental situation, including differences in
the use of formal laws and legal processes and in the perception
of their value. Several problems for the future are identified:
which language for law in a multilingual society, how many
students may properly be instructed and introduced into the
legal system, how can quality law teachers be attracted and
retained, and how may sufficient legal literature be provided.
HEAPHEY, J.J. & BALUTIS, A.P. (editors), LEGISLATIVE STAFFING:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE; Sage Publications, Inc. (1975),
distributed by Halsted Press, a Division of John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10016; ISBN 0-4-70-
36671-0, LC 75-16413; ix, 244 p.; footnotes, index.
Focusing on the importance of legislative staff to the legis-
lative process, this collection of articles attempts to provide a
basis for comparative study of structuring of legislative staff,
the nature of the services it performs, and the extent to which
it plays an important policy role. While the book is aimed at
legislative staffers themselves, students, and academicians, it
is also designed to aid concerned private citizens in more fully
understanding the legislative process.
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, THE COST OF SOCIAL
SECURITY; ILO Publications, International Labour Office, CH-
1211 Geneva 22, SWITZ. (1976); ISBN 92-2-001554-4; ix, 189
p.; comparative tables, footnotes, appendices, supplement.
Text, headings, and notes in English, French, and Spanish.
This trilingual volume gives the results of the eighth inter-
national inquiry into the cost of social security for the years
1967-1971. The inquiry aims first at establishing a consolidated
statement of the financial operations of the social security
schemes existing in various countries. It then proceeds to pro-
vide an international comparison of the data by determining
trends in social security costs and by examining the distribu-
tion of the cost of social security between different sources of
revenue and between different types of social security schemes.
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